M. Guizot’s Letter to Baron Bourqueney.
Mon Cher Baron,—Le discours de la Couronne est définitivement arrêté. Je crois que vous le trouverez conforme à la vérité des choses et aux convenances de la situation. Vous recevrez une circulaire que j’adresse à tous mes agents. J’y ai essayé de marquer avec précision l’attitude que le Cabinet veut prendre et qu’il gardera. Mais ce ne sont là que des paroles: il faut des résultats. On les attend du Cabinet. Il s’est formé pour maintenir la paix, et pour trouver aux embarras de la question d’Orient quelque issue; pour vivre il faut qu’il satisfasse aux causes qui l’ont fait naître. La difficulté est extrême. L’exaltation du pays n’a pas diminué, la formation du Cabinet donne aux amis de la paix plus de confiance, mais elle redouble l’ardeur des hommes qui poussent, ou qui se laissent pousser, à la guerre; les malveillants et les rivaux exploiteront, fomenteront les préjugés nationaux, les passions nationales. La lutte sera très-vive et le péril toujours imminent. Je dirai la vérité. Je m’applique à éclaircir les esprits et à contenir les passions: je ne puis que cela. Ce n’est pas assez; pour que le succès vienne à la raison, il faut qu’on m’aide. Deux sentiments sont ici en présence, le désir de la paix et l’honneur national. Je l’ai souvent dit à Londres, je le répète de Paris. Le sentiment de la France—je dis de la France, et non pas des brouillons et des factions—est qu’elle a été traitée légèrement, qu’on a sacrifié légèrement, sans motif suffisant, pour un intérêt secondaire son alliance, son amitié, son concours. Là est le grand mal qu’a fait la Convention du 15 Juillet, là est le grand obstacle à la politique et à la paix. Pour guérir ce mal, pour lever cet obstacle, il faut prouver à la France qu’elle se trompe, il faut lui prouver qu’on attache à son alliance, à son amitié, à son concours, beaucoup de prix, assez de prix pour lui faire quelque sacrifice. Ce M. GUIZOT’S LETTER. n’est pas l’etendue, c’est le fait même du sacrifice qui importe, qu’indépendamment de la Convention du 15 Juillet quelque chose soit donné, évidemment donné, au désir de rentrer en bonne intelligence avec la France, et de la voir rentier dans l’affaire, la paix pourra être maintenue et l’harmonie générale rétablie en Europe. Si on vous dit cela se peut, je suis prêt à faire les démarches nécessaires pour atteindre à ce but, et à en accepter la responsabilité, mais je ne veux pas me mettre en mouvement sans savoir si le but est possible à atteindre. Si on vous dit que cela ne se peut pas, qu’on entend s’en tenir rigoureusement aux premières stipulations du traité, et ne rien accorder, ne rien faire qui soit pour la France une preuve qu’on désire se rapprocher d’elle, pour le Cabinet une force dans la lutte qu’il a à soutenir, la situation restera violente et précaire, le Cabinet se tiendra immobile, dans l’isolement et l’attente. Je ne réponds pas de l’avenir. Dites cela à Lord Palmerston, c’est de lui que l’issue dépend. Il vous parlera de l’état de la Syrie, de l’insurrection du Liban, des progrès que font les Alliés. Répondez simplement que c’est là pour la France une raison de se montrer plus facile à satisfaire, mais que ce n’est pas pour l’Angleterre une raison de ne rien faire en considération de la France. Je n’ai encore rien dit, rien écrit nulle part. J’attends ce qu’on vous dira à Londres....
