Meanwhile, trouble had long been brewing in the Sudan, which had been originally conquered by Mehemet Ali. There were many insurrections of more or less importance, and the people were ripe for still more serious revolt. The advent of Mohammed Ahmed, the son of Abdullah the carpenter and Amina his wife, whose name, therefore, agreed with those of the parents of the Prophet, as the expected Mahdi, whose mission it was to convert the whole world, gave the opportunity, and one in which religious fanaticism was added to patriotism. There were many small skirmishes, with varying success, at first; but still the movement increased, and soon El Obeid was captured, Hicks Pasha, with about 7000 men, was totally defeated, and his army practically destroyed. Next General Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan and took up his residence at Khartum, and a further advance of the Mahdieh resulted in the fall of Berber and the investment of the capital of the Sudan.

Then it was that serious preparation for its relief by a British army was seriously undertaken. As far back as April 1884, Lord Wolseley had considered that General Gordon could not hold out later than the 15th November. The nature of the opposition to be expected had, however, been already tested in the independent series of operations that long took place around Suakin on the Red Sea littoral. Suakin was the port to Berber, but between the two places was an almost waterless desert, inhabited by hostile tribes of the greatest bravery.

The fighting there had commenced this way. A slave trader, Osman Digna by name, had heard of the Mahdi’s success, and saw an opportunity of a revolt of his own with the warlike sept of the Hadendowas. He invested Sinkat, which fell, and its garrison was massacred. He threatened both Tokar and Suakin, and when to relieve the former Baker Pasha marched out from Trinkitat with nearly 4000 Egyptians, he was badly beaten, for the troops showed no fight at all. This aroused the attention of the home authorities. A British force was formed, under Sir G. Graham, and moved from Trinkitat, defeating the Sheikhs at El Teb, taking six guns and a Gatling, and killing 2100 men; but Tokar had already fallen. The troops engaged were the 19th and 10th Hussars, the Black Watch, Gordon Highlanders, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the York and Lancaster Regiments, the Royal Marine Light Infantry, with a Naval Brigade and some Artillery. They advanced in a hollow square, the Gordons leading; and, leaving detachments at Trinkitat and Fort Baker (at the end of the causeway across the salt marsh that nearly surrounds the town), the small army moved against the Arabs entrenched around the wells of El Teb. The fighting was severe and desperate, but discipline and weapons soon told. The enemy’s guns were abandoned, and one taken by the Royal Marine Artillery was manned by the men under Captain Tucker and turned on the enemy, who fled finally towards Tokar. The loss to the British force had been 22 officers and 167 men killed and wounded.

After marching to Tokar, the force returned to Suakin, and as Osman Digna had collected a large force some miles outside the town, it was again decided to disperse them. Sir G. Graham formed the small army in two squares: that on the left, which led, under General Davis, had its front and flank faces formed by the Royal Highlanders and the York and Lancaster Regiments, with the Royal Marines in the rear face, and the Naval Brigade with Gatlings in the centre; on the right rear, echeloned, was General Buller’s Brigade, having the Gordon Highlanders and the Royal Irish Fusiliers in the front and flank faces, and the King’s Royal Rifles in rear, inside being the 7-pounder guns. The squares were about 1000 yards apart, and between them was a battery of 9-pounders, while the left flank was covered by the Hussars.

The enemy was met with in the deep ravine, or “Khor,” of Tamai, and early opened a brisk fire. Replying with a needlessly hot fire, which enveloped the troops in smoke, the square of General Davis made a rush with the front face and breaking up its close formation, the Arabs rushed into the gaps between the front and flank faces. For a time it was a scene of wild confusion. The British, fighting steadily still, with bullet and steel, fell back in some disorder, abandoning the guns, but they soon rallied, and the advance of the other square enabled it to re-form. The edge of the ravine was reached, and the leading square crossed it, with a cheer, to occupy Osman Digna’s camp, and disperse such of the enemy as were still there. Thirteen officers and 208 men had been killed and wounded on the attacking side.

Little was done after this for a while. The force returned to Suakin, and afterwards occupied and burned the village of Tamaneb with little opposition. Then the bulk of the troops were withdrawn, leaving the 3rd King’s Royal Rifles and a battalion of Royal Marines to garrison Suakin.

The Nile expedition for the relief of Gordon had now begun, and it was still, for a while, designed to take Berber and advance thence on Khartum. To communicate with the coast at Suakin from Berber was evidently advisable, but the district was almost waterless, and a railway was of primary importance. Furthermore, the destruction of Osman Digna’s power there was essential to its construction, let alone that to attack him would effect a useful diversion, and weaken the Dervish strength which might otherwise collect in the Nile Valley.

A second expedition was hence despatched to Suakin under Sir G. Graham. It consisted of a Guards Brigade (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and 2nd Scots), and a second brigade of the 2nd East Surrey, 1st Shropshire Light Infantry, 1st Berkshire, and Royal Marines, with two squadrons 5th Lancers, two of the 20th Hussars, some mounted infantry, Royal Engineers, and three batteries of artillery. In addition, there was a strong Indian Contingent and a volunteer force from New South Wales.

The enemy was known to be at Tamai, to the south-west, and at Hasheen to the west of the town, and by the latter the railway, which was to be made by English contractors, was to run. The first move, therefore, was the defeat of the force at Hasheen, and for this purpose the whole force, with the exception of the Shropshire Light Infantry, marched and formed in one square, of which the front face was held by the Marines and Berkshire Regiment (the Surrey was detached to cover a working party on some hills to the right front), the left flank by the Indian Brigade, and the right by the Guards. The rear was open, and the artillery, and the camel transport occupied the centre. The operations resulted in the temporary dispersion of the Hadendowas, with a loss on our side of 9 officers and men killed and 39 wounded. Throughout the enemy displayed the most reckless bravery, and an utter indifference to death.

It was now necessary to attack Osman Digna’s main force at Tamai, and for this purpose it was intended to establish an intermediate post on the road to that place, as one had been made at Hasheen. The force detailed to cover the work was under Sir J. M’Neill, and, made up of the Indian Contingent, one squadron of the 5th Lancers, with the Berkshire Regiment, the Royal Marines, etc., was formed into two squares. On reaching the open space of Tofrik, a zareba was commenced, the two angles of which were held by the Berkshires and Marines in two squares, while the Indian Contingent formed a large rectangle in between, covering the huge mass of camels and transport.