The steamer Bordeen is back from Halfeyeh.
We chose to regard Greece, Spain, Turkey, Mexico, and other lands, as debtors and bankrupts. We did not attempt to saddle the rulers, personally, with the debts of these countries—excepting in the case of Egypt and Ismail Pasha (i.e., we did not turn out the rulers of those states, while we did turn out Ismail), of course it is easy to put it down to his ill-faith. I expect the rulers of those other states were guilty of far worse faith. It is the custom to say we acted in the interests of the oppressed fellaheen, but what have the fellaheen gained up to the present time? Where are those millions to come from I have talked of?
Let us consider dispassionately the state of affairs. Does Her Majesty’s Government consider they are responsible for the extrication of the Soudan garrisons and Cairo inhabitants? We can only judge that Her Majesty’s Government does recognise this responsibility, for otherwise why did they send me up, and why did they relieve Tokar?
Once this responsibility is assumed, I see no outlet for it but to relieve the garrisons, coûte que coûte. It may be said that the object of the present expedition is for my relief personally. But how is it possible for me to go away and leave men whom I have egged on to fight for the last six months? How could I leave after encouraging Sennaar to hold out? No one could possibly wish me to do so. No Government could take the responsibility of so ordering me. There is this difficulty: perhaps it would be patriotic to bolt; but even if I could get my mind to do it, I doubt if it is possible to get my body out of this place. Had Baring said in March, “Shift for yourself as best you can,” which he could have done, the affair could have been arranged, and we could have bolted to the Equator; but, if you look over my telegrams,[108] you will see I ask him what he will do, and he never answered.[109] The people had not then endured any privation, and I was, as it were, not much engaged to them; but now it is different, especially as we have communicated with Sennaar.
No one can judge the waste of money and expense of life in the present expedition—it is an utter waste of both—but it is simply due to the indecisions of our Government. Had they said from the first, “We do not care—we will do nothing for the garrisons of the Soudan, they may perish; had they not relieved Tokar; had they not telegraphed to me as to the force to relieve me (vide telegrams, 5th May, from Suakin; 29th April, from Massowah). Had they telegraphed (when Baring telegraphed to Cuzzi 29th March, which arrived here saying, ‘No British troops are coming to Berber, negotiations going on about opening road—Graham was about to attack Osman Digna’”), “SHIFT FOR YOURSELF”, why, nothing could have been said; but Her Majesty’s Government would not say they were going to abandon the garrisons, and therefore “shift for yourself”. It is that which has hampered us so much. On the one hand, if I bolted I deserted them (Her Majesty’s Government); on the other hand, by staying I have brought about this expedition. Baring gave me distinct orders not to go to the Equator without the permission of Her Majesty’s Government (vide telegrams with Stewart’s journal).[110] I do not question the policy of Her Majesty’s Government in not keeping the Soudan. It is a wretched country, and not worth keeping. I do not pretend even to judge the policy of letting the garrisons, &c., &c., perish; but I do say, I think that Her Majesty’s Government ought to have taken the bold step of speaking out and saying, “SHIFT FOR YOURSELF” in March, when I could have done so, and not now, when I am in honour bound to the people after six months’ bothering warfare. Not only did Baring not say, “Shift for yourself,” but he put a veto upon my going to the Equator—vide his telegrams in Stewart’s Journal. I say this because no one deplores more the waste of money and life in this expedition, and no one can realise its difficulties better than myself, but, owing to what has past, owing to indecision, we are in for it, and the only thing now to do is to see how to get out of it, with honour and the least expense possible—and I see no other way than by giving the country to the Turks. I am not raising difficulties, or being cantankerous; I wish most sincerely I was out of the place, where from February I have had no peace. The question is how to do so. I may be wrong, but I have a strong suspicion that much rejoicing (rejoicing perhaps a little for my personal, but a good deal for my official safety) would have taken place in official circles had I appeared in the Abbas with Stewart; but it was not even physically possible, and I should have been a disgraced man for ever had I been able to do so and had done it. Besides which, we were entirely in doubt as to the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government as to letting the garrisons slide or not. I might have been tried for deserting my post, and for letting the steamers and stores fall into the hands of the Mahdi, for that was certain within five days of my quitting the place. What I suspect or do not suspect, would not justify me in my action, and, as it turns out, my suspicions were wrong, for after Stewart left, I hear a British force is coming up—of course it is a query what is it coming up for? If for the garrisons, then I have done what the Government wants, for I have kept the city; if for me, then I have done wrong, for I should have come down at all costs; but in one case great inconvenience would have been given; while in the other it is only my life—and if it is for me the expedition comes, it would be better to tell me, “Shift for yourself; we do not mean to extricate the garrisons”—in which case perhaps we may find an issue—at any rate the people will know exactly the state of affairs, and our Government will not be exposed to an unnecessary expense and danger in sending troops up here for ME. I should consider Her Majesty’s Government were completely exonerated from all responsibility with respect to myself if they sent me that order, “Shift for yourself; we do not mean to extricate the garrisons,” I should make my arrangements, and (telling the people how I am situated, with no hope of relief for them), should make a bolt to the Equator in six weeks’ time. There would be no dishonour in that, for, as I had no relief coming, the only sequel of my staying with them would be to be a prisoner with them, and in fact my presence would only exasperate the Arabs instead of being of any good.
It may be argued, Why not retreat on Berber? I would rather not do that, for I would wish to show in a positive way that I had no part or lot in the abandoning of the garrisons, &c., &c., and, at any rate, I should save the garrisons of the Equator and of the Bahr Gazelle if I succeeded in getting away to them.
October 6.—The steamer Bordeen up the Blue Nile wasting a lot of ammunition on the Arab foraging parties. No arsenals could stand this drain on their resources. I expect that the Bordeen fired fifty rounds to-day.
Three escaped soldiers came in from the Arabs; they say that the Arabs have sent a Krupp and a mountain gun to Giraffe; so that may account for the heavy firing above mentioned. One of the men says the Arabs placed two boats in a position close to the two guns they had brought, in order to entice the steamer to go and take them, thus hoping to sink her. However, I am glad to say the steamer is on her way back. The continual anxiety one is in about these little things is very wearing. One never knows if, through some rash act, I may not lose a steamer, or men may not be cut off. One has no man like Gessi[111] who one can trust for these little expeditions. Steamer Towfikia went up the White Nile and fired upon the Arabs. It is just as I thought: the Bordeen steamer has come back, having been struck by a shell about a foot above the water-line, close to the cutwater; no one was hurt. All the Arabs are going from the White Nile towards Giraffe. I expect we shall have the old game at Bourré again. In these circumstances you can imagine how very vicious one feels towards Her Majesty’s Intelligence Department for not giving us any news. It is not so much for myself as it is for the townspeople.[112]
The steamer reports that the Arabs had five guns. It is evident the Arabs mean to hold the Blue Nile by their force at Giraffe, and I dare not try to dislodge them; they will then communicate with the Sheikh el Obeyed’s force, and eventually come down upon Shoboloha or thereabouts; while the Mahdi, coming to Omdurman, will circle us in, a second time.