Hatchford, January 4th.—I was in London yesterday, where I saw George Lewis, who was very low, sees no chance of peace, and everybody thinks it hopeless since the Russian Circular has appeared. It is difficult to understand the motive of the Russians in publishing such a proposal, when they must know it would not and could not be accepted, and were also aware of the terms the Western Powers were going to offer to her. Lewis says our financial prospect is very bad, a declining revenue, rising prices, a large loan wanted which will be got on bad terms, and more money to be lent to Sardinia and Turkey. He thinks, if the Russians propose to negotiate, that Palmerston will never consent; but though he will no doubt resist, if France presses it I have no doubt he will give way and that the majority of the Cabinet will be for doing so. Everything looks as black as possible, and the Emperor Napoleon's speech to the Imperial Guard following Persigny's article in the 'Morning Post' wears a very menacing aspect. It is possible indeed that he may have held this language in order to frighten us into a more pacific disposition, but so far from being alarming or unpalatable to the majority here, they will hail with satisfaction any intimation of his resolution to make war on Prussia; and if Louis Napoleon will only go on fighting against Russia, they will be quite willing that he should take whatever he pleases from any other power which will not join us in our present crusade. I often wonder what the Duke of Wellington would have said and thought if he could have lived to see this day, and the madness of this nation.
London, January 9th.—I came to town on Monday and found when I arrived that there was a fresh glimmering of peace. Austria had sent word she was inclined to believe that Russia intended to accept the terms. I went to Lewis, who told me this was true, but he did not know on what ground their opinion rested more than that ten days had elapsed during which no symptoms of a flat refusal had appeared, and Lewis himself thought there was no doubt they were considering whether they should accept or what reply they should make. Colloredo called on Clarendon the other day, and, after some unimportant talk, asked him if he had ever heard, or had reason to believe, that Russia had made a communication to France to the effect that if France had a mind to take the Rhenish Provinces and make peace with her, she should not oppose such a design. Clarendon replied that he knew nothing of it, but thought it not at all improbable.
Bernstorff had a conversation with Reeve the other day in which he told him that he was much put out at the isolated condition of Prussia, and gave him to understand that he should like the King to join the alliance, but he did not think anything would induce him to do so. It might perhaps be prudent, but it would be enormously base if Prussia were to come au secours des vainqueurs, and, now that Russia is in exceeding distress, to join England and France, to whom she certainly is under no obligations, in crushing her. But then it would only be prudent for the moment and to remove an immediate and impending danger, for in the more comprehensive view of the balance of power and with referance to general policy, it would be far wiser to leave the power of Russia undiminished. Germany has nothing to fear from Russia, for the notion of her being eternally animated with designs of conquest in every direction is a mere chim�ra which the people who propagate it do not themselves believe. The part she has played for many years past has been that of a pacificator, and her only intervention has been to appease quarrels, and resist the progress of democracy and revolution. In 1848 it was the authority of the Emperor Nicholas which prevented a great war between Austria and Prussia which would have made all Germany a scene of havoc and bloodshed. Our Government now evidently expect a proposal from Russia to negotiate, and are living in hopes that it may be rejected in limine by Esterhazy, and that they shall be able to prevail on the Emperor Napoleon not to consent to any overture that may be made to him through any other channel.
January 15th.—I came to town yesterday morning and found on my arrival the Russian answer, which was pretty much what I expected. I suspect our Government will have been disappointed that so much was conceded as to make a peremptory rejection so monstrous as to be hardly safe. However, Esterhazy has been ordered to withdraw on the 18th, unless everything else is conceded. Granville fancies they are not unlikely to do this, but I am persuaded they will not. It remains to be seen what the French will do, for all depends on them. I asked Granville what he thought would be the end of it; he said on the whole he was rather disposed to expect it would lead to peace; he said Austria did not mean to go to war with Russia in any case, he thought she had played her cards with considerable dexterity, and made herself a sort of arbitress, and, what she most desired, had got a decided lead of Prussia, the object of her hatred. I asked him if Prussia was terrified at the menaces contained in the Emperor's speech and other things against her, and he said he thought she was irritated but not frightened, and he inveighed against the folly of such, speeches, and especially such articles as Persigny, if it was he, had put into the 'Morning Post.'
January 16th.—So far as I can as yet discover of public opinion, it is in favour of accepting, or at all events of negotiating on, the Russian proposals. The 'Times' has an ambiguous article on the subject. Nobody will approve of the continuation of the war merely to obtain an Austrian object, which the cession of Bessarabia is, and the article about Bomarsund, which has nothing to do with the avowed object of the war. I have not the least doubt one half of the Cabinet, at least, are in their hearts of this opinion, but I am afraid they will not have the courage to stand forth, avow, and act upon it.
