Strength of Native Troops.
| 2nd Q.O. Light Inf. | 11 | officers, | 373 | other ranks. |
| Sappers | 3 | " | 127 | " " |
The Baluch tribes had shown themselves uniformly hostile towards us during the whole course of the expedition to Afghanistan. They had attacked our convoys, murdered officers, and cut up camp followers with impunity, and apparently with the full approval of their chiefs. General Willshire, on the return march of the Bombay column, was instructed to inflict condign punishment on the Khans of Khelat. These, on the other hand, determined to make a sturdy resistance. On approaching Khelat the General found the Baluchis massed on the heights surrounding the city, and he at once took measures to attack them. Whilst the Bombay artillery shelled the heights, three columns of infantry, each consisting of but four weak companies, pushed up the three principal spurs, the remainder of the force, under the General's own personal command, being held in reserve. The Bombay artillery always held the reputation of being second to none, and the accuracy of their fire not only silenced the few Baluch guns which were posted on the heights, but compelled the enemy to seek shelter behind the walls of the fortress before the advancing columns had come to close quarters. The General, seeing the enemy streaming towards the walls, endeavoured to forestall them, and it became a race as to who should reach the open gateway first. Although in this we were beaten by a short head, yet we were so close in rear of the Baluchis that they were unable to make any very well-organized stand: our men were close at their heels. The gates were blown in, and British private, well supported by the Bengal sepoy, pressed into the place. If we compare the numbers present at Khelat with those which assisted at the storming of Ghuznee, and then study the two casualty lists, it will at once be seen that, although the name of Khelat may not be so familiar as that of Ghuznee, the feat of General Willshire's army is in no way inferior to that which gained for Sir John Keane the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznee.
Casualties at the Storming of Khelat.
| Regiments. | Officers. | Men. | ||
| K. | W. | K. | W. | |
| Royal Artillery | - | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| The Queen's | 1 | 5 | 2 | 42 |
| Leicesters | - | 1 | 6 | 32 |
| 2nd Q.O. L.I. | - | 2 | 2 | 17 |
| Bombay Saps. and Miners | - | - | 2 | 6 |
Kahun, 1840.
105th Mahratta Light Infantry.
In the month of March, 1841, the Governor of Bombay issued the following Order in Council:
"In order to testify his admiration of the gallantry, prudence, and perseverance which distinguished Captain Brown in the defence of Kahun, and the fidelity and bravery of the officers and men under his command, the 5th Regiment of Native Infantry shall be permitted to have 'Kahun' inscribed on their colours and borne on their appointments."
Outside the ranks of the 105th Mahratta Light Infantry there are few who know of the gallant deed which this one word commemorates. On his return to India after the successful capture of Ghuznee, Sir John Keane deemed it advisable to occupy the forts of Quetta and Kahun, commanding as they did two passes between Afghanistan and the Lower Indus. Quetta is well known to the present generation of soldiers, but Kahun is still in the territory of the Murri tribe. It is situated in a valley some ten miles long by five broad, at the western extremity of an exceedingly difficult pass. The town in 1840 was surrounded by a lofty wall, 25 feet in height, with six bastions, but unprovided with a ditch. The force told off to hold the fort consisted of 300 men of the 105th Mahratta Light Infantry (then the 5th Bombay Infantry), under a Captain Lewis Brown, of that corps. He was instructed to move in with six months' supplies, as it was considered quite possible that the Baluchis would refuse to supply him with provisions. The 500 camels, with provisions, were to be escorted back to Sukkur, on the Indus, by a company of the 5th and a squadron of the Scinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke of the 5th, who were to march up to Kahun under Brown's orders. Two guns were at first told off for this force, but this order was afterwards countermanded. However, Brown, contrary to orders, did succeed in taking one gun with him. Leaving Sukkur late in April, Brown reached Kahun on May 12, his march having been vigorously opposed by the Baluchis. On the 15th he sent back the camels, adding a second company to the infantry escort, as he considered the attitude of the tribes very threatening. He thus reduced his force to 140 bayonets, 12 gunners, and 1 gun. On the return march Clarke's little force was attacked by a large body of Baluchis and totally annihilated. Brown now saw that he would have to fight for life. He at once commenced to strengthen the walls, levelled all houses in the immediate neighbourhood, cut down all trees within musketry range, and dug a ditch round the place. On August 31 an effort was made to relieve him. Major Clibborn, of the 101st Grenadiers, with 300 bayonets of his own regiment, 200 sabres of the Scinde Horse, with three guns, reached the foot of the pass, within sound of gunshot of the beleaguered garrison. There Clibborn was attacked by an overwhelming force of Baluchis, and after a stubborn fight was driven back, with the loss of all his guns, 5 officers and 190 men killed. The garrison had long since been deprived of all meat rations, and on September 5 Brown found that he had but six bags of flour left. On this day he received an official letter from the Brigade-Major at Sukkur, informing him of the defeat of the relieving force, and further adding that it would be impossible to make another attempt, as there were no more troops available. Brown was therefore told that he must act on his own resources, and either cut his way out or make arrangements with the Baluch chiefs for a safe conduct to Sukkur. On more than one occasion Dodah Khan, the head of the Murri tribe, had offered to allow Brown to march through his country if he would hand over the fort, but without superior orders Brown felt he was not entitled to treat. Now he had full power to act on his own responsibility, and on September 12, after a close siege of four months, the gallant Brown entered into an arrangement with the Baluch chief, and evacuated the fort which he had held so nobly. The Baluchis, unlike the Afghans at Kabul, held to their word. Brown's return march was unmolested, and early in October the remains of his own worn-out, half-starved garrison reached Quetta. Few battle honours have been more worthily earned than Kahun.