November 10th.—Palmerston pronounced a glowing eulogium on Canning last night at the Lord Mayor's dinner, which will infallibly stop the current of abuse against him. It has already turned the 'Times.' He seems to have been induced to do this by the great pressure brought to bear on him, for otherwise he had no desire to stand forth and oppose public opinion and the press; but Clarendon, Lansdowne, and others all urged him strenuously to support Canning, and he did it handsomely enough. His speech in other respects was an injudicious one, full of jactance and bow-wow, but well enough calculated to draw cheers from a miscellaneous audience.
PALMERSTON'S SPEECH AT THE MANSION HOUSE.
November 11th.—I was told yesterday that Palmerston's swaggering speech would produce a bad effect in France, and those whom I have spoken to agree in thinking it very ill-timed and in very bad taste. It is the more objectionable because he might have said something very different that would have been very becoming and true. He might have observed upon the remarkable good taste and forbearance which had been so conspicuous in all foreign nations towards us, even those who may be supposed to be least friendly to us, or those whom we have most outraged by our violent and insulting language or conduct. It is at once creditable to other countries and honourable to us that no disposition has been shown in any quarter to act differently towards us, or to avail themselves of what they may suppose to be our weakness and difficulty; but, on the contrary, the same consideration and deference has been shown to us as if there had been no Indian outbreak to absorb our resources. Our position in Europe is not only as high as ever, but no one shows any disposition to degrade or diminish it; and while this is a gratifying homage to us and a flattering recognition of our power, it is, or at least ought to be, calculated to inspire us with amicable sentiments, and to be an inducement to us to depart from the insolent and offensive tone which has so long prevailed here, and which has made England universally an object of aversion. It was of course impossible that some expressions should not be given here and there and now and then to such feelings, but on the whole we have no reason to complain, but much the contrary; not even in Russia, whose power and pride we have so deeply wounded, and whom we have so outraged by every topic and expression of insult and injury which the bitterest hatred could suggest, has there been anything like asperity, or any rejoicing over our misfortunes.
Frognal, November 14th.—The news of the capture of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow excited a transport of delight and triumph, and everybody jumped to the conclusion that the Indian contest was virtually at an end. Granville told me he thought there would be no more fighting, and that the work was done. I was not so sanguine, and though I thought the result of the contest was now secure, I thought we should still have a great deal on our hands and much more fighting to hear of before the curtain could drop. But I was not prepared to hear the dismal news which arrived to-day, and which has so cruelly damped the public joy and exultation. It appears that Havelock is in great danger and the long suffering garrison of Lucknow not yet out of their peril, for the victory of Havelock had not been complete, the natives were gathering round the small British force in vast numbers, and unless considerable reinforcements could be speedily brought up, the condition of the British, both military and civilians, of men, women, and children, would soon again be one of excessive danger.
SUSPENSION OF THE BANK ACT.
The Grove, November 15th.—I talked with Clarendon about the Government letter to the Bank[1] and the state of financial affairs. It is evident that Clarendon knows very little about these questions, and takes very little part in them, but he told me one curious fact. A letter which appeared about a week ago, addressed by the Emperor of the French to his Finance Minister, made a great sensation here. In it the Emperor deprecated all empirical measures for the purpose of meeting the prevailing difficulties, financial and commercial, at Paris. About a week before this Clarendon received a letter from Cowley, who said that he had been conversing with the Emperor and with Walewski on these matters, and Walewski had begged him (by the desire of the Emperor) to write to Clarendon and request the advice of the English Government as to the course he should adopt. Clarendon said that George Lewis was out of town, but as there could be no delay, he sent his private secretary to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, and requested their advice and opinion. They said it was so important they would go down to the Foreign Office, which they did, when they told Clarendon that their advice was that the Emperor should insist on the Bank of France following as nearly as possible the example of the Bank of England, to keep their rates of discount high, and to avoid all rash experiments of any kind. He wrote to Cowley accordingly, who communicated the answer, and judging from the dates it would appear that the Emperor's letter was the consequence of the advice so tendered. But Clarendon seemed to think that the appearance of the Government letter was rather awkward, and would appear to the French Government very inconsistent with our communication to them. However, it will probably be easy to afford satisfactory explanations on this head. The measure itself here has apparently had the desired success, and they hope the panic and distress will gradually subside, without any more mischief happening. Lewis thinks that the best mode of dealing with Peel's Act will be to retain it, but to give a power to the Queen in Council to relax it in the same manner as has been now twice done by the interposition of Government, whenever an urgent necessity should arise, and I suppose this is the course that will be adopted, though not without a great deal of discussion and diversity of opinion. I have hitherto said nothing about the very curious and important state of affairs in America and in this country, because I am too ignorant of financial questions to talk about them, and I have not been apprised of any facts beyond what all the world knows that it was worth while to record, but this anecdote of the French Government and our own appears sufficiently curious to have a place in this book.