Nothing can be better, more serious, or better calculated to produce an effect, if anything can, upon our impenetrable Cabinet. Bourqueney showed it in the first instance to Melbourne, who told him to show it to Palmerston; but he said he had scruples in doing that lest Palmerston should make him an answer calculated to exclude all hope of accommodation; but Melbourne hinted that he would take care of this, and accordingly he took it to Palmerston this morning. He read it, said it was very moderate, and praised the tone and language. But when Bourqueney began to ask what he had to say to the fond, he only talked of the practical difficulties, and ended without saying anything the least promising or satisfactory, though nothing decidedly the reverse. Bourqueney had previously been with Billow, who is just come back, and who desires no better on the part of his Government than to join in any conciliatory measure we may adopt; and Esterhazy, who is expected every hour, will, he doubts not, be equally well disposed. But although such is the disposition both of Austria and Prussia, though the Queen is earnestly desirous of seeing tranquillity and security restored, and almost all, if not quite all, the Cabinet, are in favour of an accommodation with France, and France herself is prepared to accept the slightest advance offered in a conciliatory spirit, the personal determination of Palmerston will probably predominate over all these opinions and inclinations. He will put down or adjourn every proposal that is made, and if any should be adopted in spite of him, he will take care to mar it in the execution, to remove no difficulties, and create them where they don’t already exist. The most extraordinary part of the whole affair is, that a set of men should consent to go on with another in whom they have not only no confidence, but whom they believe to be politically dishonest and treacherous, and that they should keep gravely discussing the adoption of measures with a full conviction that he will not fairly carry them out. It is like Jonathan Wild and his companions playing together in Newgate. I understand the last decision of the Cabinet is that Guizot is to be invited to say what would suit his case. There would be a difficulty in specifying what concessions we should make, either for Mehemet Ali or his sons, because events are proceeding rapidly in Syria, and we might be offering what we have already restored to the Sultan, and what the Porte has assisted to recover for itself. It is settled that all this shall be fairly stated to Guizot, with an assurance that we are desirous of assisting him, together with our willingness to concert with him the means. This may do, if honestly and truly carried out.
Friday, November 13th, 1840
The day before yesterday Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter from Guizot in reply to the one I had written him. He then proceeded to tell me all that had occurred since I had before seen him, and to this effect: On Saturday the Cabinet had resolved upon an invitation to Guizot to announce his wishes and ideas, and proposed a frank explanation de part et d’autre on the whole question. On Sunday, Palmerston communicated this to Bourqueney, and very faithfully. On Sunday or TERMS OF CONCILIATION. Monday arrived a despatch from Metternich, first of all confirming Neumann as sole Minister to the Conference, and secondly announcing that any concession in Syria was now quite out of the question. This he told Bourqueney, and conveyed to Palmerston, to whom it was a great accession of force, and by this the disposition of Austria, and with it that of Bülow, became entirely changed, and very unfavourable to any transaction. On Monday morning Bourqueney received a letter from Guizot saying that he had had a conference with Lord Granville, to whom he had suggested various alternatives for a settlement on the basis of a concession, which Granville was by the same post to transmit to Palmerston, and he at the same time told Bourqueney what they were: Egypt hereditary, St. Jean d’Acre for life, and either Tripoli or Candia for one of his sons; or the hereditary Pashalik of Acre instead. On Monday night Bourqueney met Palmerston at dinner at the Mansion House, when he said to him, ‘You have heard from Lord Granville, and he has transmitted to you M. Guizot’s proposals (or suggestions).’ ‘No,’ said Palmerston, ‘I have heard from Lord Granville, but he sent me nothing specific on the part of Guizot. But come to Lady Palmerston’s to-night from hence, and we will talk it over.’ He went there, and Palmerston read to him a long despatch from Granville, but which, to his surprise, did not contain any of the specific propositions which Guizot had notified to him, and, conceiving that Granville must have certain good reasons for this reticence, he resolved to say nothing of them either, and confined himself to mere general inquiries as to what could be done, to which he obtained no satisfactory reply, not a hope being held out of any concession. In this condition of affairs he came to me to tell me what passed and consult me as to the future. I told him that though there was the same desire for a reconciliation with France, and the same anxiety to assist M. Guizot on the part of my friends, when they came to consider what was possible and would be safe and justifiable, they were unable to find any expedient to meet the immense practical difficulties of the case; that events had proceeded with such celerity, and placed the question in so different a position, that concessions formerly contemplated as reasonable and possible were now out of the question. They all