A History of Spain / founded on the Historia de España y de la civilización española of Rafael Altamira

by Charles E. Chapman; Rafael Altamira

The annexation of Portugal.

In the middle years of Philip’s reign there was one project of great moment in Spanish history which he pushed to a successful conclusion,—the annexation of Portugal. While the ultimate importance of this event was to be lessened by the later separation of the two kingdoms, they were united long enough (sixty years) for notable effects to be felt in Spain and more particularly in the Americas. The desire for peninsula unity had long been an aspiration of the Castilian kings, and its consummation from the standpoint of the acquisition of Portugal had several times been attempted, though without success. The death of King Sebastián in 1578 without issue left the Portuguese throne to Cardinal Henry, who was already very old, and whom in any event the pope refused to release from his religious vows. This caused various claimants to the succession to announce themselves, among whom were the Duchess of Braganza, Antonio (the prior of Crato), and Philip. The first-named had the best hereditary claim, since she was descended from a son (the youngest) of King Manuel, a predecessor of Sebastián. Antonio of Crato was son of another of King Manuel’s sons, but was of illegitimate birth; nevertheless, he was the favorite of the regular clergy, the popular classes, some nobles, and the pope, and was the only serious rival Philip had to consider. Philip’s mother was the eldest daughter of the same King Manuel. With this foundation for his claim he pushed his candidacy with great ability, aided by the skilful diplomacy of his special ambassador, Cristóbal de Moura. One of the master strokes was the public announcement of Philip’s proposed governmental policy in Portugal, promising among other things to respect the autonomy of the kingdom, recognizing it as a separate political entity from Spain. A Portuguese Cortes of 1580 voted for the succession of Philip, for the noble and ecclesiastical branches supported him, against the opposition of the third estate. A few days later King Henry died, and Philip prepared to take possession. The partisans of Antonio resisted, but Philip, who had long been in readiness for the emergency, sent an army into Portugal under the Duke of Alba, and he easily routed the forces of Antonio. In keeping with his desire to avoid giving offence to the Portuguese, Philip gave Alba the strictest orders to punish any infractions of discipline or improper acts of the soldiery against the inhabitants, and these commands were carefully complied with,—in striking contrast with the policy which had been followed while Alba was governor in the Low Countries. Thus it was that a Portuguese Cortes of 1581 solemnly recognized Philip as king of Portugal. Philip took oath not to appoint any Spaniards to Portuguese offices, and he kept his word to the end of his reign. Portugal had now come into the peninsula union in much the same fashion that Aragon had joined with Castile. With her came the vast area and great wealth of the Portuguese colonies of Asia, Africa, and more particularly Brazil. If only the Spanish kings might hold the country long enough, it appeared inevitable that a real amalgamation of such kindred peoples would one day take place. Furthermore, if only the kings would have, or could have, confined themselves to a Pan-Hispanic policy, embracing Spain and Portugal and their colonies, the opportunity for the continued greatness of the peninsula seemed striking. The case was a different one from that of the union of Castile and Aragon, however, for a strong feeling of Portuguese nationality had already developed, based largely on a hatred of Spaniards. This spirit had something to feed upon from the outset in the defeat of the popular Antonio of Crato and in the discontent of many nobles, who did not profit as much by Philip’s accession as they had been led to expect. It was necessary to put strong garrisons in Portuguese cities and to fortify strategic points. Nevertheless, Philip experienced no serious trouble and was able to leave Portugal to his immediate successor.

Causes of the war with England.

Philip’s relations with England, in which the outstanding event was the defeat of the Spanish Armada, had elements of importance as affecting Spanish history, especially in so far as they concerned English depredations in the Americas. They were more important to England, however, than to Spain, and the story from the English standpoint has become a familiar one. From the moment of Protestant Elizabeth’s accession to the English throne in 1558, in succession to Catholic Mary, there was a constant atmosphere of impending conflict between Spain and England. Greatest of the motives in Philip’s mind was that her rule meant a Protestant England, a serious break in the authority of Catholic Christianity, but there were other causes for war as well. English aid of an unofficial but substantial character was helping to sustain the Protestant Netherlands in revolt against Spain. In the Americas “beyond the line” (of Tordesillas) the two countries were virtually at war, although in the main it was a conflict of piratical attacks and the sacking of cities on the part of the English, with acts of retaliation by the Spaniards. This was the age of Drake’s and Hawkins’ exploits along the Spanish Main (in the Caribbean area), but it was also the age of Gilbert and Raleigh, and the first, though ineffectual, attempts of England to despoil Spain of her American dominions through the founding of colonies in the Spanish-claimed new world. Incidents of a special character served to accentuate the feeling engendered by these more permanent causes,—such, for example, as Elizabeth’s appropriation of the treasure which Philip was sending to the Low Countries as pay for his soldiers: the Spanish vessels took shelter in an English port to escape from pirates, whereupon Elizabeth proceeded to “borrow,” as she termed it, the wealth they were carrying. Hard pressed for funds as Philip always was, this was indeed a severe blow.

