DISCUSSION WITH M. GUIZOT.
At night.—This morning I called on Madame de St. Aulaire, whom I found, and Madame de Gontaut, whom I did not; then, Madame de Lieven. Much talk on the old subject, and the fire of my tongue extinguished the fire of hers, for, without the least convincing her, I reduced her to silence. The great gun I brought to bear on her was Aberdeen's despatch to the Duke de Sotomayor, which proved that Palmerston had in no way departed from the system of conduct pursued by Aberdeen. From her I went to Guizot, and was with him for an hour and a half. We began with an agreement that we should be mutually frank and sincere. He went through the whole case and exhibited all his causes of complaint and suspicion against Palmerston, that when he came into office he never said a word (in public or private) expressive of a desire to be on good terms with France, neither in his speech at Tiverton, nor in the House of Commons, nor to Jarnac; that he never alluded to the Spanish question nor sought to establish or confirm an understanding thereupon with France; that the despatch he wrote to Bulwer (19th), which contained instructions for his conduct, was not imparted to the French Government; and that when Jarnac spoke to him, and Palmerston showed him the despatch, it was already gone. All this apparent reserve and uncommunicativeness excited suspicions that he was not well disposed and, above all, not going to tread in the footsteps of Aberdeen. I defended him by saying that he ought to have considered Palmerston's situation—just come into office, encumbered with business, occupied with questions of much more urgent importance in the House of Commons. Nothing new having occurred about Spain, he contented himself with desiring Bulwer to abide by his predecessor's instructions, and really had nothing to say on the subject; that it was his habit to write in a rather familiar, offhand style, and his despatch to Bulwer, which was not intended to be published or communicated, was of that description, but that it meant nothing; and when asked, and the objection urged to the obnoxious passage, he gave the most positive assurance that no change of policy was contemplated. Guizot insisted that it did not signify what he meant; that the question was, what impression it was calculated to convey. Then he went into the various delays, and the impossibility of getting an answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the note of February 27 gave him a right to act, le cas échéant, and that in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated his intention by saying that if England adopted une politique isolée, he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have understood what this meant—and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I said I did not mean to acquit Palmerston of much negligence and tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously; that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.[5]
M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.
I replied that he was entirely mistaken: that he exaggerated Palmerston's disposition and mistook his position; that in Melbourne's time he did what he chose in his own department, but that was not now the case; that all important affairs were decided by the Government, and that John Russell was far from having any bitter feeling against France, and had always entertained sentiments of esteem towards Guizot personally; that neither he nor anyone else (not even Palmerston) wished to see him out of office. It was true that they did think there had been on different occasions and in various places an undue succumbing to France, but that there was no desire to commence a general struggle against French interests; that they would certainly see with pleasure the Liberal party in Spain again lift up its head, and some such reaction as should promise a Government disposed to act in a constitutional manner, and put an end to the despotism that now prevailed. He said that he considered this the best and most constitutional Government that Spain had ever had; that it was far more so than Espartero's; that every change had been effected in a legal, constitutional manner by the Cortes itself; while all former changes, especially the expulsion of Queen Christina, had been effected by violence. I said I was amazed to hear him say so, and begged to ask him how the Cortes itself was constituted, and whether it had not been packed by stratagem and force, and by the most unscrupulous use of despotic power—the municipalities having been suppressed and all free opinion overborne. He only replied that the municipal question was made the instrument of the Queen's deposition, and that it had been voted by the Cortes.
It is very difficult to record accurately a conversation in which we often diverged and then returned to the same topic. I pressed him hard on his want of openness and confidence, and urged that when the two countries had been so long on such terms of amity, and the two Sovereigns also, that before he proceeded to act in so serious and decisive a manner and which could not fail to offend England, he ought to have left nothing vague, but have said distinctly and at once what he intended to do. He ought, if he took the note of February 27 as his justification, to ascertain that Palmerston was cognisant of that note. Why did he not as soon as he came into office renew to Palmerston the notice he had thought it necessary to convey to Aberdeen, and why not say frankly that he regarded the state of the case to be such that, acting on the right he had reserved to himself, he should send instructions to Bresson to conclude the marriages. His answers to this were very weak. He said that it was not his business to look after Palmerston's affairs, and that he had a right to conclude, since Aberdeen had communicated with him, that he had imparted to him this note; that he showed confidence to those who showed confidence to him, and that he did not think Palmerston had acted towards him in such a manner as to require such confidential communication on his part. His real reason was (though I did not think it necessary to charge him with it), that if he had given notice to Palmerston, the latter would have sent off to Madrid and probably counteracted his scheme. He insisted that his letters to Jarnac, and the conversation he had had with Lord Cowley (which he repeated to me word for word as Lord Cowley had done), were warning enough and were sufficient indication of his intentions. Besides that Bresson's instructions were general, he had had them above a year with a discretionary power to act upon them whenever he had reason to believe the Coburg marriage was imminent, which case he contended had arrived. I said if its imminence arose from our despatch, Bresson had himself created it, inasmuch as he had shown it to the Spanish Government. He said that was not true, that Bresson had given