Great Events in the History of North and South America

by Charles A. Goodrich

In the height of the engagement, Washington crossed over to Brooklyn, and seeing some of his best troops slaughtered or taken, he uttered, it is said, an exclamation of anguish. He could, if he saw fit, draw out of their encampment all the troops, and send them to succor the corps that were engaged with the enemy; he might also call over all the forces he had in New York, and order them to take part in the battle. But all these rëinforcements would by no means have sufficed to render his army equal to that of the English. Victory having already declared in their favor, the courage with which it inspired them, and the superiority of their discipline, cut off all hope of being able to restore the battle. If Washington had engaged all his troops in the action, it is probable that the entire army would have been destroyed on this fatal day, and America reduced to subjection. Great praise, therefore, is due to him for not having allowed himself, in so grave circumstances, to be transported into an inconsiderate resolution, and for having preserved himself and his army for a happier future.

The English were so elated with victory, that eager to profit by their advantages, they would fain have immediately assaulted the American camp. But their general manifested more prudence; whether he believed the intrenchments of the enemy stronger than they really were, or whether he considered himself already sure of entering New York, without encountering new perils, he repressed the ardor of his troops. Afterwards, encamping, in front of the enemy's lines, in the night of the 28th, he broke ground within six hundred paces of a bastion upon the left. His intention was to approach by means of trenches, and to wait till the fleet could cöoperate with the troops.

The situation of the Americans in their camp became extremely critical. They had, in front, an enemy superior in number, and who could attack them at any moment with a new advantage. Their intrenchments were of little moment, and the English, pushing their works with ardor, had every possibility of success in their favor.[41]

Added to these unfavorable circumstances, the arms and ammunition of the soldiers had suffered from a powerful and long-continued rain. Besides, they were worn out with fatigue, and discouraged by defeat. Thus environed with difficulty and danger, a council of war decided that to evacuate their position, and retire to New York, was the part of wisdom and safety.

The accomplishment of this project, however, was a movement attended with difficulty, but was effected with great skill and judgment, and with complete success. The commencement of the retreat was appointed for eight o'clock on the night of the 29th; but a strong north-east wind and a rapid tide, caused a delay of several hours. In this extremity, Heaven remarkably favored the fugitive army. A south-east wind springing up at eleven, essentially facilitated its passage from the island to the city; and a thick fog hanging over Long Island from about two in the morning, concealed its movements from the enemy, who were so near, that the sound of their pickaxes and shovels was heard. In about half an hour after, the fog cleared away, and the enemy were seen taking possession of the American lines. General Washington, as far as possible, inspected every thing. From the commencement of the action on the morning of the 27th, until the troops were safely across the East river, he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback. His wisdom and vigilance, with the interposing favor of Divine Providence, saved the army from destruction.[42]

The defeat experienced by the Americans at Brooklyn, spread a deep gloom through the army; and excited, on that account, no little anxiety in the bosom of Washington. It was the first serious loss which they had sustained—the first reverse which essentially shook their confidence and weakened their courage.

To Washington and his officers, the great defect in the American army was apparent. It was twofold—first, the employment of by far too large a proportion of militia, and secondly, the utter impracticability of introducing among them that discipline and subordination which could place them on equal footing with the practised and veteran troops of the enemy. At length, convinced of the justness of the views of Washington on these points, congress decided that a regular army should be formed, in which the soldiers should be enlisted to serve during the present war; and that it should consist of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised in all the provinces, according to their respective abilities. A bounty of twenty dollars, and a grant of land, were offered. At a subsequent date, soldiers were allowed to enlist for three years; in which case, however, they were not entitled to the grant of land. Had congress, at an earlier day, taken this measure to furnish an adequate army for Washington, both he and the country might have been saved great anxiety, and a succession of mortifying defeats. And but for the adoption of the above resolution, it is scarcely possible to predict what would have been the ultimate fate of the new republic.

Fortunate would it have been for the Americans, had their ill-fortune terminated in the defeat experienced on Long Island. To other and not much less mortifying reverses they were destined, ere the deepest point of depression should be reached.

It was the ardent wish of Washington to retain possession of New York; but, finding, as he said, in a communication to congress, the militia "dismayed and intractable," and "leaving the camp in some instances almost by regiments, by half-ones, and by companies at a time;" he was compelled to relinquish the place to his enemies, and to abandon, which he still more regretted, all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of the baggage, provisions, and military stores. On leaving the city, the American army took post on Harlem heights.

Here Washington had time to ponder upon his situation, and form his plan. His army had become seriously reduced, and from the despondency and dismay which were visible among them, it might become at anytime still more reduced. On the other hand, the forces of the enemy were numerous, and withal consisted of regular and well-disciplined troops. It was futile, therefore, to attempt to maintain offensive operations against them. Far better in his judgment to risk no general engagement; but by retiring gradually before them, to lead them as far as possible from their resources; and in the mean while to inspire his own troops with courage, by engaging them in skirmishes, where success was probable. Having adopted this cautious system, he prepared to put it in practice.