The cavalry are perhaps the weakest branch of the service, not on account of any human deficiency, but rather because of the small size of the horses. These are not altogether suitable for several reasons, among others that, being entire horses, they are exceptionally savage, and in camp cause great trouble as well as many casualties. Then again, on account of their lack of weight, they are unsuitable for shock tactics. This, however, did not prevent them from carrying out one of the most effective charges in the campaign, nor did it prevent them from rendering scouting services beyond all praise, during the advance on the capital. Their weapons were the sword and carbine. They appeared to be well trained, and with no defects except those already mentioned.
The Japanese artillery are armed with a Q.F. gun, throwing a shell of about 14 lb. weight. They are smart and efficient. The uniform worn by them hardly differs from that worn by the infantry. The hospitals, both base and field, were wonderfully good, prompt and skilful attention being received by all the wounded, who were certainly better off in this respect than those of any other nation. From these few remarks it may be seen that we are allied to a Nation with an Army strong in numbers, well skilled in war, brave to a fault, and still further allied to our Army by many points of close similarity. It should be mentioned that the behaviour of the Japanese troops was exemplary, and that in this respect they could give points and a beating to nearly all the other troops engaged. Among many equally gallant actions performed by Japanese troops, one stands out pre-eminent. It was the storming and blowing up of the south gate of Tientsin, the deciding move in the most important engagement of the war. In days to come the Japanese will talk of it as we talk of our sappers at the Cashmir gate, Delhi!
The other nations engaged in the campaign were Italy, Austria, and Germany, but although the services of the representatives of the first two named were valuable at a time when every rifle counted, their numbers were too small to admit of an excuse to describe them, and in doing so to spoil more paper. Even Germany hardly shone in the operations, notwithstanding her shriek of vengeance, and the soul-stirring speeches made by the Kaiser to his departing troops. They, however, deserve some mention, even were it only because Field Marshal Von Waldersee was the Commander-in-Chief, recognised by all the Powers concerned. He, with most of the German troops, arrived too late for any serious fighting, but for the rest of the operations he showed the greatest capacity and tact, and did much not only to bring the campaign to a close, but to preserve at any rate the semblance of a Peace between the Allies, who, immediately after the fighting was over, began to quarrel amongst themselves. The “Iltis” too, at Taku forts, wrote a glorious page in the naval history of her empire, which was added to by the devotion and gallantry of the German sailors under Seymour. In conclusion, it may be said that it was Germany’s misfortune, not her fault, which forbade her taking a more glorious share in the work of punishing China, against whom she had a more genuine grievance than most of the other Powers.
CHAPTER XV
RETURN OF NAVAL BRIGADE, PEH-TANG AND SHAN-HAI-KWAN
After the events recorded in the twelfth chapter, it became certain that the Navy’s share of work on shore had been completed. However, the Brigade with its guns remained in Pekin for about a week before the order was received to return to shipboard. This was recognised to be inevitable now that the Army had come, and, on the whole, the men were ready to welcome the change back to their proper role. The Pekin Brigade embarked on junks at Tung-Chow, and after a very uneventful journey, arrived at Tientsin on the 3rd of September. Here they picked up the remainder of the Force with the exception of Captain Bayley, R.N. (provost-marshal), and his personal staff, and returned to their ships on the following day, in tugs and lighters. Thus, on the 5th September, the only representatives of the senior service ashore were the Blue Marines, a hundred in number, who were left to garrison the North-west fort, until the time came for its demolition, and the three officers and two men at Tientsin. A most satisfactory thing was it to grip one’s messmates by the hand again, and receive their congratulations on one’s safe return, a feeling marred only by thoughts of the missing, about whom many questions had to be asked and answered. Outside the bar, quite close to the fleet, lay the “Salamis,” on board of which were upwards of 300 men of the New South Wales and Victoria Naval forces. It was hoped that these fine fellows would be in time for the occupation of Pasting-fu, which operation was about to be undertaken by a combined British and French force. Most of them did take part in this movement, but unfortunately, either the policy of “Let’s get there first, never mind existing arrangements,” or an utter lack of appreciation of combined movement, was responsible for the fact that, when the British force arrived in front of the town, it was but to see tricolors floating at every point. The place had fallen, with a very slight resistance, and was occupied, because it was the headquarters of the Boxer movement, and the scene of many early atrocities.