him his most positive assurance that though he had spoken of it to different people he had never shown it to the Spanish Ministers. He spoke with great energy of the King's feelings and of his own, especially at the strong language that had been applied to him personally, and of his having been accused in a formal document as well as in a letter, of bad faith; that it was impossible to transact business with any confidence and in a useful manner with those who charged him with bad faith. Such accusations were intolerable. He then spoke of his letter to John Russell; that he had only intended to call his attention to the difficulty of going on with Palmerston while he put such a tone into the discussions; that it was absurd to suppose that he had ever thought or dreamt of effecting Palmerston's removal from office. He excused this letter very clumsily, and said he had not expected any answer to it (being evidently to the last degree nettled at that which he had received). I admitted that this letter was very imprudent, that it was very strong, and spoke of Palmerston in terms he was likely to feel and not easily to forgive; that he should have recollected what a situation he placed John Russell in, who really was compelled to answer it as he did, or to quarrel outright with Palmerston; that if he had not answered it as he did, the indignation and resentment of Palmerston would have been very great, and he would probably have resigned; and that he might have found means of conveying his sentiments in some manner less dangerous and offensive. He insisted on the clear intention of Palmerston, from the despatch, the delays, and various circumstances, to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. I said that we could prove that Aberdeen himself had laid down precisely the same rule of conduct on which Palmerston had acted, and expressed the very same sentiments; that they were recorded in a former despatch addressed to the Duke de Sotomayor for the information of the Spanish Government; that this was very different from the letter to Bulwer which was neither to be shown nor any thing done upon it, but was a reply to two important questions: the first, whether if the Spaniards chose a husband for the Queen not a Bourbon prince, such choice would be displeasing to England; and secondly, if France attempted to coerce their choice, whether England would support them. His reply was plain and decisive: viz. that their choice would not be objected to by England, whatever it might be; and that while it was impossible to conceive that France ever would attempt coercion, if she did, Spain would have the 'sympathy' of England and of all Europe. He said he had no copy of this despatch, and did not well recollect its contents. I said, 'But you have seen it.' He 'had not had it in his hands, it had been read to him.' He was evidently much put out by the citation of it.
EFFECT OF LORD PALMERSTON'S DESPATCH.
After a great deal more talk he spoke of his intentions. First, however, he complained of our refusal to join with him in the Cracow affair, and that we had done so in an offensive manner, giving him to understand that his breach of the Treaty of Utrecht made it improper to join with him in enforcing that of Vienna, but that, nevertheless, he was resolved to observe the greatest moderation and to evince no rancune; that he should lay the papers he thought necessary before the House of Peers, and make such a statement of the whole case as he was convinced would prove to demonstration to France, to Europe, and even to many people in England itself, that he was clear and blameless in the transaction; that he might deceive himself, but that such was his sincere belief; that he should, however, do this in language of moderation and with an earnest desire to avoid furnishing any fresh matter for irritation; that he should continue his endeavours to act towards England in a friendly spirit, and he should not be deterred by her past conduct from offering to communicate and consult with her on all those subjects which it was desirable they should consider with reference to their mutual or common interests. He said he had a great deal more to say to me, hoped to see me again, and that I would dine with him, and so we parted.
January 10th.—On Friday I called by appointment on Duchâtel. There is nothing of much interest to record of my conversation with him. He talked in the same strain as Guizot, expressed great desire for reconciliation, confidence in the goodness of their case, said their majority was stronger and more secure than ever, and any change of government impossible.
LORD COWLEY'S VIEW OF THE CASE.
Yesterday morning I went to Lord Cowley, who showed me his letters to Palmerston giving him an account of the state of the Spanish question and of his conversations thereupon with the King and Guizot. These communications ought certainly to have drawn Palmerston's attention to the subject, and have induced him to lose no time in coming to some understanding with the French Government. At the same time the anxiety of the King to gain time, and his urgent recommendations to Miraflores to have patience, may have misled Palmerston and made him think there was no danger. It is clear to me that what they took alarm at was Miraflores' communication; that they really did believe the Coburg alliance was imminent, and that when it was followed up by Palmerston's despatch of the 19th their fears were still more increased. They all along suspected both Palmerston and Bulwer; and they did, in truth, think that between Christina's impatience, the difficulty of finding an eligible Bourbon, the probable intrigues of Bulwer, and the suspected co-operation of Palmerston, unless they settled the matter themselves somehow it would be settled in the way they most dreaded. They knew, or at least they thought, that their difficulty would be very agreeable to Palmerston, and that it was not likely he would help them out of it. In this state of things I have no doubt that Guizot wrote to Bresson and told him to settle the affair if he could, and that Bresson was furnished with fresh instructions on which he did act, and not on the old discretionary ones on which they now pretend that he acted. Lord Cowley thinks Christina told Bresson that if he would at once strike a bargain and give the Duke de Montpensier for the Infanta, Don Francisco should have the Queen; that he instantly accepted this proposal, sent it off to Paris by telegraph, where it was confirmed at once. Whether this was the exact mode or not, or whoever took the initiative, I believe this is the way it was done; certainly the King seemed anxious to put the question off. Lord Cowley thinks he expected to be able to bring back Trapani. Guizot's vehemence (for he spoke much more strongly than the King) ought to have alarmed Palmerston. The mischief has arisen from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and alarmed.