The History of Minnesota and Tales of the Frontier

by Charles E. Flandrau

In 1862 there were in the State of Minnesota four principal bands of Sioux Indians—the M'day-wa-kon-tons, Wak-pa-koo-tas, Si-si-tons and Wak-pay-tons. The first two bands were known as the Lower Sioux and the last two bands as the Upper Sioux. These designations arose from the fact that, in the sale of their lands to the United States by the treaties of 1851, the lands of the Lower Sioux were situate in the southern part of the state, and those of the upper bands in the more northern part, and when a reservation was set apart for their future occupation on the upper waters of the Minnesota river they were similarly located thereon. Their reservation consisted of a strip of land, ten miles wide, on each side of the Minnesota river, beginning at a point a few miles below Fort Ridgely and extending to the headwaters of the river. The reservation of the lower bands extended up to the Yellow Medicine river; that of the upper bands included all above the last named river. An agent was appointed to administer the affairs of these Indians, whose agencies were established at Redwood for the lower and at Yellow Medicine for the upper bands. At these agencies the annuities were paid to the Indians, and so continued from the making of the treaties to the year 1862. These bands were wild, very little progress having been made in their civilization, the very nature of the situation preventing very much advance in that line. The whole country to the north and west of their reservation was an open, wild region, extending to the Rocky Mountains, inhabited only by the buffalo, which animals ranged in vast herds from British Columbia to Texas. The buffalo was the chief subsistence of the Indians, who naturally frequented their ranges, and only came to the agencies when expecting their payments. When they did come, and the money and goods were not ready for them, which was frequently the case, they suffered great inconvenience, and were forced to incur debt with the white traders for their subsistence, all of which tended to create bad feelings between them and the whites. The Indian saw that he had yielded a splendid domain to the whites, and that they were rapidly occupying it. They could not help seeing that the whites were pushing them gradually—I may say rapidly—out of their ancestral possessions and towards the West, which knowledge naturally created a hostile feeling towards them. The Sioux were a brave people, and the young fighting men were always making comparisons between themselves and the whites, and bantering each other as to whether they were or were not afraid of them. I made a study of these people for several years, having had them in charge as their agent, and I think understood their feelings and standing towards the whites as well as any one. Much has been said and written about the immediate cause of the outbreak of 1862, but I do not believe that anything can be assigned out of the general course of events that will account for the trouble. Delay, as usual, had occurred in the arrival of the money for the payment, which was due in July, 1862. The war was in full force with the South, and the Indians saw that Minnesota was sending thousands of men out of the state to fight the battles of the Union. Major Thomas Galbraith was their agent in the summer of 1862, and being desirous of contributing to the volunteer forces of the government, he raised a company of half-breeds on the reservation and started with them for Fort Snelling, the general rendezvous, to have them mustered into service. It was very natural that the Indians who were seeking for trouble should look upon this movement as a sign of weakness on the part of the government, and reason that, if the United States could not conquer its enemy without their assistance, it must be in serious difficulties. Various things of similar character contributed to create a feeling among the Indians that it was a good time to recover their country, redress all their grievances, and reestablish themselves as lords of the land. They had ambitious leaders. Little Crow was the principal instigator of war on the whites. He was a man of greater parts than any Indian in the tribe. I had used him on many trying occasions, as the captain of my bodyguard, and my ambassador to negotiate with other tribes, and always found him equal to any emergency; but on this occasion his ambition ran away with his judgment, and led him to fatal results. With all these influences at work, it took but a spark to fire the magazine, and that spark was struck on the seventeenth day of August, 1862.

A small party of Indians were at Acton, on August 17th, and got into a petty controversy about some eggs with a settler, which created a difference of opinion among them as to what they should do, some advocating one course and some another. The controversy led to one Indian saying that the other was afraid of the white man, to resent which, and to prove his bravery, he killed the settler, and the whole family was massacred. When these Indians reached the agency, and related their bloody work, those who wanted trouble seized upon the opportunity, and insisted that the only way out of the difficulty was to kill all the whites, and on the morning of the 18th of August the bloody work began.

It is proper to say here that some of the Indians who were connected with the missionaries, conspicuously An-pay-tu-tok-a-cha, or John Otherday, and Paul Ma-za-ku-ta-ma-ni, the president of the Hazelwood Republic, of which I have spoken, having learned of the intention of the Indians, informed the missionaries on the night of the 17th, who, to the number of about sixty, fled eastward to Hutchinson, in McLeod county, and escaped. The next morning, being the 18th of August, the Indians commenced the massacre of the whites, and made clean work of all at the agencies. They then separated into small squads of from five to ten and spread over the country to the south, east and southeast, attacking the settlers in detail at their homes and continued this work during all of the 18th and part of the 19th of August, until they had murdered in cold blood quite one thousand people—men, women and children. The way the work was conducted, was as follows: The party of Indians would call at the house, and, being well known, would cause no alarm. They would await a good opportunity, and shoot the man of the family; then butcher the women and children, and, after carrying off everything that they thought valuable to them, they would burn the house and proceed to the next homestead and repeat the performance. Occasionally some one would escape, and spread the news of the massacre to the neighbors, and all who could would escape to some place of refuge.

