[CHAPTER XII.]
Lord Clarendon's favourable View of the Peace—General Evans' Proposal to embark after the Battle of Inkerman—Sir E. Lyons defends Lord Raglan—Peace concluded—Sir J. Graham's gloomy View of Affairs—Edward Ellice's Plan—Favourable Reception of the Peace—A Lull in Politics—A Sabbatarian Question—The Trial of Palmer for Murder—Defeat of the Opposition—Danger of War with the United States—Ristori as an Actress—Defeat of the Appellate Jurisdiction Bill—Return of the Guards—Baron Parke on the Life Peerage—Close of the Session—O'Donnell and Espartero in Spain—Chances of War—Coronation of the Czar—Apathy of the Nation—Expense of the Coronation at Moscow—Interference at Naples—Foreign Relations—Progress of Democracy in England—Russia, France, England, and Naples—Russian Intrigues with France—The Bolgrad Question—The Quarrel with Naples—The Formation of Lord Palmerston's Government in 1855—Death of Sir John Jervis—Sir Alexander Cockburn's Appointment—James Wortley Solicitor-General—Conference on the Treaty of Paris—Low Church Bishops—Leadership of the Opposition—Coolness in Paris—Dictatorial Policy to Brazil.
RETURN TO ENGLAND.
London, March 21st, Good Friday.—I left Paris on Wednesday morning with Mr. and Mrs. Reeve, dined at Boulogne, crossed over in the evening, and arrived in London yesterday morning at eleven o'clock. When near Folkestone we were caught in a fog, lost our way, and were very near having to anchor and pass the night at sea. After a vast deal of whistling and bellowing, stopping and going on, the fog cleared a little, lights became visible, and we entered the harbour with no other inconvenience than having made a long d�tour, and being an hour later than our proper time. I regretted leaving Paris, where I was treated with so much affection and hospitality, and on the whole very well amused. On Monday, I dined with the Duchesse de Mouchy; on Tuesday night Clarendon came after dinner to see me before my departure, and we had some talk about the peace and the terms. He spoke very cheerfully about it and seems not at all dissatisfied, nor to feel any alarm about its reception. As it is, without at all acknowledging that he has made any sacrifices, he considers that the influence he has acquired for England, particularly with Austria and Turkey, is far more valuable than any items of concession from Russia would have been. Buol told him that he was now quite convinced that England was the Power to which Austria must really look with confidence and reliance on her honour and friendship, and the Turk was still more warm and vehement in assurances of the same kind. This was elicited from the Austrians by the fact of England having supported the condition of the Bessarabian cession, while France took part with Russia and threw Austria over. Moreover, Clarendon does not, like Cowley, complain of the Emperor Napoleon, but speaks with great satisfaction of His Majesty's conduct to him, and the renewed cordiality with which he has recently expressed himself towards England, and for the maintenance of his alliance with us. In short, he evidently thinks, and not without reason, that he will return, having obtained a sufficiently good peace, and having placed England in a very fine position. He said that he had been able to accomplish his task by being ready to incur responsibility at home, and by being able to act unfettered, and taking on himself to disregard any instructions or recommendations from home that he did not approve of. Yesterday I saw George Lewis and had a talk with him and his wife about Clarendon and the peace. He said he thought the peace quite sufficient, and he did not understand what it was Cowley found fault with, nor why he is dissatisfied. He denies that we have given up anything that it would have been just and reasonable to stand out upon, and will not hear of taking an apologetic tone, but that Clarendon should defend the peace on its own merits. He thinks it will be well enough received in the House of Commons and by the country, and he is in good spirits about the Government. He says Palmerston has been moderate and reasonable, and that he is not aware of Clarendon's having been harassed with any instructions, but left entirely to his own discretion. They all think he has done exceedingly well.
SIR EDMUND LYONS' NARRATIVE.
March 29th.—I went to Hatchford on Saturday last; on Wednesday to Althorp. I met Sir Edmund Lyons at Hatchford, who talked incessantly about the incidents of the war and the conduct of the people concerned in it, and very interesting his talk was, for besides having been one of the most conspicuous and important actors in it, he was completely in the confidence of the Commanders-in-Chief, and consulted by them on every occasion and with regard to all operations. He told us what had passed between Evans and Raglan and between Evans and himself on a most important occasion, to this effect: Evans went to Raglan immediately after the battle of Inkerman, and proposed to him to embark the army immediately, leaving their guns, and (Lyons says he is almost certain) their sick and wounded to the enemy. Raglan said, 'But you forget the French: would you have us abandon them to their fate?' He replied, 'You are Commander-in-Chief of the English army, and it is your business to provide for its safety....' Raglan would not hear of the proposal. Almost immediately after Evans met Sir Edmund Lyons and told him what had passed with Raglan, and urged him to suggest the same course. Lyons made the same observation about the French that Raglan had done, and said one of two things would happen: either the French would take Sebastopol alone, when we should be covered with shame and dishonour; or they would fail and probably suffer some great disaster. The expression of 'perfide Albion' had long been current in France, and then indeed it would be well deserved and would become a perpetual term of reproach against us. These rebuffs did not prevent Evans going on board ship and there giving out that the army would in a few days be obliged to embark, and Captain Dacres came to Lyons and told him he heard this was going to happen. Lyons asked him where he had heard this, and he said Evans had announced it, and talked of it unreservedly as certain to happen. Lyons said, 'It is false; the army will not go away, and Sebastopol will be taken. It is very mischievous that such reports should circulate, and I order you not to allow such a thing to be said by anybody on board your ship, and to contradict it in the most positive manner.'
Everything that Lyons said, and it may be added all one hears in every way, tends to the honour and the credit of Raglan, and I am glad to record this because I have always had an impression that much of the difficulty and distress of the army in 1854 was owing to his want of energy and management. He was not a Wellington certainly, and probably he might have done more and better than he did, but he was unquestionably, on the whole, the first man in the army, and if he had not been continually thwarted by the French, would have done more. While many here were crying out for placing our army under the command of French generals, and recalling Raglan (and I must confess I had myself a considerable leaning that way), he was struggling against the shortcomings or the inactivity of Canrobert and P�lissier. Canrobert acknowledged that he had not nerves sufficient for the duties of his station, and he never could be got to agree to adopt the bold offensive movements which Raglan was continually urging upon him, especially after the battle of Inkerman, when Raglan entreated him to follow up the discomfited Russians, his whole army being ready and not above 1,500 of them having been engaged. With P�lissier, Raglan had very little to do, for his death occurred soon after P�lissier took the command.