REMONSTRANCE OF RUSSIA.
May 19th.—There is the devil to pay about this Greek affair, and at last there seems a tolerable chance of Palmerston coming to grief: 'Tant va la cruche à l'eau,' &c. Yesterday morning the Duke of Bedford came here and gave me an account of the state of affairs. It seems Brunnow had written a long letter to John Russell, couched in very temperate terms, but setting forth all his complaints of Palmerston's behaviour, and especially of the language of that part of the press which was avowedly under his control and direction, in reference to Russia, and he asked Lord John to call upon him, he being confined with a cold. Lord John sent this letter to Palmerston, accompanied with one from himself, in which he said that he (Palmerston) well knew how much he disliked such articles and such use of the press, and a good deal more indicative of displeasure. Palmerston wrote an answer defending himself, and the very same evening there appeared in the 'Globe' another article not less offensive than the preceding ones, greatly to the indignation of Lord John. He called on Brunnow, who repeated what he had before said in his letter, and announced that he must go away, for he would not stay here to be on bad terms with Palmerston, and it was impossible for him to remain on good terms. Meanwhile, Lord John had seen Drouyn de Lhuys before his departure, and from him he learnt what (according to his version) had passed between himself and Palmerston, that is, about the pledge which Drouyn de Lhuys affirmed Palmerston had given him that hostilities should not be renewed. The statement of Drouyn de Lhuys did not correspond with the accounts which Palmerston had given his colleagues of what had passed, and Lord John at once saw that there was no avoiding the unpleasant dilemma of the two Governments being at issue on a matter of fact which involved the good faith of ours. All this, together with what had already passed, had raised Lord John's resentment and disgust to a high pitch, and the Duke said that Lord John had at last resolved not to stand it any longer, although (he added) he could not feel complete confidence in his firmness and resolution after all he had seen on various occasions.
Lord John said that the first thing to be done was to settle this matter as they best might; that they must support Palmerston's assertions, to which they were bound to give credit; but that when this business was concluded, in about a month perhaps, he would bring matters to a crisis, that is, announce to Palmerston that he could not go on in the Foreign Office. Lord John is at present very angry, and therefore very stout, but I never can feel sure of him. He is to see the Queen on Tuesday, who will of course be boiling over with indignation, and if she finds Lord John at last disposed to take her views of the matter, the affair may possibly be settled between them.
Meanwhile no words can describe the universal feeling of reprobation, and almost of shame, with which the replies of Lord Lansdowne and Lord John were heard on Friday night. The morning arrivals from France had clearly shown that Lord Lansdowne in one House, and John Russell in the other, had tried to deceive and mislead by what they had said on Thursday. On Friday Palmerston did not make his appearance; but the figures which Lord Lansdowne cut in the Lords and Lord John in the Commons were most deplorable and humiliating; such shuffling, special pleading, and paltry evasions were never before heard from public men of their eminence and character; and of all that has occurred this discreditable exposure appears to many friends of the Government to be the most painful part. It appears inconceivable that any men should make statements the falsehood of which was shown in less than forty-eight hours; but the explanation is this. In the first place, Palmerston gave to his colleagues an imperfect and unfaithful account of Drouyn de Lhuys's communication to him. They were themselves not aware of the whole truth; but besides this Palmerston gave them to understand that Drouyn de Lhuys had carried with him such explanations, verbal and documentary, as would he hoped satisfy his Government, and consequently that the letter of recall might probably be cancelled, and the affair arranged. Hoping therefore for this result, they ventured to deny the recall altogether, but were completely confounded and exposed by the revelations of Lahitte[117] in the tribune the very same day; and then they had nothing for it but to try and shuffle out of it in the way they tried but miserably failed to do. It would have been far better to have spoken the plain truth, or to have declined to answer till the next day.
THE GREEK DISPUTE.
