Great Events in the History of North and South America

by Charles A. Goodrich

[XI. FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR.]

Declaration of War between England and France—Causes of the War—Mode of conducting it—Various Expeditions planned—Nova Scotia taken from the French—General Braddock's signal defeat—Failure of Expeditions against Niagara and Fort Frontenac—Expedition against Crown Point—Battle of Lake George—Campaign of 1756—Inefficiency of Lord Loudon—Loss of Fort Oswego—Indian Atrocities in Pennsylvania—Campaign of 1757—Massacre at Fort William Henry—Campaign of 1758—Capture of Louisburg—Unsuccessful Expedition against Ticonderoga—Capture of Fort Frontenac—Fort du Quesne taken—Campaign of 1759—Ticonderoga and Crown Point taken—Niagara Captured—Siege and Capture of Quebec—Death of Wolfe and Montcalm—Final Surrender of the French Possessions in Canada to the English—Peace of Paris.

After a few years of peace, during which the colonies had somewhat repaired their wasted strength and resources, a declaration of war was made between Great Britain and France in the summer of 1756. There had been an actual state of warfare for two previous years, causing no small grief and annoyance to the colonies, who had fondly hoped longer to enjoy the blessings of tranquillity, and prosecute their schemes of improvement. An invaluable blessing, however, ultimately flowed from the renewed conflict of arms—as, from this time, that federation took place among the separated provinces, which was consummated afterwards in their independence as a nation. The prosecution of a common object, such as was presented in the French and Indian War, naturally concentrated and united their energies, and evolved, at length, the idea of a more perfect political association.

The causes of the war grew out of the encroachments of the French upon the frontier of the English colonies in America. Such, at least, was the allegation on the part of England. France had established settlements on the St. Lawrence, and at the mouth of the Mississippi, and commenced the gigantic plan of uniting these points by a chain of forts, extending across the continent, and designed to confine the English colonists to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies. The French possessed considerable military strength in their northern colonies. They had strongly fortified Quebec and Montreal, and, at other points, the frontiers were defended by Louisburg, Cape Breton, and the forts of Lake Champlain, Niagara, Crown Point, Frontenac, and Ticonderoga. And they had, also, a fort of some strength at Du Quesne, now the spot on which Pittsburg is built.

The establishment of French posts on the Ohio, and the attack on Colonel Washington, were declared, by the British government, as the commencement of hostilities. The French, however, allege the intrusion of the Ohio Company upon their territory, as the immediate cause of the war. General Braddock, at the head of fifteen hundred troops, had been despatched to America. On his arrival in Virginia, he requested a convention of colonial governors to meet him there, to confer on the plan of the ensuing campaign. They accordingly met, and three expeditions were resolved upon—one against Du Quesne, to be conducted by General Braddock; one against forts Niagara and Frontenac, to be commanded by Governor Shirley; and one against Crown Point, to be led by General Johnson. The last-named expedition was a measure proposed by Massachusetts, and was to be executed by troops raised in New England and New York. In the mean time, a fourth expedition, which had been previously concerted, was carried on against the French forts in Nova Scotia. This province, it seems, after its cession to the English, by the treaty of Utrecht, was still retained, in part, by the French, as its boundaries were not defined. They had built forts on a portion of it which the English claimed. To gain possession of these, was the object of the expedition. About two thousand militia, under Monckton and Winslow, embarked at Boston, on the 20th of May, 1755; and, having been joined by three hundred regulars, when they had arrived at Chignecto, on the Bay of Fundy, they proceeded against Beau Sejour, now the principal post of the French in that country.

This place they invested and took possession of, after a bombardment of a few days. Other forts were afterwards attacked and taken, and the whole province was secured to the British, according to their idea of its proper boundaries.

The military operations at the South, during this time, proved to be disastrous in the extreme. One of the most signal defeats took place in Virginia, that the annals of American history have recorded. It had been a total loss of a large army (large for the colonial warfare), but for the prudence and valor of our youthful Fabius, George Washington. He saved a portion of it, while the whole was exposed to utter annihilation, through the pride and ill-calculating policy of its leader. General Braddock was not wanting in valor, or in the knowledge of European tactics; but he little understood the proper mode of meeting Indian warfare, and had the greater misfortune of unwillingness to receive advice from subordinates in office.

The object of the expedition under Braddock, was the reduction of Fort du Quesne. At the head of two thousand men, he commenced his march; but, as it was deemed an object of great importance to reach the fort before it could be rëinforced, he marched forward with twelve hundred men, selected from the different corps, with ten pieces of cannon, and the necessary ammunition and provisions. The remainder of the army was left under the command of Colonel Dunbar, to follow with the heavy artillery, by moderate and easy marches.

Washington, who was his aid, and well acquainted with the peculiarities of Indian warfare, foresaw the danger which was impending, and ventured to suggest the propriety of employing a body of Indians, who had offered their services. These, had the commander seen fit to accept the advice, would have proved serviceable to him as scouting and advanced parties. Or had he, as was also suggested to him, as a matter of safety, placed the provincial troops in his army in front, he would have avoided the danger. These troops, consisting of independent and ranging companies, accustomed to such services, would have scoured the woods and morasses, and guarded against an ambuscade. Despising the enemy, undervaluing the colonial troops, and confiding only in his own valor and the splendid array of his well-drilled British regulars, he fearlessly pursued his way. The natural and necessary impediments were many, and he did not reach the Monongahela until the 8th of July. The next day he expected to invest the fort, and in the morning he made a disposition of his forces, in accordance with that expectation. His van, consisting of three hundred British regulars, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gage, and he followed, at some distance, with the artillery and main body of his men, divided into small columns.

"Washington had the day before rëjoined the army, from which he had been a short time detained by severe illness. It was noon on the 9th of July, when, from the height above the right bank of the Monongahela, he looked upon the ascending army, which, ten miles from Fort Du Quesne, had just crossed the stream for the second time. Every thing looked more bright and beautiful than aught he had ever witnessed before. The companies in their crimson uniform, with burnished arms and floating banners, were marching gayly to cheerful music as they entered the forest."