The Spanish army in the days of its greatness.
The principal element in the Spanish army was the volunteer soldiery in the king’s pay. Foreign mercenaries were obtained for stated lengths of time or for specific campaigns, but Spaniards enlisted for indefinite service, and thus became the veterans of the army. Military life was popular during the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth, and the army abounded in hidalgos and others of yet higher rank who did not disdain to serve as privates. Later the number of Spanish recruits grew less, when the state began to fail in its regularity of payments, and their withdrawal marked the era when defeats became frequent. Among the noteworthy changes in tactics was the appearance of the regiment. Firearms had now come into general use, and cannon were greatly improved, but it was the pikemen of the Spanish infantry who formed the principal branch of the army until near the close of the period. Because of the inferiority of their weapons the troops with firearms were regarded as a mere auxiliary to the pikemen. Armies were small; 20,000 to 40,000 men was perhaps the usual rule. Even in the century of Spain’s greatness many lands were left without garrison, as occurred nearly always in the case of the Americas; one report of the period of Charles I stated that there was not a port in the colonies which could resist an attack of three hundred men. The worst evils in connection with the army were those of bad administration and a lack of regularity in paying the troops and in remitting funds for munitions and other supplies. Fraud and graft accounted for a great deal of the money which the state did apply to the army. These factors contributed to a lack of military discipline; it was not unusual for ragged and starving soldiers to beg from door to door, and it is not to be wondered at that the troops occasionally took the matter of the collection of their wages into their own hands. It was customary for women of bad repute to accompany the armies, and it sounds strange today that one of the military manuals of the time recommended that there should be eight women, who should be common to all, for every hundred soldiers. Nevertheless, the Spanish infantry, for more than a century, enjoyed the reputation of being the most capable military unit in Europe.
Naval warfare.
Despite the frequency of naval warfare and the necessity of maintaining communications with the Americas, comparatively little attention was paid to the marine establishment, and properly speaking there was no official navy in the entire period. The principal method employed to assemble a fleet was by renting ships, whether from Spaniards or foreigners. In addition a few were built by the state, or purchased, and in times of stress merchant vessels were pressed into service, but this proved ruinous to commerce and ship-building alike. So long as other powers used the same methods Spain was not greatly handicapped, but with the development of national navies in England, France, and the Protestant Netherlands, she was placed at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, considerable fleets were often assembled. In 1643 a special fleet called the Armada de Barlovento (fleet of the Barlovento, modern Windward, Islands) was organized at colonial expense for the defence of the Americas. It was soon withdrawn,—but the tax remained. The fleet of the Catalonian deputation was maintained for a while, but disappeared early in the seventeenth century. There were also a number of private fleets, engaged principally in reprisals against the Moslems, a kind of piracy. While privateering of this sort was forbidden by law the kings frequently granted dispensations which enabled the traffic to be carried on almost continuously. Greater strictness was employed in the Americas lest the privateers should fail to resist the temptation to pick up Spanish merchantmen, but the prohibition there was at length removed, and the Spanish boats rendered great service against pirates and national enemies. During the sixteenth century Spanish fleets were manned by volunteer forces, but this was changed in the seventeenth to compulsory service of the fishermen of the coasts. The heavier work, especially the rowing of the galleys, was done by captives in war and by criminals, who served terms in the galleys rather than in prison. During most of the period the galley, with three banks of oars, was the principal type of vessel. In ocean warfare, the nao, or light sailing-vessel, soon came into use, and this was gradually supplanted by heavier ships, until late in the era there developed the fragata, or frigate, of over two thousand tons, capable of carrying as many as 120 cannon. While the artillery was the principal arm of the fleet, Spanish tactics were at fault in depending on getting close to the enemy and boarding him, making a military action out of the combat and paying little attention to the use of cannon of long range. The same evils which have been described in connection with the army—graft, irregularity of payments, and laxity of discipline—obtained also in the navy; in the expedition of Charles I against Tunis, room on board was found for four thousand enamoradas (sweethearts!) of the soldiers and sailors.
