The Story of the British Army

by Charles Cooper King

In 1799 he had gone to Egypt with a considerable force. It is strange to think that such a thing was possible with British fleets on the seas. But it was so, and it only shows how the element of surprise, how the want of telegraph and the absence of steam, rendered the occupation of Egypt possible at all. It could not be so now. But then, before the danger was really grasped, the French had practically conquered Egypt, and were in full occupation of both Cairo and Alexandria. And these practically meant the country, and the closing of our highway to the East.

He returned to France in 1800, when the conditions of Continental war were, as far as England was concerned, desperate. The expeditions to the Netherlands had been productive of but little, to say the least. The only chance for England, and that was based merely on the striking at the enemy’s armed strength and not with the view of protecting the Eastern Empire which Napoleon had seen the importance of threatening, was to try conclusions with the French in Egypt when their great chief was absent in France. The expedition, consisting of the Guards, the 1st, 54th (two battalions), and 92nd, and the 8th, 13th, 19th, and 90th, the 2nd, 50th, and 79th, and the 18th, 30th, 44th, and 89th, and others, with a reserve composed of some companies of the 23rd, the 28th, 42nd, and cavalry brigade of some companies of the 11th Dragoons, the 12th and 26th Dragoons, and some mounted infantry, started. It was under the guidance of the best and most experienced general of the time, Sir Ralph Abercromby, whose leading spirit was Sir John Moore.

The force landed. The 23rd, 28th, and 42nd were the first to leap on shore, though the casualties were numerous under the fire of fifteen guns and many infantry, while the Royals, the 54th, and 58th did equally good work farther along the beach. The marines shared in the honours of the landing, and subsequent events gave them the title of “Royal” from the Egyptian campaign of 1801. Of them there is a legend of a curious speech made by a captain of the corps before his men debarked. Looking out of a porthole at the sombre masses of the enemy that were assembled to oppose the landing, he turned to his men and said, “Look here! Those fellows on shore there are the French, and that is the land of Egypt. If you don’t, therefore, help to give them a d—d good thrashing, you will soon find yourself in the house of bondage!”

So, with sundry skirmishes, especially that at Mandora, where the 92nd displayed conspicuous gallantry, the army pushed on to the battlefield outside Alexandria, where they took up an entrenched position between the dry bed of Lake Mareotis and the sea. Here, at daybreak on the 21st March 1801, they were attacked by General Menou, who, making a feint at the British left with the Dromedary Corps, vigorously attacked the right, where the 28th, 42nd, and 23rd were posted. But every attack was repulsed, even when ammunition failed, and the defence had to be conducted with the bayonet alone. The 28th, assailed in front and rear when in line by cavalry, fought back to back, and ever since have been distinguished by having the regimental number or badge on the back as well as the front of their headdress. The victory was dearly bought, for Abercromby was mortally hurt, and 1306 men, with 70 officers, were killed or wounded. Shortly after Cairo was occupied, and Alexandria, first blockaded, soon surrendered.

The employment of a camel corps was a forecast of what would be done when next an English army fought on Egyptian soil, but there is even another point of resemblance. For as an Indian brigade co-operated with the home army at Tel-el-Kebir, so in this campaign a force under General Baird, consisting of the 8th Light Dragoons, and the 10th, 61st, 86th, and 88th, from India, with some two thousand Sepoys, landed at Kosseir and made a gallant march of a hundred and fifty miles across the desert to Kenneh, and so down the Nile to Rosetta.

Foiled in seizing and holding one of the roads to the East, Napoleon turned his thoughts to Great Britain herself. Though not a Continental Power, she was his most dangerous adversary. Her naval strength and her wealth enabled her to keep alive Continental antagonism, even if her armies had, latterly at least, effected little but diversions of sorts. Every preparation had been made for the invasion of hated England; given only the even temporary command of the sea, and it was possible then, as it is infinitely more possible now, in the days of steam. The feeble efforts already referred to at the end of the last century showed the entire practicability of the idea. All that was wanted was the organisation of the effort on a large scale, and what better military organiser was there than Napoleon, aided by his staff? So much so that Soult, no mean authority, reported that a hundred thousand men could be embarked in the flotilla in seven or eight minutes. Corps were assembled at Amiens, Ostend, about Dunkirk, and at Boulogne. Flotillas for the transport and debarkation of troops were massed in large numbers. The bulk of the British army, too, was abroad, and matters looked serious. There were in England, at least, but the Life and Horse Guards, eighteen cavalry regiments, and five of regular infantry.

There were militia, of course, and volunteer corps sprang up as rapidly and as readily as they did later, when a similar provocation arose. Serious instructions were issued, both to these and to the people, as to how the enemy, if he landed, should be met and harassed.

In an undated MS., the paper of which bears the watermark of a crown, G. R., and 1801, the following instructions are issued. It is called “Advice to the inhabitants of those districts of England through which the French army may march in the course of its projected invasion.” “As the enemy may effect a landing in many parts of the coast at one and the same time, and as the precise spots on which he may do so cannot be previously ascertained, it follows, that every order which may become necessary cannot be previously given. In the actual execution of those even which are so issued, some variation may be required. Amid the numerous movements of the enemy either to effect his intended junctions, or to possess himself of such cities and towns as he may think fit to occupy, it is possible that the dispositions made beforehand, may by subsequent occurrences be rendered unavailing, and that, therefore, the inhabitants must often wait for fresh instructions. During these intervals, it will not perhaps be useless to point out to them in what manner they ought provisionally to act.”

“If it be necessary that they should defend themselves, it is not less so that they should do it in such a manner as to provide for their escape. He whose dexterity preserves him may, in a quarter of an hour afterwards, again be firing on the enemy. He who, without judgment and without precaution, exposes himself, must inevitably run very great risks; nor can the country be defended by prisoners or dead men.”

* * * * *