The result of all this presents very serious matter for reflexion, for this Irish question will probably draw a broad line of separation between parties, afford respective rallying-points, and secure a formidable and united opposition if the Tories come in; and one cannot regard without the greatest apprehension the prospect of a systematic determined hostility on the part of the Irish masses towards this country with the certainty almost that the ground on which the battle will be fought will be that of maintaining the Irish Church. This is in point of fact the interest which the Tory or English party regard. Ireland is denied her share in representation, hers is made an exceptional case, because she is under Catholic influence, and because that Catholic influence will, they suspect, if ever it is strong enough, exert its strength in overturning the English Church. I do not think anybody of sense and information believes that the Irish Catholic clergy or laity have any disinclination to British connexion, except so far as they are in their own eyes degraded or injured by it. There exists, and there ever will exist, that one deep feeling, constantly kept burning in the minds of the laity by the undying zeal of the clergy, that Catholic Ireland is insulted and impoverished by the vast Protestant ecclesiastical establishment, that in the most important, the most heart-stirring of all interests, an interest at once temporal and spiritual, they are stripped of those equal and essential rights which are possessed by England and Scotland. I have never doubted that sooner or later this contest would arise, and that the end of it will be, however long in coming, the downfall of the Church of England in Ireland, as fall it ought.[9]
[9] [This prediction was fulfilled in 1868. But the measure was not followed by that cessation of discord which Mr. Greville hopefully anticipated from it.]
February 27th, 1841
The debate lasted four nights on Morpeth’s Bill, and Ministers got a majority of five, both sides bringing down the sick and the dying without remorse. A close division and parties nicely balanced, extinguish all feelings of humanity. The best speeches were Charles Buller’s, SETTLEMENT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. Sheil’s, Follett’s, Peel’s, and John Russell’s. It is supposed this will bolster them up for the Session, but something still depends on Stanley’s Bill.
Foreign affairs have assumed a better aspect. A negotiation is going on here for the purpose of inviting France to join the alliance, and take part in the final settlement of the Eastern Question, which she desires no better than to accept, and then to disarm; indeed, she has already begun to do so. The delay is occasioned by some difficulty as to the forms to be adopted. The French want some phrases, which don’t seem unreasonable in themselves, but about which the Russian makes a difficulty. There is to be a Note, and in this Note Bourqueney wishes it to be expressly stated that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is now secured, but Brunnow makes this strange objection, that they should thereby be admitting the de jure occupation of Algiers by the French. This seems such a frivolous objection that it is difficult to conceive it can be the real one. The wonder is that Palmerston, who carries everything with so high a hand, does not overrule it auctoritate suâ. He has been showing off his flippancy lately not only to France, but to Austria, writing despatches to Lord Granville, which are in such a tone that he complains bitterly of being instructed to read them to Guizot; and, with regard to Austria, this occurred: Metternich wrote some letter complaining of delay in settling the question of Mehemet Ali’s hereditary possession of Egypt, which, it seems, nettled Palmerston, and he wrote a remarkably clever but very insolent answer, in which he reviewed the vacillations and inconsistencies of the Austrian Cabinet in a very offensive style. This despatch was read by the Cabinet; and I fancy generally disapproved, very much so by Melbourne, who however did not interfere, and let it go. But Frederick Lamb, who has all the confidence and courage which Melbourne wants, very quietly put it in his drawer, and wrote word to Palmerston that circumstances were changed and he should not give it to Metternich. Melbourne was very much pleased at this, and said it was very judicious; but he forgot that it was his business to stop it in the first instance, and that, thinking it imprudent, as Prime Minister he ought to have put his veto on it. But he is only Prime Minister in name, and has no authority. He is all in all at Buckingham Palace, but very little in Downing Street.
