When Baudin took leave of him at Paris the other day on his going to Russia, he said to him, 'Is it your Majesty's wish that I should cultivate the most friendly relations with the English Ministers at Moscow and Petersburg?' to which the Emperor replied 'Certainly,' and 'L'Angleterre avant tout.' In this there can be little doubt of his personal sincerity, but probably his personal disposition and the policy of his Government and the sentiments of the French people do not altogether coincide, and this places him in a somewhat false position, and will most likely lead to apparent vacillation and inconsistency in his conduct.
Madame de Lieven writes to me that the Neapolitan Minister at Paris affirms that his King will not give way at the dictation of the allied Powers. We do not, however, as yet know what it is that is required of him. If it be true that he should govern his people more mildly and liberally, nothing can be more vague, and our greatest difficulties would begin when we had extorted from him promises and engagements to act according to our notions of justice and humanity. He would be more than mortal if he was disposed honestly to act up to engagements and promises extorted from him by fear, and it would be impossible for us to superintend and secure their due performance without taking upon ourselves virtually the government of his kingdom and superseding the King's authority. We never should get France to concur in this, and on the whole it appears more probable that differences will arise in the course of this joint action between us and France than that we should succeed in ameliorating the condition of Naples. I fear the rage for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries will never be extinguished here. I see in the papers to-day an address to Clarendon from the Protestant Society, requesting he will interpose with the Spanish Government in favour of some Spanish subject who has got into trouble in consequence of having turned Protestant, and being engaged in diffusing the Scriptures, and trying to convert others to Protestantism, which is an offence against the laws of Spain.
October 7th.—I have seen Clarendon and asked him about the affair of Naples. He was not very communicative, and I suspect he is not very easy about the course we are pursuing and the part he has to play. He first said that it was impossible for us to tolerate the conduct of the King to us, and the impertinence of his note. I asked what it was he said; Clarendon replied it amounted to this, 'Mind your own business.' Then he alluded to the atrocities of the Government, which ought not to be endured; that no man was safe for a minute, or could tell when he went to bed at night that he might not be arrested in the morning, all which was done by the King's personal orders; that there was continual danger of an outbreak or insurrection, particularly of a Muratist revolution. I told him my opinion of the very questionable policy of interference, either as a matter of right or of expediency, and nothing could be more lame than the case he made out. He said the ships were not to act any hostile part, or to coerce the King, which makes the case worse in my opinion. It is doing neither one thing nor the other, violating a sound principle, and incurring great future risks without any present object, or effecting any good, or benefiting the people in whom we take an interest. He says the Emperor Napoleon has a great horror of a Muratist movement, the Prince Murat, his cousin, being a most worthless blackguard; but his son, who married Berthier's granddaughter and heiress, is a young man full of merit of every sort.
RUSSIAN INTRIGUE WITH FRANCE.
London, October 10th.—I met Clarendon again at the Travellers', and had some conversation with him, but was interrupted by Azeglio, or I might probably have learnt more about the present state of affairs. He told me that we had been squabbling with the French Government, and that the persevering attempts of Russia to disturb the harmony between us and them had not been unsuccessful. Nothing in the way of cajolery had been omitted at Moscow to captivate the French, while on one occasion the Emperor had been so uncivil that Granville felt himself obliged to go to Gortschakoff and make a formal complaint, which was met by all sorts of assurances and protestations in order to mollify him, and after this everything went on smoothly. It is a curious state of things, for as far as I can make it out, the policy of the French Government appears to be to become intimate with Russia and to be cool with us; but all the time the Emperor (who is the Government) shrinks from anything like a breach with England, and clings to the intimacy established between the two Courts, and has a profound respect for the Queen and value for her good opinion. I asked him how he reconciled the offensive Circular of Gortschakoff with the anxiety of Russia to please France, when he said that he had no doubt they had told the French that it was aimed exclusively at us, and had come to an understanding with Morny about it, so that France was not to take offence at it. We are now, he said, on the best terms with Austria, and Austria on the worst with Russia. Russia knows that the article of the treaty compelling her to surrender a part of Bessarabia was the work of Austria, and this was an injury and an insult (for she had never before disgorged territory) which she never would forgive. The Russian Circular would have the effect of complicating the Neapolitan question, as it made the King more resolved not to yield to the demands of the two Powers. He told me that Palmerston had resolved to take up in earnest the question of Law Reform next year, and that he (Clarendon) had strongly urged him to do so as the best way of procuring both strength and credit for his Government; that Palmerston had readily come into it, and was resolved to carry out those measures which have so long been under discussion, and which for various reasons have hitherto failed of their accomplishment.
