I talked over this letter with Clarendon last night (from whom I have no secrets), and he, while fully agreeing in the propriety of calling the Cabinet together, and making the future transaction of foreign affairs a matter for the Government and not for the Foreign Office only, and of course well disposed to buckle on his armour on this question, acknowledged that Palmerston would have very good reason to complain of any strong opposition from that quarter, inasmuch as he had been all along encouraged to proceed in his present line of policy by the concurrence and support of John Russell, who was in fact just as much responsible as Palmerston himself for the present state of affairs.
The beginning of the business may be traced to a Cabinet held at Windsor last autumn, when the general line of policy, since acted upon by Palmerston, was settled. From that time, however, the rest of the Ministers seem never to have interfered, or taken any interest in the matter, and Palmerston conducted it all just as he thought fit. This year Cabinet after Cabinet passed over, and no mention was ever made of the affairs of the East, till one day, at the end of a Cabinet, Palmerston, in the most easy nonchalant way imaginable, said that he thought it right to mention that he had been for a long time engaged in negotiation upon the principles agreed upon at the Cabinet at Windsor, and that he had drawn up a Treaty, with which it was fit the Cabinet should be acquainted. At this sudden announcement his colleagues looked very serious, but nobody said a word, except Lord Holland, who said, ‘that he could be no party to any measure which might be likely to occasion a breach between this country and France.’ No discussion, however, took place at that time, and it was agreed that the further consideration of the matter should be postponed till the next Cabinet. The following day, Palmerston wrote a letter to Melbourne, in which he said that he saw some hesitation and some disapprobation in the Cabinet at the course which he had recommended for adoption, and as he could only hope to succeed by obtaining unanimous support, he thought it better at once to place his office at Melbourne’s disposal. Melbourne wrote an answer begging he would not think of resigning, and reminding him that the matter stood over for discussion, and then sent the whole correspondence to Clarendon. Clarendon immediately wrote word that he felt under so much obligation to Palmerston that it was painful to him to oppose him; but as he could not support him in his Eastern THE EASTERN QUESTION. policy, it was much better that he should resign, and begged Melbourne would accept his resignation. Melbourne however said, ‘For God’s sake, let there be no resignations at all,’[15] that his and Lord Holland’s retirement would have the effect of breaking up the Government; and then it was suggested that they might guard themselves by a minute of Cabinet (that which they subsequently drew up and gave the Queen) from any participation in the measures they objected to. After this, Palmerston continued to do just as he pleased, his colleagues consentientibus or at least non dissentientibus, except Holland and Clarendon, with whom nevertheless he seems (especially the latter) to have gone on upon very good terms. Latterly, however, since the affair has got so hot and critical, though their social relations have been uninterrupted, and the Palmerstons have been constantly dining at Holland House, Palmerston has never said one word to Lord Holland on the subject, and he is unquestionably very sore at the undisguised manner in which Lord Holland has signified his dislike of Palmerston’s foreign policy, and the great civilities that Lord and Lady Holland have shown to Guizot for some time past.
[15] I own I cannot see why. Their retirement would have proved the unanimity of the rest, and would rather have strengthened Palmerston than not.
The manner in which business is conducted and the independence of the Foreign Office are curiously displayed by the following fact. Last Wednesday a Protocol was signed (very proper in itself), in which the four Powers disclaimed any intention of aggrandising themselves in any way. The fact of this Protocol was told to Clarendon by Dr. Bowring, who had heard it in the City, and to Lord Holland by Dedel, neither of these Ministers having the slightest notion of its existence. In the meantime, while the apprehensions of Melbourne and John Russell, thus tardily aroused, have urged them to the adoption of a measure which may possibly break up the Government, or at all events bring about some important changes of one sort or another, the French are making vigorous preparations for war, and, having persuaded the Pasha to send a new proposal to Constantinople, Thiers has intimated that, if this be rejected, France will give him active support, and then war will be inevitable. The crisis, therefore, seems actually on the point of arriving, and while all the world here fancies that war is impossible, it appears to be nearer than ever it was.
Guizot committed a great gaucherie the other day (the last time he was at Windsor), which he never could have done if he had had more experience of Courts, or been born and had lived in that society. The first day, the Queen desired he would sit next to her at dinner, which he did; the second day the Lord-in-waiting (Headfort) came as usual with his list, and told Guizot he was to take out the Queen of the Belgians, and sit somewhere else; when he drew up and said, ‘Milord, ma place est auprès de la Reine.’ Headfort, quite frightened, hastened back to report what had happened; when the Queen as wisely altered, as the Ambassador had foolishly objected to, the disposition of places, and desired him to sit next herself, as he had done the day before.
