I find there are not two opinions about Palmerston's conduct, and those who think so are ignorant how bad it is, because they know nothing of what passed between Lord John and him. I have had two long letters from Graham all about Palmerston and the new Reform Bill. With regard to the latter he is full of gloomy apprehensions, and seems in a state of contradiction with himself, desperately afraid lest John Russell should go too far, and equally afraid he should not go far enough. With all his ability he is a most strange and inconsistent politician. It is impossible to know what he will do, and I suspect he does not know himself. He writes to me one day full of alarm lest the Queen's Speech should contain anything binding the Government to go considerable lengths, and expressing strong hopes that the Court will resist any proposal of the sort. The next day he says, unless they disfranchise I know not how many boroughs, they will give no satisfaction, be deserted by the Radicals, and he is not at all sure that the Conservatives will support them; in short, his fears assume the most different shapes, and it is pretty clear that whatever the Government proposes he will find fault with their plan.

December 2nd.—I was at the Grange last week from Wednesday to Saturday. There I met Walewski, who talked to me a great deal about Palmerston, whose character he seems to understand pretty well. He said that nothing could be more aimable than he was to him personally, or more civil and obliging in their intercourse, but from the experience he had already had of him he was convinced that, if France got over her present difficulties and acquired a settled and permanent Government, so as to be able to attend to foreign affairs, in which her domestic troubles now prevented her from exercising any influence, six months would not elapse without a quarrel of some sort taking place between the two Governments. He then spoke of his interference, his procédés, and his invincible obstinacy, which made it impossible to make any impression on him, and he told me of two recent cases, one regarding Greece, the other Sicily.

LORD PALMERSTON'S CLAIMS ON NAPLES.

It seems that many months ago Wyse wrote an account to Palmerston of the frightful brigandage that was going on in Greece, not, however, pretending that there was any complaint to make on the part of British subjects. On this Palmerston wrote a despatch in his usual style of objurgation, bitterly reproaching the Greek Government for not putting the brigandage down. The Greek Government, angry and frightened, appealed to the French and the Russian Ministers, from whom of course they received sympathy and comfort, and recently the Greek Minister has sent 'a very strong answer.' This fresh squabble is probably by no means distasteful to either the French or Russian Governments, particularly the latter, and will have the effect of throwing Greece into the arms of the Emperor. I do not know what the political effect of such dependence may be, nor how British interests may be affected by it, but this result is almost inevitable, and, whatever the consequences may be, is owing to Palmerston's violence.

The case of Sicily is eminently characteristic. During the troubles in '48 a destruction occurred of the property of English and other foreigners, both at Naples and in Sicily, for which their respective Governments required an indemnity. A Commission was appointed, consisting of the French, Austrian, and English Ministers, and I think the Russian. All the claims were laboriously investigated, and after above a year of enquiry, the Commissioners came to a decision, and allotted the amount of compensation they thought due, which was to be paid in inscriptions in the Grand Livre or Neapolitan funds. This award was regularly drawn up and signed by Sir William Temple. It was sent home, when, after some delay, Palmerston sent it back and said the money was not enough, and he arbitrarily fixed a higher sum to be given to the English. Of this the Neapolitan Government bitterly complained, and the other Commissioners considered it unwarrantable and unfair. After a great deal of remonstrance and discussion, Palmerston proving inexorable, the Neapolitans gave way. They then considered the affair settled; but not at all. Palmerston then sent it back again, and said the allotted sum should not be paid in stock, but in money. Walewski told me this as I have written it down. In the course of the dispute he arrived here, and very soon had to discuss the matter with Palmerston. He represented to him that the English claims had already been treated with peculiar favour and a very large indemnity granted, that Temple was quite satisfied, and had subscribed to the award, and he pointed out the injustice of fresh demands being superadded from hence. He had a conversation of two hours with Palmerston, who listened with great politeness, appeared struck by Walewski's representations, and ended by saying, 'Well, I will write to Temple about it.' Walewski went away, fancying he had produced a great effect, and that Palmerston was going to write to Temple to relax the rigour of his exactions; but he did not then know his man, and was only undeceived when he found afterwards that he had written to Temple, but only to desire him to press his demands, and exact a concession to them to the uttermost farthing.

December 3rd.—At twelve o'clock yesterday morning the wonderful Electric Telegraph brought us word that two hours before the President had accomplished his Coup d'État at Paris with success. Everybody expected it would happen, nobody that it would happen so soon. Madame de Lieven wrote to Beauvale on Sunday, giving him an account of the efforts that were making by the Moderates, Guizot at the head of them, to bring about a reconciliation and compromise with the President, and auguring success. She says, 'Beaucoup de personnes prétendent que tout en ayant l'air de s'y prêter, le Président n'a pas grande envie de ce moyen; un Coup d'État le ferait mieux arriver: il s'y est tout préparé, la troupe est à lui, le pays aussi.' She little thought that in twenty-four hours the Coup d'État 'allait éclater,' and that all was in preparation for it, while he was amusing the Burgraves and Moderates with negotiations and pourparlers, in which he was never serious.

THE COUP D'ÉTAT IN PARIS.

Panshanger, December 14th.—Naturally the French Revolution has absorbed all interest. The success of Louis Napoleon's Coup d'État has been complete, and his audacity and unscrupulousness marvellous. The French are indeed a strange people, so restless, fierce, and excitable that they are ready to upset governments with the smallest possible show of reason or necessity—with cause as in 1830, or without cause as in 1848—and they acquiesce without a struggle, and tamely endure the impudent and vulgar democratic rule of the blackguards and mountebanks of the Provisional Government at the latter period, and now the unlimited and severe military despotism of Louis Napoleon. The Press in this country has generally inveighed with great indignation against him, very much overdoing the case. Society in general is in a rather neutral state. Few can approve of his very violent measures and arbitrary acts, but on the other hand there was such a general feeling of contempt for the Constitution, and of disgust at the conduct of the Assembly and the parties which divided it, that nobody lamented their overthrow, or regarded with the slightest interest or compassion the leaders who have been so brutally and ignominiously treated. Everybody rejoices at the misfortunes of Thiers, who is universally regarded as the evil genius of France and the greatest maker of mischief who ever played a part on the stage of politics. Flahault, who has been the agent and confidant of the President, writes word that he has saved France, and it is the object of his adherents to make the world believe that his measures were rendered necessary by a Socialist plot, which he has saved the country by putting down; and besides this we hear of an Orleanist plot, and of the violence the Assembly was about to have recourse to against him, if he had not anticipated them. These seem to be, and probably are, mere pretences, got up to cover his violence with something plausible, and which the world may swallow; the truth being that he prepared all that he has done with singular boldness, secrecy adroitness, and success, amusing his enemies with the semblance of negotiations which he never meant sincerely to carry out to an end, and relying (as it has turned out that he could do) upon the Army, by whose aid he has taken all power into his own hands. Having done so, he resolved to do nothing by halves, and certainly by the prompt, peremptory, and arbitrary measures he adopted he has secured present success, given confidence as to the stability of his Government, raised his own reputation for energy and ability, and in all probability has prevented a great amount of disorder and bloodshed, which would have taken place if his success had been less complete than it was.


DISRAELI'S LIFE OF BENTINCK