[488] Note this argument, which has so frequently been employed by Liberal economists, and which we shall come across in Bastiat’s work. The Saint-Simonians are constantly running with the hare as well as hunting with the hounds.

[489] Doctrine, p. 182. The historical argument of which we have just given a short summary is developed in the Doctrine, pp. 179-193. It is open to a still more fundamental criticism, inasmuch as it does not seem to be historically accurate.

[490] Saint-Simon, Mémoire introductif sur sa Contestation avec M. de Redern (1812) (Œuvres, vol. i, p. 122).

[491] Doctrine, p. 144.

[492] The philosophy of history might be said to consist of attempts to show that history is made up of alternating periods of organic growth and destructive criticism. The former periods are marked by unity of thought and aim, of feeling and action in society; the latter by a conflict of ideas and sentiments, by political and social instability. The former periods are essentially religious, the latter selfish. Reform and revolution are the modern manifestations of the critical nature of the period in which we live. Saint-Simonism would lead us into a definitely organic epoch. Historical evolution seems to point to a religious and universal association.

[493] Doctrine, p. 119.

[494] Ibid., p. 121. “Man is not without some intuitive knowledge of his destiny, but when science has proved the correctness of his surmises and demonstrated the accuracy of his forecasts, when it has assured him of the legitimacy of his desires, he will move on with all the greater assurance and calmness towards a future that is no longer unknown to him. Thus will he become a free, intelligent agent working out his own destiny, which he himself cannot change, but which he may considerably expedite by his own efforts.”

[495] This is developed at great length in the seventh lecture, Doctrine, pp. 211 et seq.

[496] “Politics,” says Saint-Simon, “have their roots in morality, and a people’s institutions are just the expression of their thoughts.” (Œuvres, vol. iii, p. 31.) “Philosophy,” he remarks elsewhere, “is responsible for the creation of all the more important political institutions. No other power would have the strength necessary to check the action of those that have already become antiquated or to set up others more in conformity with a new doctrine.” (Syst. indust., Œuvres, vol. v, p. 167.) He further insists upon the part which philanthropists may play in the creation of a new society. “One truth,” he writes, “that has been established in the course of human progress is this: a disinterested desire for the general well-being of the community is a more effective instrument of political improvement than the conscious self-regarding action of the classes for which these changes will prove most beneficial. In a word, experience seems to show that those who should naturally be most interested in the establishment of a new order of things are not those who show the greatest desire to bring it about.” (Œuvres, vol. vi, p. 120.) It would be difficult to imagine a neater refutation of Marxian ideas, especially the contention that the emancipation of the workers can only come from the workers themselves.

[497] Cf. on these points Weill, L’École Saint-Simonienne (1896), and Charléty, Histoire du Saint-Simonisme (1896).