September 23rd, 1840
I called on Guizot yesterday morning, found him apprised of the meeting of the Cabinet on Monday next, when I told him that I could not help thinking he might materially contribute to the adoption of some resolution conducive to peace, that I had no doubt there would be very lively discussions at this Cabinet, and it was of great importance he should, if he could, afford an appui to the peace party. He said he would willingly do anything he could. I said, ‘for example, could he say on the part of his Government, that, in the event of the new terms proposed by Mehemet Ali being accepted, France would guarantee their due performance on the part of the Pasha, and that she would join in coercive measures against him if he attempted to infringe them, or commit any act of aggression against the Porte?’ He said, ‘that he was not authorised to make such a declaration, but he had no doubt he could engage so far, and that France would not hesitate to pledge herself to join the other Allies and act against Mehemet Ali in such a DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET. case as I had supposed.’ I asked him if he would write to his Government forthwith, as there was still time to get an answer before the Cabinet met, and he promised he would; but, he added, that with every desire to say what might furnish an argument for those in the Cabinet who are disposed to accept the proffered arrangement, he did not know how to hold any communications—for with Palmerston he could not, and Melbourne and John Russell were out of town. I told him, however, that Lord John would be in town on Thursday, and he promised he would call on him on Friday and talk to him; adding that he thought the last time he saw him he was well disposed. I told him that Lord John was not a man who said much, and that I could not answer for his opinions, but that I was quite convinced Palmerston would find some of his colleagues seriously alarmed, and no longer disposed to submit quietly to whatever he might be pleased to settle and to dictate. He asked me who were the Ministers with the greatest influence, and whose opinions would sway the Cabinet; and I told him Melbourne and John Russell, without a doubt, and whatever they resolved upon, the rest would agree to. But it is most extraordinary that while all reflecting people are amazed at the Government being scattered all abroad at such a momentous crisis, and instead of being collected together for the purpose of considering in concert every measure that is taken, as well as the whole course of policy, with any changes and modifications that may be called for, the Ministers themselves, such of them at least as are here, cannot discover any occasion for any Cabinets or meetings, and seem to think it quite natural and proper to leave the great question of peace or war to be dealt with by Palmerston as a mere matter of official routine. Lord Minto and Labouchere could not imagine why a Cabinet was called, nor by whom, and Palmerston still less. The day before the summons, he told Labouchere he might safely go into the country, as there was no chance of a Cabinet; and now Minto can only imagine that they are summoned to discuss the time to be fixed for the prorogation or the meeting of Parliament.
September 26th, 1840
On Wednesday I went to Woburn, and, as soon as I arrived, the Duke carried me off to his room and told me everything that had taken place, and the exact present posture of affairs. John Russell has for some time past been impressed with the necessity of bringing the Eastern Question to a settlement, to avert all possibility of a war with France, and he has repeatedly urged Melbourne in the strongest terms to do something to prevent the danger into which the policy of the Treaty is hurrying us. None of the Ministers, except Melbourne himself, and Palmerston, have been apprised of these remonstrances, nor are any of them at this moment aware of what has been and is passing. Palmerston has been indignant at the opposition thus suddenly put forward by Lord John, and complains (not, I think, without very good cause), that after supporting and sanctioning his policy, and approving of the Treaty, he abandons him midway, and refuses to give that policy a fair trial. This he considers unjust and unreasonable, and it must be owned he is entitled to complain. Lord John, however, as far as I can learn, not very successfully justifies himself by saying that it was one thing to defend the treaty, of which he approved and does still, and another to approve the measures which are apparently leading us into a war. Between the urgent remonstrances of Lord John and the indignant complaints of Palmerston, Melbourne has been at his wit’s end. So melancholy a picture of indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity as his conduct has exhibited, I never heard of. The Queen is all this time in a great state of nervousness and alarm, on account of Leopold; terrified at Palmerston’s audacity, amazed at his confidence, and trembling lest her uncle should be exposed to all the dangers and difficulties in which he would be placed by a war between his niece and his father-in-law. All these sources of solicitude, pressure from without, and doubt and hesitation within, have raised that perplexity in Melbourne’s mind which has robbed him (as he told Lord John) of appetite and sleep. At length, after going on in this way for some time, matters becoming so bad between Palmerston and Lord John that Palmerston LORD JOHN CALLS A CABINET. refused to have any communication with him, Lord Spencer’s letter, the continued state of danger, and the prospect of some arrangement growing out of the new propositions, made Lord John determine to take a decided course, and he accordingly requested Melbourne to call a Cabinet, which was done, and this important meeting is to take place on Monday next. At this Cabinet, Lord John is prepared to make a stand, and to propose that measures shall be taken for bringing about a settlement on the basis of mutual concession, and he is in fact disposed to accept the terms now offered by the Pasha with the consent and by the advice of France. He anticipates Palmerston’s opposition to this, and his insisting upon a continuance of our present course; but he is resolved in such a case to bring matters to an issue, and if he is overruled by a majority of the Cabinet, not only to resign, but to take a decisive part in Parliament against Palmerston’s policy, and to do his utmost there, with the support which he expects to obtain, to prevent a war. He is aware that his conduct might not only break up the Whig Government and party, but that it may bring about an entirely new arrangement and combination of parties, all of which he is willing to encounter rather than the evils and hazards of war. On the other hand, if Palmerston refuses to accede to his terms, and if unsupported by the Cabinet he tenders his resignation, Lord John is ready to urge its acceptance, and himself to undertake the administration of our foreign affairs. In short, he has made up his mind, and that so strongly, that I do not think it possible he can fail either to carry his point or to break up the Government, or at least bring about very material changes in it.
Prepared as I was, by the Duke of Bedford’s letter, for something of this sort, I was not prepared for anything so strong and decisive; and while I expressed my satisfaction at it, I did not conceal my opinion that Lord John’s course had not been at all consistent, and that Palmerston, when the moment of discussion came, would have a good case against his antagonist colleague. While I was at Woburn, I had constant running talk about this matter with the Duke, but not a word with Lord John, to whom I never uttered, nor he to me.