March 2nd, 1841, Tuesday
On Sunday I met Bourqueney at dinner. He was very gloomy, talked of the debate in the Chamber and the declarations in favour of keeping up the isolement as ‘très-grave,’ and then complained bitterly, but obscurely, of the difficulties he encountered here, and how hard it was, after the unanimous expressions in both Houses of Parliament, that such obstacles should be cast in the way of a settlement, hinting at Palmerston as the cause, but without being explicit; indeed, it was in the carriage going to Lady Holland’s, and there was not time for more. To-day, however, I have heard more; and it seems that Palmerston has been at his tricks again, though I don’t yet know precisely what he has done. My brother keeps writing me word that his tone in his communications to the French Government, through Lord Granville, is very offensive; but here he appeared to be really anxious to conciliate. It is, however, quite impossible to make out what he is at. He has contributed more than anybody to give this Government a federal character; for in the Foreign Office he has resolved to be, and he is, wholly independent of his colleagues. He tells them as much or as little of his proceedings as it suits his purpose or his fancy to do; and they are now so well aware of this, and have so little confidence in him, that when he does tell the Cabinet anything they feel no security that they are acquainted with the truth or, at least, the whole truth. In the pending matter, Esterhazy and Bülow have been vehemently urging the completion of an arrangement, but the Cabinet settled that no overture should be made to France without previously ascertaining that she would accept it when made. All very proper! It was settled that the other Powers should beg Palmerston to invite France in all their names to join in a Convention for securing the free navigation of the Bosphorus; and this Convention was THE PROTOCOL DELAYED. arranged at a Conference some day last week, and at the same time a Protocol—which was to precede it—stating that, the objects of the July alliance being completed, the alliance was at an end. All this was agreed to, and on Saturday at the Cabinet the Convention was read and approved of; but objections were made to the Protocol on the ground that questions might still arise requiring the intervention of the alliance, that no certain intelligence had yet arrived either of the evacuation of Syria by Ibrahim or the publication of the firman by the Sultan, and, therefore, it would be imprudent to break up the alliance just at this moment, and this operation might as well be deferred for a brief space. Such was the general sentiment. Melbourne said, ‘Are you sure France will take the Convention?’ to which Palmerston replied, he had no doubt she would, as it had been put into his hands by Esterhazy, who had probably already communicated it to Bourqueney. But he did not tell the Cabinet that he had agreed at the Conference to the Protocol likewise, and had left his foreign colleagues under the impression that it would be agreed to by the Cabinet.
On Sunday night Bülow and Bourqueney met Normanby at Lady Holland’s, when they both spoke to him in the strongest terms, more especially Bülow; who said it was very painful to him to complain to Normanby of the conduct of Palmerston, and he would not repeat what had passed at the Conference, but he must tell him if Palmerston continued to conduct himself as he did, the most fatal consequences would ensue, and the affairs of Europe would become more embroiled and be in a more perilous state than they had ever been yet. He frightened Normanby so much that the next morning he went off to Melbourne, told him what had passed, and entreated him to interfere. Melbourne promised he would, but of course he will not; and Palmerston will probably not care a straw what he says, or be in the slightest degree biassed by any opinion he may express. As far as I can guess, Bourqueney’s excessive discontent arises from this: He very naturally wants this Protocol, and Bülow and Esterhazy, no doubt, told him that Palmerston had consented to it and would propose it to him; whereas, in their conference on Sunday, Palmerston probably offered him the Convention but did not say a word about the Protocol, and this both he and Bülow consider a great breach of faith. Notwithstanding the good reason which there really is for not formally dissolving the alliance till all the arrangements concerning Egypt and Syria are completed, it is easy to understand that in the present temper of France it would be impossible for Guizot to enter into any relations with the other Powers till their separate and exclusive alliance is at an end. It is no wonder, therefore, that Bourqueney looks upon the Protocol as an essential condition of his acceptance of the Convention; and if he has been first given to understand that the Protocol was admitted, and then told by Palmerston that it could not be, he might naturally be indignant. One never knows what else Palmerston may have said nor what tone he may have taken.
While these difficulties are obstructing a pacific arrangement here, they are rendered much more serious by the discussions in the French Chamber on the Secret Service money, when the insolent and extravagant speeches in favour of keeping up the isolement and the state of armed observation were hailed with vociferous applause; and this frantic violence is the Parliamentary response to the calm and dignified expression of peace and goodwill to France which marked our first Parliamentary night, and in which the leaders of all parties joined with equal cordiality. If this goes on, and if Guizot is not strong enough to give effect to his pacific disposition and to venture upon a reconciliation, all amicable feelings towards France will be swallowed up in a general sentiment of indignation at her insolence; and instead of wasting any more time in fruitless endeavours to bring her back into the councils of Europe, we shall begin to think of the means of securing ourselves against any possible effects of her ill-will and obstinate resentment. Those who have most strongly advocated the French alliance will be soon ready to cement that of the four great Powers, to curb the extravagant pretensions and mischievous designs A MISREPORTED SPEECH. of France, if the latter does not come to her senses and descend from her high horse very soon.