The news of the outbreak reached Fort Ridgely (which was situated about thirteen miles down the Minnesota river) from the agencies about eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th, by means of the arrival of a team from the Lower Agency, bringing a badly wounded man; but no details could be obtained. The fort was in command of Capt. John Marsh, of Company "B," Fifth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. He had eighty-five men in his company, from which he selected forty-five, leaving the balance, under Lieut. T. F. Gere, to defend the fort. This little squad, under command of Captain Marsh, with a full supply of ammunition, provisions, blankets, etc., accompanied by a six-mule team, left the fort at 9:00 a. m., on the 18th of August, for the Lower Sioux Agency, which was on the west side of the Minnesota river, the fort being on the east, which necessitated the crossing of the river by a ferry near the agency. On the march up the command passed nine or ten dead bodies, all bearing evidence of having been murdered by the Indians, one of which was Dr. Humphrey, surgeon at the agency. On reaching the vicinity of the ferry no Indians were in sight, except one on the opposite side of the river, who tried to induce them to cross over. A dense chaparral bordered the river on the agency side, and tall grass covered the bottom on the side where the troops were. Suspicion of the presence of Indians was aroused by the disturbed condition of the water of the river, which was muddy and contained floating grass. Then a group of ponies was seen. At this point, and without any notice whatever, Indians in great numbers sprang up on all sides of the troops, and opened upon them a deadly fire. About half of the men were killed instantly. Finding themselves surrounded, it became with the survivors a question of sauve qui peut. Several desperate hand-to-hand encounters occurred, with varying results, when the remnant of the command made a point down the river, about two miles from the ferry, Captain Marsh being of the number. Here they attempted to cross, but the captain was drowned in the effort. Only from thirteen to fifteen of the command reached the fort alive. Among those killed was Peter Quinn, the United States interpreter, an Irishman, who had been in the Indian territory for many years. He had married into the Chippewa tribe. He was a man much esteemed by the army and all old settlers.

Much criticism has been indulged in as to whether Captain Marsh, when he became convinced of the general outbreak, should not have retreated to the fort. Of course, forty-five men could do nothing against five or six hundred warriors, who were known to be at or about the agency. The Duke of Wellington, when asked as to what was the best test of a general, said, "To know when to retreat, and to dare to do it." Captain Marsh cannot be justly judged by any such criterion. He was not an experienced general. He was a young, brave, and enthusiastic soldier. He knew little of Indians. The country knows that he thought he was doing his duty in advancing. I am confident, whether this judgment is intelligent or not, posterity will hold in warmer esteem the memory of Captain Marsh and his gallant little band than if he had adopted the more prudent course of retracing his steps. Gen. George Custer was led into an ambush of almost the exact character, which was prepared for him by many of the same Indians who attacked Marsh, and he lost five companies of the Seventh United States Cavalry, one of the best fighting regiments in the service, not a man escaping.

Immediately previous to the outbreak Lieut. Timothy J. Sheehan, of Company "C," Fifth Minnesota, had been sent, with about fifty men of his company, to the Yellow Medicine Agency, on account of some disorder prevailing among the Indians; but having performed his duty, he had been ordered to Fort Ripley, and had on the 17th left Fort Ridgley, and on the 18th had reached a point near Glencoe, distant from Fort Ridgley about forty miles. As soon as Captain Marsh became aware of the outbreak, he sent the following dispatch to Lieutenant Sheehan, which reached him on the evening of the 18th:

"Lieutenant Sheehan:

"It is absolutely necessary that you should return with your command immediately to this post. The Indians are raising hell at the Lower Agency. Return as soon as possible."

Lieutenant Sheehan was then a young Irishman, of about the age of twenty-five years, with immense physical vigor, and corresponding enthusiasm. He immediately broke camp and returned to the fort, arriving there on the 19th of August, having made a forced march of forty-two miles in nine and one-half hours. He did not arrive a moment too soon. Being the ranking officer after the death of Captain Marsh, he took command of the post. The garrison then consisted of the remnant of Marsh's Company "B," fifty-one men, Sheehan's Company "C," fifty men, and the Renville Rangers, fifty men. This latter company was the one raised by Major Galbraith, the Sioux agent at the agencies, and was composed principally of half-breeds. It was commanded by Capt. James Gorman. On reaching St. Peter, on its way down to Snelling to be mustered into the service of the United States, it learned of the outbreak, and at once returned to Ridgley, having appropriated the arms of a militia company at St. Peter. There was also at Ridgley, Sergeant Jones of the regular artillery, who had been left there in charge of the military stores. He was quite an expert gunner, and there were several field-pieces at the fort. Besides this garrison, a large number of people from the surrounding country had sought safety at the fort, and there was also a party of gentlemen, who had brought up the annuity money to pay the Indians, who, learning of the troubles, had stopped with the money, amounting to some $70,000 in specie. I will here leave the fort for the present, and turn to other points that became prominent in the approaching war.

On the night of the 18th of August, the day of the outbreak, the news reached St. Peter, and, as I have before stated, induced the Renville Rangers to retrace their steps. Great excitement prevailed, as no one could tell at what moment the Indians might dash into the town, and massacre the inhabitants.