4. BATTLE OF COWPENS.
Never did a service require an able and efficient commander more than the American service at the South, following the disastrous defeat of Gates at the battle of Camden. Fortunately, the precise man was found in General Greene, "who, next to Washington, was the ablest commander in the Revolutionary army"—an officer of large experience, and distinguished for two qualities, which were more important, at this juncture, than all others—"great caution and great rapidity." To these were added a wonderful fortitude and as wonderful perseverance.
On assuming the command, Greene found the army reduced to two thousand men, of whom not more than eight hundred were fit for service. The officers, however, had few equals—and no superiors. There were Morgan, Lee, Marion, Sumpter, and Washington (Lieutenant-colonel), men, whose heroic achievements have justly placed them high on the rolls of military fame. Had the army borne any comparison to its officers, either in point of numbers or in discipline, energy, and enthusiasm, the royal cause, in the South, would have met a still earlier doom than it did. But the army was not only greatly reduced in numbers, but so destitute was it of arms, ammunition, food, and clothing, that it seemed a matter of presumption to attempt entering the list with Cornwallis, who, to a well-disciplined and powerful army, added every desirable materiel of war. But it often occurred during the Revolutionary struggle, that "the race was not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong."
The first measure adopted by Greene was unusual—he separated his forces, small as they were, into several divisions, and stationed them at different points. For this he has been censured, as contrary to military rule; but the sequel proved the wisdom of the measure. It served greatly to dismay Cornwallis, who scarcely knew in what direction to proceed, or which one to attack—whether Morgan, Marion, or Lee, who, with their respective detachments, were threatening him from different points.
At length, however, he decided to begin with Morgan, who was stationed at Cowpens, with an available force of less than a thousand men. The plan proposed by Cornwallis was, that Tarleton, with eleven hundred men, should assail him in front, while he himself, with the main army, would attempt to prevent his retreat. On the appearance of Tarleton, Morgan retired; but being, at length, hotly pressed, a contest became inevitable. The first onset of Tarleton was terrible—the Americans gave way, and the victorious British were anticipating the utter rout of their foes. But, at a critical moment of the action, Colonel Washington, who had been watching the various movements of the respective armies, gave orders to his bugler to sound a charge. It was nobly done! Nothing could withstand the impetuosity, the fire, the fury of the assailants. The infantry, which was pressing on to victory, were, as in a moment, borne down, and scattered like chaff before the whirlwind. Morgan had time to rally his repulsed force; and, with such an example as had been set them, they now sped their way to victory. It was a brief, but a stirring, sanguinary scene. Tarleton lost of his eleven hundred, seven hundred—besides two cannon, eight hundred muskets, and a hundred dragoons.
Charge of Colonel Washington.
The battle over, Morgan hastily retired, in order to escape Cornwallis, who was bearing down upon him. In this he was successful; but it was only at the sacrifice of the baggage, and a large part of the stores of the army. Cornwallis pursued a similar policy—never was man more determined to make sure of the enemy than he was; and never was man more determined to escape than Morgan. His object was to reach the head-quarters of Greene; but, at the distance of fifty miles, it was his good fortune to meet his general, who, with a small force, was hastening to his assistance.