The object of mentioning this phase of the matter is to place the question of accidents in its true light. That the development of any new art is bound to be attended by numerous mishaps, many of them fatal, goes without saying and it is something that can not be ignored. Nothing could be worse than attempting to gloss over or belittle the loss of life for which aviation has been responsible and doubtless will continue to be. Progress invariably takes its toll and it is more often founded upon failure than unvarying success, for every accident is a failure, in a sense, and every accident carries with it its own lesson.
Where the cause is apparent, it gives an indication of the remedy which will bring about the prevention of its recurrence. In other words, it serves to point out weaknesses and shows what is necessary to overcome them. For that reason alone is the question of accidents taken up here, as a study of those that have occurred points the way to improvement. Table III gives a resume of the more important fatalities that have resulted from the use of a heavier-than-air machine during the past four years:
Fatalities greatly increased in number during 1911, but not out of proportion to the greatly augmented number of aviators. With comparatively few exceptions, however, the accidents were more or less similar in their nature to those already tabulated, so that it would be of no particular value to extend the comparison in this manner to cover them. Many of the fatalities during that year were not of the aviators themselves, but of the spectators, a fact which calls attention to a danger that has not been fully appreciated before. At the start of the Paris-Madrid race, the French minister of war and another official were killed by a monoplane plunging into the crowd, and on the same day, May 21, 1911, five people were killed at Odessa, Russia, in the same manner. An unusual type of mishap, not mentioned in the tabulation and in which three or four aviators lost their lives during 1911, was the burning of the aeroplane in midair, or the explosion of the gasoline, setting fire to the wings and either burning the aviator at his post or killing him by the fall. One such accident occurred in France in September, another in Spain two days later, and a third in Germany, in which two men were killed. Accidents of an even more unusual nature were the collision of two biplanes in midair at St. Petersburg, the collision of a motorcycle with a biplane as it swooped down on a race track, and the partial wrecking of Fowler's biplane by a bull upon landing near Fort Worth, Texas, but these, of course, had no bearing on the design of the machines.
Apart from those specially referred to, the great majority of accidents during 1911 may be ascribed to two or three of the causes detailed in connection with the comparative table. Of these, lack of experience and foolhardiness stand out prominently, the latter undoubtedly causing the double fatality at Chicago when two aeroplanes plunged into Lake Michigan, drowning one of the aviators, while a third machine collapsed in mid-air, hurling the aviator to his death on the field. Careful reading of the reports of a large number of these accidents usually brings to light the statement "in attempting to make a quick turn," or similar phrase, showing that the moving cause of the accident was due to subjecting the parts of the machine to excessive stresses, as outlined in the following pages.
Causes. Lack of Experience. It will be at once noticeable by Table III that out of a total of 28, no less than 16, or considerably more than half of the accidents, were due in one way or another to lack of experience. In other words, the aviators had not fully complied with the cardinal principle for success in flying upon which the Wright Brothers have always laid so much stress, i.e., you must first learn to fly before you can attempt to go aloft safely. Nothing short of a thorough mastery of the machine can suffice to give the aviator the ability to do the right thing at the right moment, in the great majority of cases. There will always be occasions when even the most skilled aviator will make errors of judgment and frequently they cost him his life. But this is equally true of every dangerous calling, whether it be running an automobile, driving a locomotive, or doing any of the thousand and one things where the responsibility for his own and other lives is placed in one man's hands and depends to a large extent on his discretion and judgment in cases of emergency, so that there will be fatalities from this cause as long as man continues to fly. This involves the personal equation that must always be reckoned with. Just how many of the accidents that have resulted in the fatalities set forth, have been due to the fallibility of the operator and for how much the design of the current types of machines is responsible, would be hard to say. Fig. 45, for example, which shows H. V. Roe in the act of striking the ground in his triplane, illustrates an accident due to bad design. Methods of control will be improved and simplified and made as nearly "fool-proof" as human ingenuity can accomplish, but experience in other fields has demonstrated unmistakably that they can never be developed to a point where it is impossible to do the wrong thing. With skill at such a premium in callings of responsibility which involve only conditions that have been familiar for years, how much more so must it be in the air about which so little is known? Consequently, the real danger is to be found in the personal equation, just as it is in every other mode of conveyance, despite the fact that it has been perfected to a point which apparently admits of little further development where safe-guarding it is concerned.
Fig. 45. Roe's Multiplane as it Struck the Ground. An Accident Due to Poor Design
Fig. 46. DeLessep's Machine after Striking an Obstruction