November 30.—Fort Omdurman all right. A slave came from the Arabs to it last night. Arabs (10.30 a.m.) have fired two rounds from their (“personality”)[257] battery at Goba, but the projectiles did not reach the Palace.
I hear that one of the shells fired by Arabs did reach the town, and fell behind the Palace. They have fired three rounds more, and then the house in which they had their gun fell down. They are now digging away to get out the gun. I expect the gun-carriage requires repair, for the house was a good height. 11.15 a.m. Arabs either had another gun besides that in the house which fell down, or that gun was not damaged in the fall of house, for they have just fired another round at the North Fort. Noon. The Arabs fired three more rounds at the North Fort. The shells burst in the air, and the Arabs have now gone to dinner. Another man deserted to the Arabs; he had previously deserted from the Arabs to us. Two of the band reported to have deserted to the Arabs have been found in the town. The Arabs at Goba (whom I do not think number more than 40!!!) fired three more rounds from their gun this evening. I feel strongly disposed to go over myself with 100 men (against 40!) and attack them to-morrow. It is simply ridiculous the apathy that is shown. These forty men, which is the outside of their number, are at least four miles from any assistance. The place is so flat and bare that this is a certainty.
December 1.—During the night the Arabs fired on town with their guns. At daybreak they fired from their guns on the Palace and the North Fort, and on Mogrim and Bourré. A caravan of seventeen camels came to the Mahdi from Dongola to-day. The “Nordenfeldt” (Omdurman) has been silent for last three days. Omdurman Fort all right. 10.40 a.m. Arabs just fired one shot, which struck water in front of the Palace; they fired another which burst in the air.
11 a.m. I have sent down the Bordeen to entice the Arabs to waste their ammunition, which they are doing.
Towfik’s telegram to me, was to-day more fully explained, and I gather that he says Lord Wolseley and Sir E. Baring are coming up, and that they will settle the question of the Soudan. I have replied, that it may be convenient for him (Towfik), but it does not meet the case, unless these two officials have a firman from him, giving them authority. Now this the two officials will never have, for it virtually would make them Towfik’s subordinates. It is implied in the telegram, that I am to arrange with these two officials, as to the Soudan. A delightful arrangement for Towfik, but not one so delightful for me; so I have answered him, it is for him (Towfik) to arrange with these two officials, and to send his arrangements in the form of a firman here. It is certain that no legal authority exists in the Soudan, except it is held from Towfik, and unless these two officials have authority from Towfik, they have no authority in the Soudan; now if they hold authority from Towfik, they are under Towfik’s orders.
The “fiction” will not hold good in the Soudan. Though I am pretty well dispirited for the last few days, I cannot help laughing at the fearful mess we are in. Towfik is as sharp as his father, and wants to quietly saddle me with the controversy, reserving to himself the right of criticism, but I do not feel inclined to be thus saddled, and I shall perhaps appoint Baring Governor-General, subject to the approval of Towfik, and shall bolt. B. may say he will not take it, but he will have no choice, for, if he does not, he throws away any legal status he possesses. He, on his part, may name some one else, but that will be his look out. My object, of course, is to make tracks, if I can do so (without hurting our country, or being the cause of danger in the smallest degree to our troops), and to leave the onus on Baring and the Ministry. I do not feel so kindly to Towfik as to fight his battles up here, which is what he evidently aims at, neither do I feel inclined to compromise myself by aiding Baring.[258] I have said the only possible solution is the Sultan, let the subsidy be what it may. The fact is that the expeditionary force comes up here as allies of Towfik (unless its Government says it comes up as independent), and as allies of Towfik, it is in all reason subject, as far as civil affairs are concerned, to Towfik; its officers can issue no decrees, except in his name, save those which concern military operations. A nice accommodating Governor-General would work this affair, without friction. I will not, for I am too deeply involved with the people; but I want (like a rat) to leave the house before it falls, so the best thing is to hint to me, “make Kitchener Governor-General,” “subject to the approval of Towfik!” Then K. would do all you want, and in a legal way, and you would be happy. Unless you have a superior firman to mine, you cannot make K. Governor-General (even if you had ten million troops), unless you declare yourself the rulers of the land, which you will not do, because of the ninety millions sterling of debt on Egypt. 5 p.m. Arabs fired two more shells at the Palace, so I put the three buglers on the roof to practice at them. They say they killed fifteen. I would much like to know contents of Lord W.’s telegram to me, also the telegrams in cipher from Nubar and Baring; but I never shall have that pleasure, for I do not expect either this journal will ever be given back, or if it is, that I shall be lent the cipher books to decipher them. The Arabs fired two rounds at the Palace this evening, one fell in the water in front of the Palace, and one fell in the garden. Two shells fired by the Arabs from Bourré to-day, fell close to the hospital.
To my mind, this is the idea of H.M. Government:—Expedition comes up to look after British subjects nominally, but, in reality, to settle future government of Soudan, under the pretence that Towfik governs. Towfik telegraphs to me, “that the British officials will settle future status of the Soudan with me sub rosa”!! now, of course, I may be wrong, but my idea is that the British officials will propose the keeping of Sennaar, Kartoum, Berber, and Dongola, the non-interference with the Mahdi, cession of Kassala to King John, the leaving to their fate the Equator Provinces, &c. And what the British officials propose Towfik will agree to; but then comes the question, as I consider the proposal is unacceptable (inasmuch as long as the Mahdi is alongside, no peace is possible), I will not accept it, and will leave A. or B. as my, and Towfik’s representative, to carry the proposition out. (“Après moi, le déluge.”) No one can blame me for this, for I should be a scoundrel if I accepted any proposition which would eventually give trouble to our country.
December 2.—The Arabs fired four shells at the Palace at daybreak with no effect. 9 a.m. They have fired four more; one burst close to my room—a little high. I have put two guns near the Palace to reply to them. Report in town says Waled a Goun’s men are passing over from the right bank of the White Nile to the Mahdi’s camp on the left bank. Omdurman Fort reports all right. 11 a.m. The Arabs opened fire again on the Palace; we are answering. The Arabs have now two guns firing on us. There is a report that the Arabs of the Mahdi are going north (on the left bank of the White Nile). Noon.—We have silenced our friends opposite, having concentrated a heavy fire on them. I nearly lost my eyes this morning, firing on Arabs, the base of the brass cartridge blew out, and sent the fire into my face; this is a fault of the Remington; the metal case of this cartridge must not be used too often.