Beginnings of diplomacy.
In common with other European countries Spain developed a diplomatic service in this period. The sending of special embassies and the making of treaties had been customary since ancient times, but the practice of appointing ministers to reside at foreign courts and that of receiving those sent from abroad did not begin in Spain until the reign of Charles I. The initiative had come earlier from the Italian republics. From this time forward Spanish diplomacy, like that of other countries, took on a modern form, and ambassadors sent reports about the state of the countries to which they were accredited, strove to obtain advantages for Spain, endeavored to check the intrigues of the ambassadors of other nations, and made treaties. The use of spies as an auxiliary to ambassadorial work was general. For a time Spanish diplomacy enjoyed a high reputation for success, but in the later seventeenth century it was quite overshadowed by the French.
The Nueva Recopilación and other codes.
The absolutism of the monarchy, its bureaucratic character, and the instinct of the letrados for reducing everything to rules and regulations produced an abundance of legislation, much of which was exceedingly minute in detail and casual in subject-matter. It was natural therefore that there should be a desire for a fresh codification, and this at length took shape in a compilation by Bartolomé de Arrieta in 1567 of the Nueva Recopilación (New Compendium, or Compilation), so-called with reference to the code of Montalvo, its predecessor, of the period of the Catholic Kings. The new collection, which was for Castile only, filled nine volumes, and amounted to little more than an elaboration of the Ordenanzas of Montalvo, with the addition of laws enacted since 1484. It contained the same defects, omitting many royal orders or petitions of the Cortes which had been granted, neglecting to eliminate obsolete laws, and failing to correct others whose text contained errors. Furthermore, in perpetuating the hierarchy of legal sources which had been established in the Leyes de Toro it failed to distinguish between laws in the so-called supplementary codes (such as the Partidas) which were indeed supplementary or obsolete and those which had in fact come to be in force as the principal law. As a result the Nueva Recopilación was generally discredited, and the Roman law of the Partidas, or even of the code of Justinian, was cited in preference. The force of government maintained the new code, however, and it ran through four more editions,—1581, 1592, 1598, and 1640,—and in each case added legislation since the preceding publication. The zeal for codification found expression also in Aragon, Catalonia, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa, while the laws with regard to the Americas were gathered together, after various lesser publications had been made in earlier times, in the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, first issued in 1680. The tendency toward the legal unity of the peninsula was not systematically striven for by the kings, since the variety in private law did not greatly affect their political sovereignty. Nevertheless, something was accomplished along these lines, and within each separate unit a great deal was effected. Thus, in Castile many of the former privileges which made for a division into classes and for consequent differences in the law were done away with, and the same process, though on a smaller scale, made itself felt in the other kingdoms of the peninsula.
Underlying discontent of the people over the Spanish political system.
The submissiveness of the Spanish peoples under absolute rule has often been greatly exaggerated. In fact, neither then nor ever since were they loth to criticise the “mal gobierno” (bad government). Evidences are to be found on every hand of complaints against the bureaucratic organization which was absorbing a great part of the national wealth and of dissatisfaction with the system of government by favorites, the evils of which were only too apparent. Not a few went so far as to desire a republic. Nevertheless, as a general rule, people favored the principle of monarchy, and did not object to the reigning house, but they did desire a reform of the existing régime. The ideal of limited monarchy found strong support among political thinkers, due in a measure to the resentment of Catholics over the enforced apostasy of the subjects of Protestant princes. On this account the Cortes had numerous defenders, some of whom urged its participation in legislation. Many treatises also pronounced against such practices as the sale of public offices or the grant of posts in perpetuity, and against others which have been described as current in this era. In fine, Spaniards were well aware of the evils of their political system and, though patient, were keenly desirous of reform,—despite which, little attention was paid to their wishes.