Death of Charles III.
In December, 1788, Charles III died. As will be made more clear in the chapters dealing with institutions, he had brought Spain forward to the position of a first rank power again,—even though her enjoyment of that high station was to be of brief duration.
CHAPTER XXXIII
CHARLES IV AND FRANCE, 1788-1808
Dominating character of relations with France and their effects upon Spain
IF the reign of Charles III, despite the close union of the Bourbon crowns, had been characterized mainly in its external manifestations by the hostility of Spain to England, that of Charles IV (1788-1808) was dominated by relations with France. Unaffected for a while by the principles underlying the French Revolution, Spain was toppled from her position as a first-rate power by the Emperor Napoleon, whose designs for world power and whose methods in seeking it were not unlike those followed over a century later by William II of Germany. Meanwhile, the ideas of the American and the French revolutions were permeating the Spanish colonies, and as the wars with England continued during much of this reign, shutting off effective communication between the colonies and Spain, a chance was offered for putting them into effect in the new world. The way was well prepared in the reign of Charles IV, though the outbreak was postponed until after his fall. The blow struck by Napoleon was not without its compensations, which in the long run may be considered to have outweighed the loss of prestige. Napoleon, quite without intention, gave Spain an impulse to national feeling, in the uprising against French domination, which was greater than any she had formerly experienced, and of sufficient force to endure to the present day. In the same roundabout way Napoleon gave the Spain of the Dos de Mayo, or Second of May (the date of the revolt against Napoleon, and the national holiday of Spain), her first opportunity to imbibe democratic ideas.
The Nootka affair and the virtual repudiation of the Family Compact.
To cope with the great forces of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, Spain had to rely on the leadership of the weak, timid, vacillating Charles IV. His predecessor had left him a legacy of able ministers, but these were not long sustained by the king. At the outset Floridablanca still ruled as first minister of state. He was liberal-minded as concerned social and economic institutions, but was profoundly royalist in his political ideas and an enemy of anything which represented a diminution in the prerogatives of the crown. He was alarmed by the ideas which were being spread broadcast in France, and took steps to prevent their introduction into Spain, becoming recognized as an opponent of the French Revolution. In the midst of this situation, there occurred the Nootka affair, which obliged him for a time to change his policy. A Spanish voyage of 1789 to the northwest coast of North America had resulted in the discovery and capture of two English ships at Nootka, on the western shore of Vancouver Island. Floridablanca informed the English government of this event, in January, 1790, complaining of the frequent usurpations of Spanish colonial territories by British subjects, and asking for the recognition of Spain’s ownership of Nootka, which had been discovered by a Spanish voyage of 1774. What followed was very nearly a duplicate of the Falkland incident, twenty years before. England claimed that the British flag had been insulted, and demanded satisfaction, which Floridablanca refused to give, as it involved the acknowledgment of a doubt concerning Spain’s ownership of Nootka. War seemed imminent, and the French government was invoked to stand by the Family Compact. The National Assembly, then in actual control in France, acknowledged the obligation, but attached conditions (having to do with the revolution) to their willingness to declare war,—with the result that Charles IV and Floridablanca decided that it was better to avoid a rupture with England. A series of three treaties, from 1790 to 1794, arranged for the payment of an indemnity by Spain, and among other matters agreed that the ships of both nations should have a right to sail the waters and make landings freely in regions not already settled by either power. In effect, therefore, the lands north of the Spanish settlements were thrown open to the entry of England. These treaties had a significance which was wider than that of the matters directly involved. They marked a new spirit in the direction of colonial affairs. In the early years of the conquest Spain had played an aggressive part, followed soon by the adoption of what might be termed an aggressive defensive, or a willingness to fight for the retention of what she had, leading also to further conquests in order to ward off foreign attack. The Nootka affair was the beginning of a spiritless, waiting kind of defensive, the inevitable outcome of which was disintegration.
Floridablanca and Spanish opposition to the French Revolution.
The Nootka treaties left Spain free, however, to stand in opposition to the French Revolution. Louis XVI of France had written secretly to Charles IV, in 1789, that he had been compelled to agree to measures of which he did not approve. Other European monarchs were also acquainted with the perils of Louis XVI’s position, and in the general interests of kingship, all desired to save him, although in the case of Spain there was the strong bond of family ties as well. In 1790 Floridablanca directed a note to the French Assembly requesting greater freedom of action for Louis XVI, making thinly veiled threats in case of a refusal to comply. This action only served to enrage the French government. In 1791 Floridablanca ordered the taking of a census of all foreigners in Spain, about half of whom were Frenchmen, compelling them to swear allegiance to the king, the laws, and the religion of the peninsula. A subsequent order prohibited the entry of any literature of a revolutionary bearing, even going so far as to forbid foreigners to receive letters. When Louis XVI accepted the constitution of 1791 Floridablanca announced that Charles IV refused to recognize that the French king had signed the document of his own free will, and asked that Louis XVI and his family be allowed to go to a neutral land, threatening war if the French government should fail to accede to Charles’ wishes. Here was a direct challenge to the revolution, but instead of accepting the gauntlet France sent an agent to Spain who was able to persuade Charles IV that Floridablanca’s policy was in fact contributing to the dangerous position of Louis XVI. Floridablanca was therefore relieved from power early in 1792, and Aranda became first minister in Spain.
Brief ministry of Aranda.