felt that they could offer nothing in Syria; that it was possible the Sultan might be actually in possession of any town or territory at the moment they were offering it, and that now justice to the people, honour and fidelity to our allies, especially to the Sultan himself, forbade us to make any concession whatever in that quarter. Bourqueney did not deny the force of this, but he said Guizot was sanguine as to the acceptance of some such terms as he had suggested, and it was of the last importance he should be undeceived, and made acquainted with the real truth, and know what he had to rely on. He said he would write, but he entreated me to write to him too, and to tell him the substance of what I had imparted to him. Accordingly I did write to Guizot at great length, setting forth in terms as strong as I could, and without any disguise, the difficulties of the case, and the utter unreasonableness of the French public in requiring, as a salve to their vanity, terms which we could neither in good policy or good faith concede. We both agreed that under existing circumstances it was not desirable that Guizot should make any proposal to our Government, and so we both of us told him. Such was the result of a conversation which when reported to Guizot will be a bitter disappointment to him; but I concur with the rest, that we could not now make any of the concessions he was disposed to ask. Bourqueney suggested that if the chances of war should be hereafter favourable to the Pasha, if the Allies should make no impression upon Acre or the south-west part of Syria, then possibly some transaction on such a basis might be possible. This, however, it was useless to discuss. Yesterday I saw Dedel, who has lately been at Walmer, and he told me the Duke of Wellington’s opinion exactly coincided with ours, coincided both as to the impossibility of our making any concession in Syria, and to its perfect inutility if we did. We might degrade ourselves, weaken our own cause, but we should neither strengthen Guizot nor satisfy the cravings of French vanity and insolence, still less silence LORD PALMERSTON’S IRRITATING LANGUAGE. that revolutionary spirit which, not strong enough in itself, seeks to become formidable by stimulating the passions and allying itself with all the vanity, pride, and restlessness, besides desire for plunder, which are largely scattered throughout the country.
It is curious that Austria, hitherto so timid, should all of a sudden become so bold, for besides this notification to Neumann, Metternich has said that, though we have instructed Ponsonby to move the Sultan to restore Mehemet Ali to Egypt, he has not given the same instructions to Stürmer, and that he wants to see the progress of events and the conduct of the Pasha before he does so.
Events have so befriended Palmerston that he is now in the right, and has got his colleagues with him; but where he is and always has been wrong is in his neglect of forms; the more fortiter he is in re, the more suaviter he ought to be in modo. But while defending his policy or attacking that of France, he has never said what he might have done to conciliate, to soften, and to destroy those impressions of intended affronts and secret designs which have produced such violent effects on the French public. On the contrary, he has constantly, in his State papers, and still more in his newspapers, said what is calculated to irritate and provoke them to the greatest degree; but Dedel says this has always been his fault, in all times and in all his diplomatic dealings, and this is the reason he is so detested by all the Corps Diplomatique, and has made such enemies all over Europe. Guizot will now be cast on his own resources, and must try whether the language of truth and reason will be listened to in France; whether he can, by plain statements of facts, and reasonable deductions therefrom, dissipate those senseless prejudices and extravagant delusions which have excited such a tempest in the public mind. It is clear enough to me that if he cannot, if vanity and resentment are too strong for sober reason and sound policy, no concessions we could make would save him from downfall, or save Europe from the consequences of this moral deluge.
November 15th, 1840
Two days ago, Lord John Russell called on me. We had some talk, but nothing very conclusive. He said the operations in Syria could not go on much longer, and we are threatened with the greatest of all evils, the hanging over of the question for another year. This he thought the worst thing of all. It is curious that he told me Stopford wrote word he must send his ships into port, and all the authorities, military and naval, say nothing can be done after the 20th. Palmerston keeps telling Bourqueney they can go on all the winter, and that the operations will not be suspended at all. I asked Lord John, if the campaign did close, leaving the Pasha in possession of all the south-west of Syria from Damascus to the Desert, and Acre unattacked, whether on such a status an agreement could not be concluded, terminating the contest by the concession of the original terms of the treaty. He said Melbourne would like that very well, but that there would be difficulties, and France would not come into the treaty on those terms. I told him I was pretty sure France would, though I did not tell him what had passed between Bourqueney and me. However, I sent for Bourqueney, and told him to propose nothing new, but to wait till the campaign was over, and in the meantime to prepare the way for some specific proposition which France might make in a spirit of amicable intervention to put an end to the contest.