Why a declaration of war was delayed.

Nevertheless, a declaration of war was postponed for nearly thirty years. English historians ascribe the delay to the diplomatic skill of their favorite queen, but, while there is no need to deny her resourcefulness in that respect, there were reasons in plenty why Philip himself was desirous of deferring hostilities, or better still, avoiding them. In view of his existing troubles with France and the Low Countries he drew back before the enormous expense that a war with England would entail, to say nothing of the military difficulties of attacking an island power. Though he received frequent invitations from the Catholics of England and Scotland to effect an invasion, these projects were too often linked with similar proposals to the kings of France, the leading European opponents of the Spanish monarch. Philip wished to break the power of Elizabeth and of Protestantism if possible, however, and gave encouragement to plots against the life of the English queen or to schemes for revolutionary uprisings in favor of Mary Stuart, a Catholic and Elizabeth’s rival, but none of these designs met with success. Many Spanish leaders urged a descent upon England, among them Juan of Austria, who wished to lead the expeditionary force himself, dreaming possibly of an English crown for his reward, but it was not until 1583 that Philip viewed these proposals with favor.

Preparations for a descent upon England.

Once having decided upon an expedition Philip began to lay his plans. Mary Stuart was persuaded to disinherit her son, who was a Protestant (the later James I of England), and to make Philip her heir. The pope was induced to lend both financial and moral support to the undertaking, although it was necessary to deceive him as to Philip’s intentions to acquire England for himself; the pope was told that Philip’s daughter was to be made queen of England. The proposed descent upon England was no secret to Elizabeth, who made ready to resist. With a view to delaying Philip’s preparations, Drake made an attack upon Cádiz in 1587, on which occasion he burned all the shipping in the bay. This only strengthened Philip’s resolutions with regard to the undertaking, and tended to make him impatient for its early execution. Plans were made which proved to be in many cases ill considered. The first mistake occurred when Philip did not entertain a proposition of the Scotch and French Catholics that he should work in concert with them, thus declining an opportunity to avail himself of ports and bases of supply near the point of attack; political reasons were the foundation for his attitude in this matter. Against advice he also decided to divide the expedition into a naval and a military section, the troops to come from the Low Countries after the arrival of the fleet there to transport them. The worst error of all was that of Philip’s insistence on directing the organization of the fleet himself. All details had to be passed upon by the king from his palace of the Escorial near Madrid, which necessarily involved both delay and a faulty execution of orders. Evil practices and incompetence were manifest on every hand; quantities of the supplies purchased proved to be useless; and the officers and men were badly chosen, many of the former being without naval experience. A great mistake was made in the appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to lead the expedition; the principal recommendation of the duke was that of his family prestige, for he was absolutely lacking in knowledge of maritime affairs, and said as much to the king, but the latter insisted that he should take command.

Defeat of the Armada.

At length the fleet was able to leave Lisbon, and later Coruña, in the year 1588. Because of its great size it was termed the Armada Invencible (the Invincible Fleet), a name which has been taken over into English as the Spanish, or the Invincible, Armada. In all there were 131 ships, with over 25,000 sailors, soldiers, and officers. The evil effect of Philip’s management followed the Armada to sea. He had given detailed instructions what to do, and the commander-in-chief would not vary from them. Many officers thought it would be best to make an attack on Plymouth, to secure that port as a base of operations, but Philip had given orders that the fleet should first go to the Low Countries to effect a junction with the troops held in readiness there. The story of the battle with the English fleet is well known. The contest was altogether one-sided, for the English ships were both superior in speed and equipped with longer range artillery. Nevertheless, storms contributed more than the enemy to the Spanish defeat. The Armada was utterly dispersed, and many vessels were wrecked. Only 65 ships and some 10,000 men were able to return to Spain.