The constitution of the United States in express terms gives to the congress of the United States the power to regulate commerce between the states and with foreign nations. In pursuance of this power and duty imposed by the constitution, the congress of the United States in February, 1887, enacted a statute defining the duties and obligations of common carriers engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers between the states, and by express terms gave to the people a right of action in the federal courts against any railroad company violating its duty as defined by the act. This right of action was by civil suit for such damages as inured to the party by reason of a wrongful act of a common carrier.
The Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company had a main line of road extending from Chicago, in the state of Illinois, located through the state of Iowa to Council Bluffs on the Missouri river. From the main line of this road at Carroll, in Carroll county, this company had constructed a number of branches running northwest from that point, known as the Sac City Branch and the Sioux City and Mapleton Branch. During the year 1890 we brought a number of suits against the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company for unjust discrimination and overcharge for shipments of corn and oats from various points on these branch roads to Chicago, and also a number of suits for shipments made at Carroll and points west on the main line of its road. The cases for shipments on the branch lines of its road were settled by the company, and we collected for our clients about $75,000. Suits for shipments on the main line of its road were contested by the railroad company. We tried two of these cases before the United States circuit court at Des Moines, Judge Shiras presiding, and obtained verdicts and judgments in the causes. The railroad company took a writ of error to the United States court of appeals, and these causes were submitted to that court upon both oral and printed arguments at the May term, 1892, of that court, sitting at St. Louis, Missouri. After the causes had been so submitted, Judge N. M. Hubbard who had made the argument in behalf of the railroad company, left St. Louis and went to Chicago for consultation with the general solicitor of that road, Mr. Goudy. After a few days, the court of appeals still being in session at St. Louis, Judge Hubbard appeared before the court, without any notice to me, and had the order submitting the causes set aside and dismissed his appeal or writ of error. After a few weeks had elapsed he sued out another writ of error in the same cases to the United States court of appeals, which, according to the arrangements for the sitting of that court, would be held at St. Paul in the state of Minnesota, and Justice Brewer of the supreme court of the United States would be in attendance as the presiding judge of that court.
It would be too long and too tedious a story to enter into particulars in regard to these suits, and the questions of fact and law involved in them. The unusual and unwarranted conduct of the attorneys for the Northwestern road in getting these cases before Justice Brewer for his decision and determination was by no means a compliment to the judge for whom they manifested such a strong partiality. Neither would I indulge in any surmise as to the grounds for their partiality. It is sufficient to say they were not disappointed in the result and that Judge Brewer reversed both of these judgments.
I afterward determined if possible to obtain the opinion of the supreme court of the United States upon the questions of law involved in these cases. I accordingly brought another suit for another client; to-wit, one E. M. Parsons, in a case involving an amount sufficient to entitle me to an appeal directly to the supreme court of the United States, having previously attempted to get the supreme court of the United States to review the decision of Justice Brewer in the former cases upon writs of certiorari, the same being denied by the supreme court. Judge Shiras, presiding in the circuit court at Des Moines, in view of the action of the circuit court of appeals in the other cases, sustained a demurrer pro forma to my amended petition filed in the Parsons case, and it was upon demurrer admitting the averments and allegations in this petition that the case was heard before the supreme court of the United States. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion in the Parsons case in which he held that the statements of the petition did not entitle the plaintiff to recovery. The opinion discloses the fact that Judge Brewer was somewhat offended at my attempt to have the supreme court pass upon the questions of law involved in the cases that he had disposed of as the presiding judge in the court or appeals. I had supposed that a judge of the supreme court of the United States would regard it rather as a compliment than otherwise to his sense of fairness to believe that he was capable of impartially and without prejudice, sitting with his brother judges, to review one of his own decisions, but the opinion shows plainly that I overestimated that distinguished jurist, and that he thought more of his infallibility than I did of his impartiality. This opinion of the court will be found in the case of Parsons vs. The Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company in volume 167, United States Reports, 324. The court in this opinion asserts the very extraordinary position that the Interstate Commerce Law in providing a remedy whereby a shipper of grain might recover his actual damages for a refusal of the railroad company to comply with the law which was enacted for his protection, was in the nature of a penal statute, and that the petition of the plaintiff in such a case must expressly aver and negative the existence of any possible excuse for the wrong committed by the railroad company.
One great benefit to the public of these suits against the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company was to arouse public attention to the necessity of further legislation by congress in order to carry out the design of the original act for the protection of the public. Congress had already by amendment to the act provided for penalties against any parties violating its provisions, but the suits that I brought were simply for actual damages and injuries, and not for any penalty whatever under the law. The penal clause in the act as amended March 2, 1889, reads as follows: "That any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or, wherever such common carrier is a corporation, any director or other officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee, agent, or person, acting for or employed by such corporation, who, alone or with any other corporation, company, person, or party, shall willfully do or cause to be done, or shall willfully suffer or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or who shall aid or abet therein, or shall willfully omit or fail to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, or shall cause or willfully suffer or permit any act, matter or thing so directed or required by this act to be done not to be so done, or shall aid or abet in such omission or failure, or shall be guilty of any infraction of this act, or shall aid or abet therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not to exceed five thousand dollars for each offense: Provided, that if the offense for which any person shall be convicted as aforesaid shall be an unlawful discrimination in rates, fares, charges, for transportation of passengers or property, such person shall, in addition to the fine herein provided for, be liable to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." The charge of Judge Shiras to the jury in the two cases tried before the United States circuit court, before referred to, will be found in full in volume 48 of the Federal Reporter, commencing on page 50, and the opinion of Justice Brewer, presiding in the circuit court of appeals, before referred to, in which he reverses these judgments, will be found in the 10 U.S. court of appeals on page 430.
It may be interesting to any law student and to anyone who desires to determine where right and justice should have prevailed, to compare the charge of Judge Shiras to the jury and the principles of law recognized by Judge Shiras, with the opinion of Justice Brewer. It is not within my purpose to re-argue any of my causes in this paper.
It is sufficient to say that the supreme court held the provisions of the inter-state commerce law, that gave to shippers a remedy for unjust discrimination by a civil suit for damages, to be a penal statute upon the ground that if the railroad company discriminated by charging one person ten dollars for a particular service and charged another person twenty dollars for a like service, then a suit to recover back the ten dollars thus unjustly demanded and received by the railroad company was in the nature of a statute to recover a penalty. Upon this mode of reasoning a suit against any person or corporation who unjustly and unlawfully gets possession of my money, for the purpose of recovering back what they illegally obtained, would come under the head of a suit to recover a penalty. The trouble with the supreme court of the United States has been that they have uniformly regarded this legislation by congress to protect the people against unjust charges and discriminations as intended to punish the railroad companies of the country, and the court has felt called upon to protect the railroads from legislation interfering with their absolute control over their freight and passenger traffic. The court has assumed the role of a conservative element in the government, intended for the protection of railroad property against the legislative power of the country.
CHAPTER XI
Des Moines River Land Titles