To the eastward of Taku, distant about seven miles, lay some other powerful forts called Peh-tang. The arrangement which had allowed them to exist during the past three months had been an eminently common-sense one, when it is considered how the Allies were pressed for time and men. It was simply this, “You don’t hit me, and you won’t get hurt,” an arrangement fulfilled to the letter by both sides. It was, therefore, with feelings of surprise that I, having finished some duty which took me to Tientsin, and having a day or two to look round, heard that the French, Russians, Germans, and Austrians had decided to break the agreement, and attack the forts. I went down to Tong-Ku with the French officers, and hoped to be allowed to go with them, but on arrival I found that our two 4-in. Q.F. guns were being brought up to entrain, and that the Marines from the fort were to be their escort. This was much better, and I immediately attached myself to the officer in command of the latter, and we waited impatiently at the station for the guns. To every one’s great disgust, the only available trucks were not large enough to take the improvised field mountings, and the Russian officer in command of the station would not allow them to be broken. This, of course, did away with the necessity of an escort, and much to their disgust, the “Joeys” were marched back to the Fort at two in the morning. However, by dint of hard walking, a Marine officer and myself managed to see enough of the action to justify a very short account of it.
The Allies attacked from the direction of Taku, and numbered in all about 2600, with a battery of howitzers (Russian) and some French and German artillery. The engagement commenced at about one o’clock in the morning, with occasional shots from the forts; but it was not until daylight that the heavy Howitzer battery replied, and the fight became general. After a somewhat protracted bombardment, a general advance took place, and the Force was almost unopposed from this time. Indeed, so slight were the losses of the Allies, that it at one time seemed as if the whole affair was a “put up job,” and this supposition was further strengthened by a temporary lull in the proceedings at about eight o’clock. The advance was again continued about 9 a.m., and by 10.30 it appeared as if the Forts had been evacuated. Up till now, the attacking Forces had been beyond the range of effective rifle fire, but at eleven o’clock, a bridge about 2000 yards away from the nearest fort was demolished, and shortly afterwards the trouble commenced. The small company of Austrian bluejackets was marching along quickly, when a tremendous explosion took place, and the head of the company was literally blown to pieces. A sailor had trodden on a contact mine, and the result was—one officer killed, one wounded; three men killed and twelve wounded, three of whom afterwards expired. This was the first of a series of explosions, several of which took effect, the most notable being that which caused the death of a Russian Engineer Officer, who had been indefatigable in his exertions to find and destroy these deadly weapons before they could do any harm; one, more cunningly hidden than the rest, practically blew the poor chap to pieces.
No further opposition being encountered, the two forts were successfully occupied by one o’clock, when it was clearly demonstrated that the Chinese had left some hours since. It is doubtful if the enemy lost more than a dozen men in this ridiculous action, while the loss of the Allies was but slightly larger. It should be mentioned that the British were carefully prevented from taking part in this action by the lack of proper intelligence, and by being thwarted at every turn by the Russians, who only sent word to the Australian brigade when it was too late to leave Tientsin. Curiously enough, but perhaps for the same reasons, neither the Japanese nor Americans participated, but it must be admitted that, but for the use of land mines, the affair was neither very difficult nor particularly exciting.
A more interesting, and, to the British, a much more satisfactory affair, shortly happened at Shan-Hai-Kwan. This place is situated between 150 and 200 miles to the north-eastward of Taku, and is the site of some more very powerful forts. It is also a railway terminus, and once had some slight strategical importance on account of being the place where the Great Wall of China comes down to meet the sea. It possesses no Naval value, being an open roadstead, and ice-bound during the winter months. It became imperative to take the forts on account of the valuable line of communication afforded by the railway, and because of the possibility of the place becoming a rallying centre for the enemy. The “Whens” and “Hows” were the reason for many conferences between the Admirals; and it became evident that, to them, it appeared to be a difficult and risky matter, and one, moreover, likely to entail severe loss on the attacking fleet. This conclusion having been arrived at, the difficulty arose of choosing a leader who would make all the arrangements, and hold himself responsible for the result.