October 30.—This morning the Arabs came to Halfeyeh, capturing some of our heedless people; whether they will stay there or not I do not know—rumour says they are on their way to Shoboloha and Shendy to repel the ravages of steamers.
You have the map made by railway engineers of the route from Ambukol to Metemma, which must have all information, wells, &c., &c. I should put five station forts along the line, and when I made my debouch at Metemma I should split off one detachment to capture Berber, and another towards Kartoum, taking care of any guns in Shoboloha defile (during which passage I should march the men, and not leave them in the steamers or boats). I would make my base at Metemma for all operations in the Soudan connected with the Nile Valley—the numbers I have put for the forts along road are probably in excess of what would be required.
The Arab force which went towards the north (? Shendy) consists of 200 footmen, and 50 horse.
Two men came in from the south front—they say the Sheikh el Obeyed is with the Mahdi; and Waled a Goun, and Abou Gugliz are at Giraffe. I expect that the Arabs have captured one of our merchant’s boats at Halfeyeh.
We have 1300 men in the North Fort, yet 250 Arabs went boldly across our front to Halfeyeh, and we do not dare to show our noses; this speaks for our morale.
A slave came in at Omdurman; he says the Mahdi says he will not fight until after Moharrem (to-day is 12th Moharrem).
Arabs fired on the lines from near the White Nile to-day, but did no harm. Not being able to sleep last night, I was late in getting up, and consequently every one also slept and no proper look-out was kept on the Arabs. I should think I had written twenty orders about their keeping a look-out, but it is of no use. The Arabs have gone back to Giraffe. I am going to make the officer of North Fort pay compensation for the men wounded, and to the families of those killed, in this raid. The map made by the railway engineers (1874-1875) must have every information as to water supply on Ambukol-Metemma road.
In reality, the relief of the garrisons is only a question of crossing over a well-surveyed road of 150 miles, at the end of which are found five steamers and nine guns: of course there is a great deal of trouble in transport arrangements, but no particular danger.
I believe we (i.e. those Shaggyeh) lost to-day twenty-three soldiers taken prisoners, one killed, one wounded; seventeen cows, five women, eight slaves, three donkeys, seven horses,[174] twenty-four Remington rifles[175] captured; and this after I had repeatedly warned them of an impending attack, and specially warned them last night after the capture of the three spies. They, these Shaggyeh, number 1200; on the other side, with 30 horses, the Arabs were not 200; they made no attempt to defend themselves; dreadful lot, how I look forward to their disbandment! Had I left them at Halfeyeh what a time I should have had with them. The Arabs have paid us off with interest for our cavalry raids of a few days ago. If any troops come up, as soon as the environs are clear around Kartoum, I would recommend their immediate disbandment. I cannot see any reason why the “expedition for the relief of the garrisons” should not have captured Berber, and arrived at Kartoum on 10th November (Lord Mayor’s Show), which is giving ample time; saying that troops did advance from Cairo on the 15th August, which I guess (from Kitchener’s laconic dispatch of 31st August) was the case. That strong rumours could not have been known at Debbeh (for at least twenty days) that Kartoum steamers were at Metemma (plundering right and left) is most unlikely, even if my many spies (sent with notes to this effect) did not get through one of their number. These rumours should have pointed out that the Ambukol-Metemma road was the road to follow[176]—even if not decided on before, which is most probable.