The storm broke in the reign of Philip IV (1621-1665). Philip IV was only sixteen at the time of his accession to the throne. He had good intentions, and tried to interest himself in matters of government, but was of a frivolous and dissolute nature, unable to give consideration for any length of time to serious affairs. The result was the rule of another favorite, the Count-Duke of Olivares. Olivares was possibly the worst man who could have been chosen, precisely because he had sufficient ability to attempt the execution of his mistaken ideas. He was energetic, intelligent, and well educated, but was stubborn, proud, irascible, boastful, and insulting. He was able to make plans on a gigantic scale, and had real discernment as to the strength of Spain’s enemies, but lacked the practical capacity to handle the details. The times were such as demanded a Spínola, but the counsels of Olivares prevailed, and their keynote was imperialism in Europe and a centralized absolutism in the peninsula.
Spanish losses in the Thirty Years’ War.
The truce with the Dutch came to an end in 1621. Spínola urged that it be continued, but Olivares gave orders for the resumption of hostilities. No advantages of consequence were obtained by Spain, but the Dutch were again successful in their career on the seas. The Thirty Years’ War continued to involve Spain. France, though Catholic and virtually ruled by a Catholic cardinal, Richelieu, was more intent on the development of the French state than upon the religious question, and aided the Protestants against their enemies. Richelieu did not bring France into the war until 1635, but, in the meantime, through grants of money and skilful diplomacy, he was able to make trouble for Spain in Italy and in the Low Countries. When at length it seemed as if the Catholic states might win, due largely to the effectiveness of the Spanish infantry, France entered the war on the side of the Protestant princes. Spanish troops continued to win battles, without profiting greatly because of the incessant difficulties from lack of funds. In 1643 the French, under Condé, defeated the Spaniards at Rocroy. The moral effect of this victory was tremendous, like the surrender of the ancient Spartans at the Island of Sphacteria, for it was the first time in some two centuries that the Spanish infantry had been defeated in pitched battle under nearly equal conditions. Henceforth defeats were no novelty. The tide had turned; Rocroy spelled Spain’s doom as a great power. The treaties of Westphalia in 1648 affected Spain only so far as concerned the war with the Protestant Netherlands. Dutch independence was reaffirmed, and the colonies which the Dutch had won, mainly from the Portuguese in the East Indies, were formally granted to them. The Catholic Netherlands remained Spanish. The war with France went on until 1659. In 1652 Cromwell offered Spain an alliance against France, but the price demanded was high; one of the conditions was that Spain should permit Englishmen to trade with the Spanish colonies,—an entering wedge for an English commercial supremacy which might easily be converted into political acquisition. Spain declined and Cromwell joined France. The English conquest of Jamaica in the ensuing war was the first great break in the solidarity of the actually occupied Spanish domain, marking a turning point in colonial history, as Rocroy had done in that of Europe. By the treaty of 1659 Spain gave up the Roussillon and Cerdagne, thus accepting the Pyrenees as the boundary between herself and France. Spain also surrendered Sardinia and large parts both of the Catholic Netherlands and of her former Burgundian possessions. The most fruitful clause in the treaty was that providing for the marriage of the Spanish princess, María Teresa, with Louis XIV of France. The former was to renounce for herself and her heirs any rights she or they might otherwise have to the Spanish throne, while a considerable dowry was to be paid by Spain on her behalf. The results of this marriage will be mentioned presently.
Catalan discontent.
