His theoretical error consists in his treating money at one moment as capital par excellence, at another as a mere medium of exchange having no value. He forgets that money is desired not merely for purposes of exchange, but also as a store of value, as the proper instrument for hoarding and saving; and although the exchange notes may replace it in one respect, they fail in another. We may increase the circulating media at pleasure, but we cannot multiply our capital. Money may be replaced by goods, but this will not add a single franc to the capital which already exists in society, of which money itself is a part. Nor will it lessen the superior value of present as compared with future goods—a superiority which gives rise to the phenomenon of interest. The only result of multiplying the exchange notes without increasing the amount of social capital would be to raise prices as a whole, the price of land, houses, and machinery as well as the price of consumption goods. Capital would be lent as before, and being less plentiful the high rate of interest or rent would tend to maintain the high level of prices, and these would in turn be still further increased—a strange outcome of a reform intended to lower them! Proudhon, having exaggerated the evil effects of gold, now accepts Say’s formula too literally. J. B. Say allowed himself to be led into error by his own formula that “Goods exchange for goods,” and it is interesting to note that the Exchange Bank is the logical, though somewhat paradoxical, outcome of the reaction against the Mercantilist ideas concerning money which can be traced to Adam Smith and the Physiocrats.
This does not imply that Proudhon’s idea is devoid of truth. The false ideal of free credit contains the germ of a true ideal, namely, mutual credit. The Bank of France is a society of capitalists whose credit is established by the public who accept their notes. They really deal in public credit. Proudhon saw clearly enough that their notes are ultimately guaranteed by the public. The public are the true signatories of these commercial goods. Were the public insolvent the bank would never recover its advances, which really constitute the security for the bills. The shareholders’ capital is only a supplementary guarantee. The Comte Mollien, the Financial Minister of Napoleon I, declared that in theory a bank of issue should be able to operate without any capital. The public lends money to itself through the intermediary, the bank. Why not operate without the intermediary? Why not eliminate the entrepreneur of credit just as the industrial or commercial entrepreneur is eliminated in the case of the co-operative society? Discount would not disappear altogether, perhaps, but the rate of discount for borrowers would be diminished in proportion to the extent to which they stood to gain as lenders. This is the principle of the mutual credit society, where the initial capital is almost entirely superseded, its place being taken by the joint liability of the co-operators. Proudhon’s initial conception seems to be reducible to this very simple idea.[678]
It seems that Proudhon was merely following the idea of a co-operative credit bank, just as in other parts of the work he copies other forms of co-operation without ever showing much sympathy for the principle itself.[679]
In addition to a correct conception of the value of mutual credit, there runs throughout his whole system a more fundamental idea which helps to distinguish it from other forms of official socialism which arose either before or after his time. This is his profound belief in individual liberty as the indispensable motive of economic activity in industrial societies. He realised better than any of his predecessors that economic liberty is a definite acquisition of modern societies, and that every true reform must be based on liberty. He has estimated the strength of spontaneous economic forces more clearly than anyone else. He has demonstrated their pernicious effects, but at the same time he has recognised, as Adam Smith had done, that this was the most powerful lever of progress. His passionate love of justice explains his hatred of private property, and his jealous belief in liberty aroused his hostility to socialism. Despite his famous formula, Destruam et ædificabo, he destroyed more than he built. His liberalism rested on his profound hold of economic realities, and the social problem of to-day, as Proudhon clearly saw, is how to combine justice with liberty.
Proudhon’s project for an Exchange Bank must not be confused with analogous schemes that have appeared either before or after his day. All these schemes have a common basis in a reform of exchange as a remedy for social inequalities. Apart from this one idea the resemblance is frequently superficial, and the economic bases differ considerably.
(1) Proudhon’s idea has often been contrasted with Robert Owen’s labour notes, and with the scheme prepared by Mr. Bray in 1839, in a work entitled Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy,[680] as well as with the later system outlined by Rodbertus. Proudhon’s circulating notes have nothing in common with the labour notes described by these writers. The circulating notes represent commercial goods produced for the purpose of private exchange. Prices are freely fixed by buyer and seller, and they bear no relation to the labour time, as is the case with the labour notes. The final result, doubtless, was expected to be the same. Proudhon hoped that in this way the price of goods, now that it was no longer burdened with interest on capital, would equal cost of production. This result was to be obtained indirectly. The economic errors in the two cases are also different. Proudhon’s error lay in his failure to realise that metallic money is a merchandise as well as an instrument of circulation. The error of Owen, of Bray, and of Rodbertus consisted of a failure to see that the price of goods includes something more than the mere amount of labour which they have cost to produce—an error which Proudhon at any rate did not commit.
(2) Proudhon’s bank has also been confused with other banks of exchange which are really quite different. The ideas underlying such schemes had become prominent before Proudhon’s days, and numerous practical experiments had been attempted along the lines indicated. These banks aimed, not at the suppression of interest, but at a gradual rapprochement between producer and consumer, the goods offered for sale being bought by the bank, and paid for in exchange notes upon an agreed basis of calculation. Buyers in their turn would come to the bank to obtain the necessaries of life, paying for them in exchange notes. An experiment of this kind was made by a certain Fulcrand Mazel in 1829.[681] In this case the bank was merely an entrepôt which facilitated the marketing of the goods produced. Such a system is open to the objection that the value of the notes issued in payment for goods would necessarily vary with the fluctuations in the value of these goods during the interval which would elapse between the time they are taken in by the bank and their eventual purchase by consumers. Proudhon’s plan was to discount the goods already bought or actually delivered. The bank would only advance what was actually promised, but would make no charge for accommodation. Depreciation could only arise if the buyer were insolvent. It could never result from a fall in price as a result of a diminished demand for the product. Proudhon renounced all dealings with solidarity when he dismissed Mazel’s project.[682]
(3) M. Solvay, a Belgian entrepreneur, has recently elaborated a scheme of “social accounting.” He also proposes the suppression of metallic money and the introduction of a perfect system of payment. Here, however, the analogy ends.