The pretension of the Queen was not merely personal, pro hâc vice, and one of arrangement, but it went to the establishment of a principle unlimited in its application, for she declared that she had felt bound to make her stand where she did, in order once for all to resist the encroachments which she anticipated, and which would lead, she supposed, at last to their insisting on taking the Baroness Lehzen herself from her. In a constitutional point of view, the case appears to me to be much stronger than in that of a Queen Consort, for the Minister has nothing to do with a Queen Consort; he is not responsible for her appointments, nor for the conduct of her officers, and she is a feme sole possessed of independent rights which she may exercise according to her own pleasure, provided only that she does not transgress the law. It was a great stretch of authority when Lord Grey insisted on the dismissal of Lord Howe, Queen Adelaide’s Chamberlain; but he did so upon an extraordinary occasion, and when circumstances rendered it, as he thought, absolutely necessary that he should make a public demonstration of his influence in a Court notoriously disaffected to the Reform Bill.

The origin of the present mischief may be found in the UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE OF THE WHIGS. objectionable composition of the Royal Household at the Accession. The Queen knew nobody, and was ready to take any Ladies that Melbourne recommended to her. He ought to have taken care that the female part of her household should not have a political complexion, instead of making it exclusively Whig as, unfortunately for her, he did; nor is it little matter of wonder that Melbourne should have consented to support her in such a case, and that he and his colleagues should have consented to act the strange, anomalous, unconstitutional part they have done. While they really believed that she had been ill-used, it was natural they should be disposed to vindicate and protect her; but after the reception of Peel’s letter they must have doubted whether there had not been some misapprehension on both sides, and they ought in prudence, and in justice to her, even against her own feelings, to have sifted the matter to the bottom, and have cleared up every existing doubt before they decided on their course. But to have met as a Cabinet, and to have advised her what answer to send to the man who still held her commission for forming a Government, upon points relating to its formation, is utterly anomalous and unprecedented, and a course as dangerous as unconstitutional.[1] The danger has been sufficiently exemplified in the present case; for, having necessarily had no personal cognisance of the facts, they incurred the risk of giving advice upon mistaken grounds, as in this instance has been the case. She might be excused for her ignorance of the exact limits of constitutional propriety, and for her too precipitate recurrence to the counsels to which she had been accustomed; but they ought to have explained to her, that until Sir Robert Peel had formally and finally resigned his commission into her hands, they could tender no advice, and that her replies to him, and her resolutions with regard to his proposals, must emanate solely and spontaneously from herself. As it was, the Queen was in communication with Sir Robert Peel on one side, and Lord Melbourne on the other, at the same time; and through them with both their Cabinets; the unanimous resolutions of the former being by her conveyed to, and her answer being composed by, the latter. The Cabinet of Lord Melbourne discussed the proposals of that of Sir Robert Peel, and they dictated to the Queen the reply in which she refused to consent to the advice tendered to her by the man who was at that moment her Minister, and it was this reply which compelled him to resign the office with which she had entrusted him.

[1] Melbourne explains away this objection by alleging that the negotiation with Peel was over at six on Thursday; that the Queen sent for him to tell him so; that he was again become her Minister; and that he and his colleagues properly advised the terms in which she should convey her final decision. This explanation seems to have gone down, but I can’t imagine how: the decision to persist in refusing Peel’s demands became their decision, when they advised the letter in which it was conveyed. I know not why more was not made of this part of the case.

May 13th, 1839

Lord Tavistock went on Saturday to Buckingham Palace; found Melbourne was not there, and followed him to his house, where the Cabinet was sitting. He wrote him a letter, in which he said that he had seen the Duke, and that his impression was that there had been a misunderstanding between Peel and the Queen; and suggested to Melbourne that he should see the Duke, who was very willing, if he pleased, to talk the matter over with him. This letter was taken in to the Cabinet, and they discussed its contents.[2] Melbourne was not indisposed to see the Duke; but, after a careful consideration of Peel’s letter, they came to the conclusion that there was no difference between the Queen’s statement to them and Peel’s to her, and, therefore, no misconception to correct. The Chancellor accordingly gave his opinion, that there was no ground for an interview between Melbourne and the Duke; so then ended the last hope of a readjustment.

[2] Lord Grey was at Melbourne’s house; Melbourne sent for him, and consulted him, and he remained in another room while the Cabinet was in deliberation. Lord Grey took it up very warmly, and was strongly for supporting the Queen, saying they could not do otherwise.

The question (they say) was all along one of principle, and never of the application of the principle; but the extraordinary part of it is that they admit that the principle is not THE DEBATE ON THIS TRANSACTION. maintainable, yet declare that they were bound as gentlemen, when the Queen had recourse to them, to support her. This is strange doctrine in Whig mouths. They have, in my opinion, abandoned their duty to the country and to the Queen, and they ought to have been impressed with the paramount obligation of instructing her in the nature and scope of her constitutional obligations and duties, and the limits of her constitutional rights, and to have advised her what she ought to do, instead of upholding her in doing that which was agreeable to her taste and inclination.

In the meantime Brougham wrote a violent letter to Lord Tavistock, imploring him, while it was still time, to arrest the perilous course on which his friends had entered, and full of professions of regard for him and his. Tavistock went to him in the evening, found him in a state of furious excitement, abusing the Ministry greatly, and many of them by name in the grossest terms, and pouring forth a torrent of invective against men and things. After a time he became more cool, and half promised that he would not speak at all; but when he learnt, what he was not aware of, that Lord Spencer was come to town and would be in the House of Lords, he broke out again, and said that if they had brought him up to support that miserable rotten concern, he must speak. Lord Spencer was not, however, brought up by them; he knew nothing of passing events till he read them in the ‘Times’ on Saturday, at Barnet, and his reflexion on them was, that if he should be sent for, he should advise the Queen to send for Peel again and concede the point. He is now, however, disposed, in case of need, to defend his friends in the House of Lords; but if they can secure Brougham’s silence as the price of his, the Ministers will be glad enough to pair them off.

May 19th, 1839

At Mickleham (for Epsom) from Tuesday to Friday, and, of course, nothing done, written, heard, or thought of, save and except the Derby. The explanations went off, on the whole, very well, without acrimony, and as satisfactorily as the case allowed. Peel’s speech was excellent (though Lord Grey did not approve of it, and regretted not having the power to answer it), and without any appearance of art or dexterity he contrived to steer through all the difficult points and to justify himself without saying a word offensive to the Queen. Lord John Russell was very nervous, feeble and ineffective. In the other House Melbourne made, as all allow, a capital speech; Clarendon, a good and fair judge, told me that he never heard Melbourne speak so well throughout; while the Duke was painful to hear, exhibiting such undoubted marks of caducity: it did not, however, read ill. Melbourne made one admission, for which Lord John Russell was very angry with him, and that was of the ‘erroneous impression’ on the Queen’s mind, because his argument was that there was ‘no mistake.’ Lord Grey and Lord Spencer would either of them have spoken, but it was deemed better they should not, or Brougham would have been unmuzzled, and as it was he adhered to his engagement to Lord Tavistock and held his peace. He had said, ‘If you let off Althorp or old Grey, I must speak.’