[1] [On the 12th of November a letter was addressed to the Governors of the Bank of England by Lord Palmerston and Sir George Cornewall Lewis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, empowering the Bank to exceed the limits prescribed by the Bank Act of 1844 (if necessary) to meet the demands for discount and advances on approved security. This measure was rendered necessary by the extensive failures which had recently taken place, and the severe pressure on the money market. On the 4th November discount had advanced to 9 per cent. The Issue Department made over to the Banking Department two millions in excess of the statutable amount, of which about one million was advanced to the public. On the 1st December the whole amount was repaid. Parliament was summoned to pass a Bill of Indemnity, and public confidence was restored.]
November 17th.—A council was held yesterday at Windsor to summon Parliament, where I found the ministers much dejected at the news from India. There was a letter from Colin Campbell, expressing great alarm at the position of Outram and Havelock, whom he thought to be in a great scrape, though without any fault of theirs, and there was also a report from Sir John Lawrence that affairs were in a ticklish state in the Punjaub, and expressing a great anxiety for reinforcements, which he had very little prospect of getting; in short the apparently bright sky in which we were rejoicing only a few days ago seems to be obscured by black clouds, and the great result to be as uncertain as ever.
THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY.
I met Clarendon at dinner this evening, when he told me that affairs were in a bad state in the City, and that Lewis had received very unsatisfactory accounts, so that it is not clear that the Government letter is producing the good which at first seemed to be following from it. There is a good deal of uneasiness in the financial and commercial world and no confidence. The very prudence of the trading community in arresting the course of production is becoming a source of distress, for already vast numbers of people are out of employment, or working short time with reduced wages. The prices of everything are falling, consumption will be diminished, and the revenue must be diminished likewise, while our expenses cannot but be increased by the war. A general cry is getting up for making India pay for the expense of this Indian war, which, even supposing it to be just and reasonable, will make the ultimate settlement of the Indian question more difficult, and a measure little calculated to reconcile the native population to our rule. Then, as if we had not embarrassments enough on our hands, America is going to add to them, for President Buchanan, who hates England with a mortal antipathy, threatens to repudiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty upon the pretence that we have not abided by its conditions, and if he proposes to the Senate to declare it null and void, the Senate will do so at his bidding. This would be a flagrant violation of good faith, and of the obligations by which all civilized nations consider themselves bound. If this event happens, it will place us in a very perplexing dilemma, especially after Palmerston's absurd bravado and confident boastings of our power, for we are not in a condition to enable us to take a highline corresponding with that lofty language, and we shall have to eat humble pie and submit to the affront. Hitherto all other nations and governments have behaved to us as well and as respectfully as we could desire, and far more than we deserve; but if America bullies us in one instance, and we are found pocketing the affront, it is by no means improbable that other governments will begin to take advantage of our weakness, and adopt towards us a conduct injurious to our interests or a tone galling to our pride.[1]