Intimately related to the wars just referred to was the Catalan revolt. The Catalans had long been a nation so far as separate language and institutions go, and their traditions compared well with those of Castile, which had now come to dominate in the Spanish state. The whole course of the revolt is illustrative of the difficulties under which Spain labored in this era of European wars. The Catalans had objected for centuries, even before the union with Castile, to the policy of centralization and absolutism of the kings, alleging their charter rights which were thus contravened. Such acts as the failure of the kings to call the Catalan Cortes, the increases in taxation, or the levying of taxes like those paid in Castile, and the introduction of the Castilian Inquisition had been unfavorably received in the past. Now came the monarchical designs of Olivares, coupled with the unavoidable exigencies of the wars, to heighten the discontent. Aside from the increased taxation there were two matters to which the Catalans were strenuously opposed on the ground that they were against their legal rights,—the maintenance of foreign troops (even Castilians and Aragonese being so regarded) in Catalonia and the enjoyment of public office by persons who were not Catalans. Furthermore they objected to the employment of Catalan troops in foreign countries, holding that their obligations were limited to defending Catalonia, and similarly they maintained that funds raised in Catalonia should not be used for wars outside that province. Philip IV tried to procure a subsidy from the Catalan Cortes in 1626, but the grant was denied. Another attempt was made in 1632, on which occasion Olivares imprudently followed the methods of Charles I at the time of the Cortes of Santiago-Coruña. He got the funds, but his action caused great dissatisfaction in the province. Meanwhile the danger of an invasion from France had led to the sending of troops to Catalonia, and constant friction followed their arrival. The imperfect military discipline of that age, together with the annoyances usually inseparable from the presence of armies, resulted in many abuses, which were resented even to the point of armed conflict; as early as 1629, eleven years before the outbreak, there was a bloody encounter between the citizens and the soldiery at Barcelona. The irksome requirement calling upon the towns to lodge the troops was also productive of ill feeling. By law the most that could be demanded was the use of a room, a bed, a table, fire, salt, vinegar, and service, while all else must be paid for. Lack of funds was such, however, that more than this was exacted. In addition to this there came an order from Madrid calling for the imposition of the quinto, or fifth, of the revenues of the municipalities. France took advantage of the situation to fan the flame of discontent and to win certain Catalan nobles of the frontier to her side. Nevertheless, when the French invaded the Roussillon in 1639 the Catalans rushed to arms and helped to expel them early in 1640.
Beginning of the Catalan revolt.
The questions of lodging the soldiers and of procuring additional funds continued to provoke trouble. Olivares said in an open meeting of the Consejo Real that the Catalans ought to be made to contribute in proportion to their wealth. Later he ordered an enforced levy of Catalan troops for use in Italy, and stated in the decree so providing that it was necessary to proceed without paying attention to “provincial pettiness” (menudencias provinciales). The impulse for the outbreak proceeded, however, from the conflicts between the soldiers and the peasantry of the country districts, especially on account of the excesses of the retreating royal troops at the time of the French invasion of the Roussillon. Curiously enough, the peasantry acted very largely from religious motives. Many of the soldiers were utter foreigners to the Catalans,—such, for example, as the Italians and the Irish, both of which elements were present in considerable numbers. To the ignorant peasants these strange-mannered people, who were Catholics in fact, seemed most certainly heretics. Attacks on the soldiery began in the mountain districts early in 1640, and soon extended to the cities as well. In June a serious riot occurred in Barcelona, during which the hated royal viceroy was killed. That act marked the triumph of the revolution and the beginning of the war.
The war against the Catalans.
It is possible that a policy of moderation might still have avoided the conflict, but such action was not taken. The war lasted nineteen years, and was fought bitterly until 1653. In 1640 the Catalans formed a republic, and made an alliance with France, putting themselves under the protection of the French monarchy. The republic was short-lived; in 1641 the monarchical form returned, with a recognition of the king of France as ruler. French troops aided the Catalans in many expeditions, but in this very fact lay the remedy for the grievances against Spain. The Catalans found that French officials and French soldiers committed the same abuses as those which they had objected to in the case of Castile. Coupled with a statement of Philip IV that he had never intended to interfere with the Catalan fueros, or charter rights (although Olivares certainly had so intended), this proved to be the turning point. Philip confirmed the charters in 1653, but the fighting went on in certain regions until 1659, when Catalonia was recognized as part of Spain in the treaty of peace with France. The war had one good result; it occasioned the dismissal of Olivares in 1643. Nevertheless, the evil had been done beyond repair, though the dispute had experienced a turn for the better, dating from Olivares’ deprivation from office.
Mildness of Spanish rule in Portugal.