May 22nd.—I have read the long series of despatches published by the French Government, and the result in my mind is that they do not make out a case of breach of faith against our Government, supposing Palmerston's instructions to Wyse to have been in conformity with what was agreed upon between the two Governments here. This (the most essential) part of the case lies in a narrow compass. It was all along perfectly understood that if Gros threw up his mission, being unable to induce the Greek Government to consent to equitable terms, our Minister was at liberty to recommence the coercive measures without any further reference to his Government; but if the negotiation came to a standstill in consequence of Gros and Wyse not being able to agree, then the difference between them was to be referred for the decision of the two Governments upon it, and in this case the coercive measures were not to be renewed. The French maintain that the last of these contingencies occurred, Palmerston contends that it was the first. It is possible that Wyse may have received instructions conformable with this arrangement, and that he may have thought that the course which Gros took brought the case within the former category. This may have been an unsound opinion, but if such was the case it exonerates the British Government from the charge of having violated an engagement to that of France. But in order to make this defence valid, it will be necessary to prove that the instructions given to Wyse were such as the French had a right to expect. It does not appear that these instructions were ever imparted to them. These are minute, however important, points; but emerging from the confusion and perplexity of dates and circumstantial details, the question is, what is the general impression as to the whole conduct of the two Governments, more particularly of our own, throughout the transaction. I reserve the consideration of this till I have seen Palmerston's case as set forth in the papers that are to be laid before Parliament, and in the long and able despatch which he is said to have written in explanation and defence of his conduct.
May 25th.—The morning before yesterday the Duke of Bedford came here again. He had seen Lord John since, and heard what passed with the Queen. She was full of this affair, and again urged all her objections to Palmerston. This time she found Lord John better disposed than heretofore, and he is certainly revolving in his mind how the thing can be done. He does not by any means contemplate going out himself, or breaking up the Government. What he looks to is this, that the Queen should take the initiative, and urge Palmerston's removal from the Foreign Office. She is quite ready to do this as soon as she is assured of her wishes being attended to. For various reasons it would not do to put Clarendon in his place. Clarendon would not like it, and it would make Palmerston furious; therefore this is out of the question. The only possible arrangement is that Lord John should himself take the Foreign Office, provisionally, and he is quite prepared to take it. I told the Duke I entirely agreed that this was the only feasible arrangement, and I did not apprehend any danger to Lord John, because he would do the business in a very different way, and manage to lighten the burthen both by his mode of transacting it, and by delegating many details to his Under-Secretary, instead of, like Palmerston, doing everything himself. There certainly never appeared to be so good a chance of getting the Foreign Office out of Palmerston's hands as now; but long experience of his boldness and success, and of the pusillanimity and weakness of his colleagues, make me feel very doubtful and uncertain as to the result. If the thing is done, they mean to propose to him to take another office instead; not to turn him out. I don't know how they think of managing this, but he is sure to refuse to give up the Foreign Office and take another instead of it. He would consider this a degradation, and a sort of pleading guilty to the charges that are brought against him. If he will lend himself to this change, so much the better; if he does not go out, the Duke thinks, not without reason, that it will be almost impossible for Clarendon to come into office at present, and that he ought not; his opinions on foreign affairs are so strong, that he could not join the Cabinet while Palmerston was at the Foreign Office without the certainty of either very soon quarrelling with him, or of being obliged to make concessions against his conscience and real opinions, and which would therefore be discreditable to him.
PAPERS ON THE GREEK DISPUTE.
Meanwhile Palmerston has made his explanation in the House of Commons. There is much difference of opinion as to how it was received, but I gather that it was a good deal applauded by the Radicals and his own people; it was clever as he always is, but it was weak. As the case more develops itself (for now all the Blue Books are out, French and English), it resolves itself into a very small point: Did Palmerston, or did he not, send instructions to Wyse in conformity with what was agreed upon between himself and Drouyn de Lhuys? This is what the French have a right to ask: if he did, let him show these instructions; if he did not, he broke faith with the French Government. By Wyse's letter of the 15th, it seems pretty clear he did not send any such instructions. I do not see how volumes of Blue Books, or all the conferences and debates imaginable, can put the case in a clearer light, or bring it to a more direct issue than this.
June 2nd.—I was never able to plunge into the Blue Book till Epsom races were over, but I have now done it, and have gone through both—that and the French Book. The case is quite complete, and it is not difficult to extract from the mass of details with which the former is uselessly encumbered a clear view of the case. The result is a conviction in my mind that the French Government acted with amity and good faith, and that the conduct of Gros at Athens was irreproachable. He did his best to bring about an arrangement, and he failed because the requisitions of the English Minister were such as in honour and conscience it was impossible for him to support, sanction, or recommend to the Greek Government. If Stanley works this case well, he will make a great affair of it, for his materials are ample and excellent. Palmerston's Blue Book is just like former productions from the Foreign Office under him, voluminous details of matter quite uninteresting and beside the question, and the absence of those documents which we most require to see, and on which the whole case turns, his instructions to Wyse and Parker—none of which, or scarcely any, are given.