But though the English army thus delayed, Junot thought the game was up. He entered into negotiations for the abandonment of Portugal, and by the “Convention of Cintra” the fortresses were to be given up, and the French troops transported to France in the vessels of the Russian fleet for a time blockaded in the Tagus by a British fleet.

Meanwhile Moore, landing at Maceira Bay, had joined the army, the whole of which finally marched to Lisbon.

The convention was bitterly condemned in England, though Napoleon thought she had concluded a good bargain. By it Portugal had been temporarily freed, and a good base of operations, with good harbours, was obtained for further efforts. None the less both Dalrymple and Burrard were practically retired, and the supreme command was now open for the future Duke of Wellington when the time came. But scapegoats were wanted, if only to please the irresponsible and irrepressible home critics.

“But when Convention sent his handywork,
Pens, tongues, feet, hands, combined in wild uproar;
Mayor, aldermen, laid down the uplifted fork;
The bench of bishops half forgot to snore;
Stern Cobbett, who for one whole week forbore
To question aught, once more with transport leapt,
And bit his devilish quill again and swore
With foe such treaty never should be kept.
Then burst the blatant beast, and raged, and roared, and slept.”[34]

For a brief space, matters were quiescent. But Napoleon fully recognised the gravity of the situation, and saw that a Spanish rising might become a grave menace to France. He even induced his ally, the Czar, to address King George a letter, asking him to make peace “in the name of humanity”! It was like “Satan reproving sin,” and produced no result; so he himself therefore took the matter in hand. He re-invaded Spain to re-instate Joseph on the Spanish throne. He defeated the Spanish armies, to be met by the advance of the army under Moore, who had succeeded to the command after the Convention of Cintra, had landed at Lisbon, and was to be reinforced by Sir David Baird, who had reached Corunna with a force of some ten thousand men.

It was arranged that the two divisions should concentrate at Salamanca, but there were many difficulties in the way. The point of union, or concentration, was too close to the enemy to be safe. There was Spanish and Portuguese opposition, want of money on the one hand; on the other, a country to traverse which was ill provided with roads, and those of the worst character. Hence Moore still further subdivided his command. The cavalry and artillery and heavy baggage were to move by Elvas on Salamanca, whither Baird was also directed; the remainder in two columns, one by Almeida, the other by Alcantara, and thence by Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca; while, in addition to this separation, the columns themselves were further subdivided into sub-units, separated by intervals in the columns of march, thus greatly increasing their depth and lessening their power of concentration for battle. Moore’s difficulties increased rather than lessened as the advance continued. The Spanish, profuse of promises of assistance, were slow in fulfilling them. The transport was notoriously insufficient and inefficient. The inhabitants themselves, strangely enough, were by no means enthusiastic to their allies and would-be deliverers. The Spanish armies had been successively beaten, and were much disorganised. There was nothing for it but retreat really, though Moore made a last desperate effort to retrieve matters, trusting to the glowing but untrue reports as to the enthusiastic resistance the Madrileños were prepared to make, and continued his advance to Madrid. The idea was more than risky. The capital was already in French hands; Lefevre had already, by a movement towards Talavera, seriously endangered his retreat to Portugal. The weather was most severe, the local supplies of the smallest.

Still he attempted to engage Soult, whose corps was somewhat weak and the bulk of whose cavalry were about Sahagun. Baird was directed on Mayorga; Moore himself moved on Saldaña, and the 10th and 15th Light Cavalry, by a night march, engaged the enemy at Sahagun, the latter regiment won the right to carry the name on its battle-roll. It is the only cavalry regiment so distinguished. This fully roused the energies of Napoleon. He determined to attempt the complete destruction of the British force. Soult from the north, through Astorga, Lefevre from the south by Talavera, and the main army under his own command by the Escurial Pass, were to close in and surround Moore.

The celebrated “Retreat to Corunna” commenced. Moore was to change his base from Lisbon to Corunna, and began by falling back on Castro Gonzalo (at Benevente) and Baird was retiring on Valencia (towns on the river Esla) to unite with him at Astorga; and at both Mayorga and Castro Gonzalo skirmishes occurred with the French cavalry which were highly creditable to the British. Napoleon pursued as rapidly as the state of the weather, with deep snow, would permit; but, recalled to France on the 1st January 1809, he left to Soult the task of “driving the leopard into the sea.” While in supreme command, the emperor had infused his own boundless energy into the army, and had marched a force of fifty thousand men over snowclad passes and in bitter weather some two hundred miles in ten days! Many brilliant skirmishes were carried out by the English cavalry at Mayorga, Benevente (where General Lefebvre Desnouettes was taken prisoner), and at Constantine, and notoriously that by the 10th Hussars at Calcabellos; and an attempt was made to induce the enemy to attack at Lugo, but it only resulted in a skirmish and not a battle, and the dismal retreat was continued by Betanzos on Corunna. By this time the army was completely demoralised. Repeated orders had been issued, but seem to have been of little effect. At Bembribee, for example, the men broke into the wine vaults, and drunkenness reigned; shops were broken into and plundered there and elsewhere. The sufferings were extreme. Soldiers, women, and children lay down in the snow by the line of march to die. It being winter, fords were deep, and men had to cross them, and march in their wet clothes under storms of rain, wind, and sleet.

Guns had to be abandoned, and, like the military chest on one occasion, thrown over precipices to avoid capture; and horses were shot, as there was no food for them. The “stars in their courses” fought against Moore. Even the precautions taken at Lugo to carry out a night march failed, for the wind blew down the bundles of straw that had been placed to mark the roads, and bridges that should have been destroyed were left standing.

Little wonder then that the troops hailed the sight of the sea at Corunna with cheers, though it was three days after their arrival under the walls of the little fortress before the transports dropped anchor in the harbour. But the retreat was over, and the army stood at bay. With all their unquestionable indiscipline and insubordination on the march, those who were left had not lost the fighting spirit. It was either victory, or capitulation, or a most disastrous embarkation; and the army played for the first and won. Soult had twenty thousand men flushed with the feeling of success to engage the remnants of Moore’s army, barely fifteen thousand strong.