First Brigade—Brigadier Pennycuick: 24th Foot (South Wales Borderers), 25th and 45th Bengal Infantry.
Second Brigade—Brigadier Hoggan: 61st Foot (2nd Gloucesters), 15th, 36th, and 46th Bengal Infantry.
Third Brigade—Brigadier Penny: 15th, 20th, and 69th Regiments Bengal Infantry.
Artillery Division—Brigadier-General Tennant: Six batteries of horse artillery, three field and two heavy batteries.
Ever since the advance from Sobraon we had retained a strong force at Lahore, as well as at Ferozepore, but no success had attended our efforts to keep down the numbers of the Sikh army; in fact, at that time the Sikhs were a race of warriors, every man carrying arms, and every second man had undergone military training. Lahore, it is true, was no longer the headquarters of their army, but Lord Gough soon found that the Sikh forces drawn up on the far side of the Chenab were no whit inferior to those he had met and with difficulty overthrown on the banks of the Sutlej. On November 23 the opening action of the campaign took place at Ramnuggur,[23] where the 14th Hussars showed themselves worthy of the high reputation they had made in the Peninsula; and on the 30th of the month Sir Joseph Thackwell, in command of the cavalry, fought the successful action of Sadoolapore.[24]
Chillianwallah, January 13, 1849.
This battle honour, which commemorates one of the hardest fights ever waged in India, is borne by the following regiments:
3rd Hussars.
9th Lancers.
14th Hussars.
South Wales Borderers.
Gloucesters.
Worcesters.
Royal Munster Fusiliers.
2nd Q.O. Light Infantry.
11th Rajputs.
On January 10 Lord Gough received orders from the Governor-General to attack the Sikhs. Up to this date it had been the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to await the arrival of General Whish's division from Multan, the fall of which was daily expected. On January 13 Gough found the enemy in a strongly entrenched position at Chillianwallah, and attacked them in his usual formation, with his cavalry on the flanks, the advance being preceded by a heavy artillery fire. The Sikhs far outnumbered our forces, and their front, it is said, extended to a distance of no less than six miles, so that a turning movement with the small numbers at his disposal would have exposed Lord Gough to the piercing of his line by a counter-attack. The ground was much broken and covered with thick jungle, which rendered it exceedingly difficult for any General to exercise efficient control over even one brigade. Some confusion was the inevitable result, for it must be borne in mind that the only means of communication then known was by mounted orderlies, and I am afraid it must be admitted that this was not one of the Bengal sepoys' fighting-days. The Sikhs had abandoned their stereotyped plan, and had advanced from their entrenched position, and literally forced the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They relied on the nature of the ground to hide their dispositions, and in this they were to a certain extent successful. The result of the day was by no means satisfactory. Our losses were abnormally heavy, amounting to 2,338 officers and men killed and wounded. The Sikhs, it is true, were driven from their position and fell back during the night, but they retired unmolested and carried off all their artillery.
The Commander-in-Chief was subjected to a great amount of harsh criticism for his conduct of the operations—criticism based on but a very partial knowledge of the real facts—and in deference to public opinion, too often the offspring of the fertile brains of armchair critics, Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Scinde, was sent out to India to relieve the brave Gough. It is but fair to state that the Commander-in-Chief had never lost the love or confidence of the officers and men under him, and the stars fought for the genial Irishman. Multan fell; Whish, with his own and the Bombay division, joined headquarters, and before the new Chief arrived Gough had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sikhs at Goojerat, and the Punjab had passed into our hands for ever.