[80] The Gabra wells are about thirty miles to the north-west of Kartoum.—Ed.
[81] United Service Club.—Ed.
[82] The blanks are General Gordon’s.—Ed.
[83] The following extract from Herodotus is pasted on the opposite side of page in the original journal:—“The spies having seen everything returned home; and when they reported all they had passed, Cambyses marched against the Ethiopians without making any provision for the subsistence of his army, or once considering that he was going to carry his arms to the remotest parts of the world; but as a madman and not in possession of his senses, as soon as he heard the reports of the Icthyophagi he set out on his march ... but before the army had passed over a fifth part of the way all the provisions were exhausted, and after the provisions the beasts of burden were eaten. Now if Cambyses had then led back his army he would have proved himself a wise man. He, however, went on; but afterwards none, except the Ammonians, and those who have heard their reports, are able to give account of them; for they neither reached the Ammonians or returned back, but the report was that heaps of sand covered them over and they disappeared.” General Gordon has written against this extract:—“Hicks’ army disappeared. This expedition was made into these lands.”—Ed.
[84] General Gordon was under the impression that Colonel Chermside was at Debbeh, whereas he was, in fact, at Suakin.—Ed.
[85] The primary object of the expedition up the Valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Kartoum. When that object has been secured no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken.—Egypt, No. 35, 1884; No. 157.—Ed.
[86] Upper part of Nubian Desert.—Ed.
[87] From British agent and Nubar Pasha to General Gordon, sent 5th May from Suakin; reached 29th of July.—Ed.
[88] Telegram from General Gordon to Sir E. Baring dated Feb. 27, 1884, says: “You have to say whether the partial evacuation of the Soudan fulfils your objects,—if it does not, then you must act by Indian Moslem troops from Wady Halfa; and do so at once by sending detachments of troops to Wady Halfa.”—Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Enclosure 1, in No. 229. And again, on Feb. 29, “Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Suakin-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt. Whether you think it worth while to do this or not you are, of course, the best judge. I can only tell you the modus operandi of an expeditious intervention. If you decide against this you may probably have to decide between Zubair and the Mahdi. Zubair with £100,000.”—Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Enclosure 5, No. 229.—Ed.
[89] “Nineteenth Century,” August, 1877.—Ed.