The case that I am about to cite would satisfy the most credulous that there are other causes that produce uncertain results besides the difference in applying the general principles of the law to different cases.

Section 3, article XI of the constitution of the state of Iowa, provided as follows: "No county or other political or municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property within such county or corporation, to be ascertained by the last state or county tax list previous to the incurring of such indebtedness." In November, 1870, the taxable property, real and personal, within and subject to taxation by the said city of Des Moines, as ascertained by the last state and county tax list, amounted to the sum of $3,140,805 and no more, and that five per centum on said amount was only the sum of $157,040.25. In the month of May, 1869, the city had by ordinance authorized the issuing of bonds to the amount of $50,000 for the purpose of funding outstanding warrants, and afterwards in May, 1870, they had enacted a further ordinance authorizing the issuing of bonds for funding outstanding warrants on the city treasurer to the amount of $75,000, all of which bonds had been duly issued and were outstanding at the time of the commencement of the suit hereinafter mentioned. In addition to these bonds aggregating $125,000 there were also outstanding warrants upon the treasury to the amount of $55,000, making an aggregate indebtedness of the city $180,000. On the 7th of July, 1870, the city passed a further ordinance authorizing the issuing of bonds to the amount of $130,000 for the building and repair of certain bridges across the Des Moines and Raccoon rivers, thus exceeding the constitutional limit upon the city's indebtedness.

George Sneer, a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Des Moines, applied to me to bring a suit to test the validity of this last bond issue of $130,000, informing me that the bonds had been placed in the hands of B. F. Allen, then a banker of the city of Des Moines. I informed him I was willing to take the case provided that the suit should be maintained in good faith, that I was satisfied that the bonds were absolutely void whether in the hands of Allen or any other person, being issued in plain violation of the constitution of the state, and that every person purchasing any evidence of indebtedness against the city was bound to take notice of the existing indebtedness of the city and was charged with knowledge thereof, as it was a matter of record and easily ascertained. Mr. Sneer informed me that he desired the question of the validity of the bonds tested in good faith, and that if I undertook the case I might prosecute it to the end. He contracted to pay me the sum of two hundred dollars for my services, and I accordingly prepared the bill for a perpetual injunction against the city council, city treasurer, and B. F. Allen. No one was made defendant to the petition except Allen and members of the city council and the city treasurer. Answers were filed by Mr. Withrow for B. F. Allen and by Seward Smith, his partner, for the city of Des Moines and members of the city council, and the case was submitted on bill and answer. There was no denial of the facts set forth in the petition in regard to the indebtedness of the city, nor did anyone appear in the case claiming to be bona fide purchasers of the bonds, but the answer of Allen was to the effect that he acted as agent for the city and had sold the bonds to one George P. Opdike & Co. of New York City. Maxwell was judge of the district court, and to my surprise entered the following decree in the case:

This cause coming on for final hearing on the plaintiff's petition, and answer made thereto, and the defendant's answer and cross petition, and thus heard upon the pleadings alone, and the court having heard the argument of counsel, inspected the said record and being fully advised in the premises, doth order, adjudge and decree, that the plaintiff's bill be dismissed; that the bridge bonds described therein be treated as in every respect binding obligations of the city of Des Moines according to the tenor thereof, and that the parties thereto and those in privity with them be forever concluded from asserting or maintaining any defense against the payment of said bonds, and the interest thereon, on the grounds that the same were irregularly issued in excess of the constitutional limitation upon the power of the said city to become indebted; that the money now in possession of the defendant Allen, be applied by the proper officers of the city of Des Moines to the purposes for which the same was raised; and that the defendant have and recover the costs herein taxed at —— dollars, and that execution issue therefor. To which plaintiff excepts.

Upon the rendition of this decree I immediately entered an appeal in behalf of George Sneer, and perfected the same by filing the proper abstract of record in the supreme court of the state. The cause was submitted to the supreme court on printed arguments on April 4, 1871. At the October term of the supreme court, being an argument term held at Davenport at that date, the supreme court really decided the case by an opinion written by Judge Beck in behalf of a majority of the court, and the opinion was sent by Justice Day to the clerk about the time the court was to adjourn, with orders to file the same, and Mr. Charles Linderman, the clerk of the court, informed me that he had actually marked the opinion "Filed," and that about the time that the filing was completed Judge C. C. Cole, then one of the judges of the supreme court, entered the clerk's office and filed with him a paper signed by George Sneer dismissing his appeal, and that he entered upon the records of the court the following entry: "On application of appellant, it is ordered by the court that the appeal herein be, and the same is hereby dismissed."

At the ensuing regular term of the supreme court held at Des Moines, December 5, 1871, the following entry was made in the case: "At the argument term held at Davenport in October last, on application of George Sneer per se, appellant herein, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed." Before this dismissal either at Davenport or at Des Moines Sneer had settled with me and paid me the fee agreed upon, and I had nothing further to do with the case except to reproach him for violating his agreement with me that I should prosecute the case to a final result.

It appeared from the sequel that Judge Cole had also prepared a dissenting opinion in the case, and these two opinions, that written by Judge Beck as the opinion of the court, and the one written by himself were both published in the Western Jurist the ensuing January, the one marked "B" and the other marked "C," but suppressing the fact that the opinion marked "B" was the opinion of a majority of the court, and that none of the judges, except Judge Cole, agreed with the opinion marked "C;" and having the following extraordinary note printed in connection with the opinions, Judge Cole being then the editor of the Western Jurist: "These two articles, this and the following which advocates a different view of the same question, are from members of the profession in Iowa occupying equal prominence before the public, and whose opinions are entitled to consideration." Whilst these opinions do not give the detail of the case that was submitted to the court and to which they relate, yet by carefully reading them you can easily see that they refer to an actual controversy that had been pending before the supreme court. The supreme court of Iowa subsequently decided the question that was involved in the case of Sneer vs. the City of Des Moines, establishing the principle as applied to this transaction to the effect that the bonds were absolutely void in the hands even of an innocent purchaser if such had been the case. See

The dismissal of the appeal by Sneer left the decree entered by Judge Maxwell in full force as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the parties procuring this result, after they had full knowledge of the fact that the majority of the judges of the supreme court held the bonds void, are fully entitled to all of the credit that their conduct merits, and I only record the matter here as a matter of history and as vindication of myself and to exonerate myself from any responsibility for the final result, as I had no knowledge of the dismissal of the appeal until long after the thing was done.

I have within the past few weeks examined the archives of the supreme court, and find that the original opinion of the court written by Judge Beck signed "B" and printed in the Western Jurist (see Vol. VI-1872) cannot be found, and also the paper signed by George Sneer dismissing the appeal is missing from the files of the court. I presume the city council, as they had by their attorney asked to be enjoined from disputing the validity of these bonds, had obtained a decree against themselves to that effect, very willingly paid the bonds when they matured, but of this I have no actual knowledge.