TERMS OF PEACE ACCEPTED BY RUSSIA.
January 17th.—I saw Lewis yesterday and for the first time saw something approaching to a certainty of peace. His information was curious: the 'Morning Post,' in the statement inserted by Persigny, said that the Russians had rejected the conditions about Bessarabia, and about Bomarsund and had accepted the rest. In the counter proposition of Russia there was no mention of Bomarsund, and for this very good reason, that no such proposal was made to them. When the terms of Austria and France were sent here our Government objected to that article which said the allies reserved to themselves to make other conditions, or some such words. They said it was not fair, and that they should at once say what they wanted, and all they wanted, and the additions they proposed were that Bomarsund should not be restored, that Consuls should be admitted to the Black Sea ports, and that 'something' should be done about Georgia and Circassia. This was their answer, and our allies agreed to these additions, but for what reason has not as yet appeared. They sent the terms to St. Petersburg in their original shape and without our articles, so that in fact no condition about Bomarsund was made to them. The Cabinet met yesterday to determine what answer should be sent to Paris, the French having notified that they would make no reply to the counter proposal till they were apprised of our sentiments thereupon. Lewis said he had no doubt that both governments would be willing to enter upon negotiation on these terms, France and Austria being anxious for peace and our Government not averse, for they begin to perceive that there is a rapidly increasing disposition to put an end to the war, and particularly that nobody will desire to continue it merely to obtain an exclusively Austrian object, which the cession of part of Bessarabia would be, especially as Austria has no thought of going to war. The Russian Government have written in a very conciliatory tone to Paris, which is known, though the letter has not yet arrived. The King of Prussia had written a private, but very pressing letter to the Emperor of Russia entreating him to make peace. Though very private, the French Government contrived to get a copy of it, and Cowley sent this copy home. It is said to be a very able letter written in a most confidential style. Such being the state of affairs and all parties apparently being agreed in a disposition to put an end to the war, it seemed to me quite certain that the negotiations would be established, and that they would lead to peace. In the evening I asked Granville if he did not think we should now certainly have peace, and he said 'I think so, but there are still a great many complications,' and he said Cowley and Walewski were on such bad terms that they hardly spoke. The fact is that Cowley is a gentleman and a man of honour and veracity, but he is sensitive and prone to take offence; the other is an adventurer, a needy speculator, without honour, conscience, or truth, and utterly unfit both as to his character and his capacity for such an office as he holds. Then it must be owned that it must be intolerably provoking to Walewski or any man in his situation to see Cowley established in such strange relations with the Emperor, being at least for certain purposes more his Minister for Foreign Affairs than Walewski himself.
12 o'clock.—Payne has just rushed in here, to say that a telegraphic message, dated Vienna, ten o'clock last night, announces that 'Russia accepts unconditionally the proposals of the allies.' The consequence of this astounding intelligence was such a state of confusion and excitement on the Stock Exchange as was hardly ever seen before. The newspapers had one and all gone on predicting that the negotiations would lead to nothing, and that the war would go on, so that innumerable people continued to be 'bears,' and they were all rushing to get out as fast as they could. It remains yet to be seen whether it is really true; if it is, the Russians will be prodigiously provoked when they find that this concession was superfluous, and that the allies would have accepted their terms.
January 18th.—Though the account in the 'Times' was not exactly correct, it proved substantially so. The right message came from Seymour soon after. There was such a scene in the Stock Exchange as was hardly ever witnessed; the funds rose three per cent., making five in the last two days. The Rothschilds, and all the French who were in the secret with Walewski, must have made untold sums. I have been endeavouring to account for what appears the extraordinary conduct of Russia in accepting the Austrian terms purely and simply, and this strikes me to be the solution of it, and if my idea is correct it will account for the exceedingly bad terms which Cowley and Walewski are on. The conditions offered to Russia contained none of the points insisted on by our Government. I believe that the French and Austrians believed, very likely were certain, that if they had been sent Russia would have refused them, and, being bent on peace, they resolved to leave them out, and excuse themselves to England as they best could; they therefore simply presented their proposal as it originally stood. Russia replied with a qualified acceptance, and then Esterhazy was obliged by the compact to say that he could only take yes or no; then, finding them not inclined to give any other answer, that he or somebody else told them the true state of the case, viz., that he had kept back the conditions we had demanded, and that unless they accepted his proposition, it must of necessity fall to the ground, and that nothing would then prevent the English points being brought forward and made absolute conditions of any fresh preliminaries. This was very likely to determine them to accept the proposals as put before them, for although by so doing they accepted the fifth condition, which exposes them to further and not specified demands, the especial points on which we insist can only be brought forward as points for negotiation, and will not form part of those conditions to which by their acceptance they stand completely and irrevocably pledged.
POPULAR FEELING FOR WAR.