November 10th.—I went to The Grove on Saturday and had a good deal of comfortable talk with Clarendon about foreign affairs, especially the Bolgrad question and Naples. He described the former very clearly, and satisfied me that we are entirely in the right. It was settled, he said, at Paris mainly between him and Orloff. He drew the line on the map as the boundary had been agreed upon, and as he was doing so, Orloff said, 'I wish you would draw it a little more to the south; it will make no sort of difference to you, and by this means it includes within our line a strip of territory which the Emperor wishes to retain because it forms a part of a military colony which he is anxious to keep intact;' and Clarendon agreed to draw the line accordingly and to accomplish the Emperor's wishes. They have since attempted to quibble about another Bolgrad which was not even marked at all on their map, and it turns out that the story of the military colony was a mere pretence, as they have themselves given that up without making any difficulty. The state of the case and the difference which has since arisen with Russia and with France is this: the Emperor Napoleon, who is very indolent and abhors the trouble of examining details, and consequently remains often ignorant of what it behoves him to know, suffered himself to be bamboozled by Brunnow and misled by Walewski into giving his assent to the Russian interpretation of the boundary line, and to giving a promise of his support in the controversy. Recently at Compi�gne Cowley, in a long audience, went through the whole question with him and minutely explained the case against Russia. The Emperor said he had never really understood it before, acknowledged that our case was good, regretted that he had committed himself, but said that having pledged his word he did not know how to break that pledge and to withdraw the support he had promised to give to Russia in the dispute, and this is the fix in which the question now is. While the foolish and ignorant newspapers here (except the 'Times') are endeavouring to separate the Emperor from his ministers, and to make out that he is one with our Government, and that the difficulties and obstructions proceed from other parties, the truth is that they now proceed entirely from himself, worked upon and deceived certainly by Russian agents and pro-Russian ministers; but if he really was in the disposition which our press attributes to him, he might break through such obligations as he suffered himself to be entangled in and settle the question at once; nor is it very easy to see why he does not, for there is good reason to believe he is sincerely desirous of remaining on good terms with us. I asked Clarendon why the question could not be again referred to a Conference of the Powers parties to the Treaty, and he said we could not consent to this, because we should be in a minority, for Sardinia, partly cajoled by Russia and partly from antipathy to Austria, would go against us.
DISMISSAL OF NEAPOLITAN MINISTER.
I asked him about Naples, of which affair he could give but a very unsatisfactory account and a lame story. He said France had acted with us very steadily, but that it was she who had started this hare, and he had engaged in it in the belief that the Emperor would never have mooted the question unless he had been assured that the King of Naples would yield to the remonstrances of the two Courts, and but for that conviction he would never have meddled in it, which he now very much regretted. He had given Carini notice to quit, and at their parting interview he had entreated him to persuade the King if possible to change his system, and, now that he was relieved from all interference, menace, or coercion, and his dignity could not suffer, to give satisfaction to all Europe by putting an end to the inhuman and impolitic system, which had occasioned our interference and had drawn upon him remonstrances and advice from every Sovereign in Europe. Very good advice, and I hope it may be followed, but it is a lame and impotent conclusion to the menacing demonstrations with which we began to quarrel. Clarendon talked of the various atrocities of the King of Naples, but with an evident consciousness that the fact, even if it be true, and not, as is probable, exaggerated, affords no excuse for our policy in the matter. As the subject could not be agreeable I did not press it, and abstained from telling him how general the opinion is that he has committed a great blunder. He will probably hear enough of it before the chapter is closed; even Granville, who never says much, said to me yesterday that 'it was a very foolish affair.'
Clarendon talked to me of Palmerston, and told me (what I think I had heard, and have very likely noted before) that on Aberdeen's fall Palmerston was quite ready to join Derby when Derby tried to form a Government, and that it was Clarendon's refusal which frustrated that attempt. Palmerston endeavoured to persuade Clarendon to join, but when Clarendon put to him all the reasons why they had both of them better refuse, Palmerston saw them all very clearly, and rather imprudently said on leaving him, 'We are both agreed that it will not do to have anything to do with Derby and his Government.' When Clarendon went to the Queen and explained his own conduct to her, and she expressed to him the embarrassment which she felt, and asked him what she could do, he at once said, 'Send for Lord Palmerston, who is the only man, in the present temper of the people and state of affairs, who can form a Government that has a chance of standing. Send for him at once, place yourself entirely in his hands, give him your entire confidence, and I will answer for his conduct being all that you can desire.' The Queen took the advice, and has had no reason to repent of it, and Clarendon told me he had done everything in his power, and seized every available opportunity to reconcile them to each other, to promote a good feeling and understanding, and to soften any little asperities which might have made their intercourse less smooth, and the consequence is that Palmerston gets on with her very well, and his good sense as well as Clarendon's exhortations make him see of what importance it is to him for the easy working of his Government and his own ease to be on good and cordial terms with the Queen. It is therefore really to Clarendon that Palmerston is indebted in great measure, if not entirely, for being in his present position, but Clarendon has too much tact ever to remind him of it, or of what he was himself inclined to do in 1855.