[3] [It was proposed by the Sovereigns to place the Pope at the head of an Italian Confederation—a wild scheme, which entirely failed.]
[4] [This was so. The details of Kossuth's negotiations with the Emperor have been published by Kossuth himself in his memoirs.]
July 15th.—The news of the peace took everybody so much by surprise, that people had no time to arrange their thoughts upon it; but in the midst of the general satisfaction that the war is over, it is already apparent that there is an explosion of disappointment and resentment to come. All the Italian sympathisers here are in despair, Palmerston is much dissatisfied, and the anti-Austrian Press is indignant. The King of Sardinia has not openly testified any ill-humour, and has published an Address to his new Lombard subjects in a joyful style, but it is impossible he should not deeply feel and resent the contemptuous way in which he has been treated by his Imperial ally, and the resignation of Cavour is a clear manifestation of his feelings on the subject.
When it was announced that an interview was to take place between the two Emperors, everybody predicted that the elder of the two would have as much success in diplomacy over his rival as he had already obtained in arms, but the result does not appear to bear out that expectation, though we do not yet know what the real motives of the Emperor Napoleon were in concluding such an extraordinary peace. Granville told me that at this interview the Austrian Emperor had taken a very high line, and shown little disposition to concession. He said to Napoleon, 'You have conquered Lombardy, and I do not contemplate making any attempt to recover it. I am therefore quite ready to cede it to you, and you will deal with it as you please. I have nothing to say to the King of Sardinia, and make no concessions to him. With regard to Venetia, and the country of which I remain in possession, I have nothing to concede or to offer, all that I mean to retain, but I have no objection to my Venetian dominions forming part of the Italian Confederation.' They appear to have had a vast deal of conversation and discussion, for they are said to have been together for above twelve hours. What they talked about it would be interesting to know, but which they will neither of them tell us. The field for speculation is as wide as can well be. How the settlement of Italy is to be accomplished, how the Italians are to be contented, and how peace in that country is to be permanently secured, are questions enough to puzzle the acutest politicians.
We congratulate ourselves at having kept entirely clear both of the war and the peace, but no doubt Palmerston is mortified, and I think England generally will be provoked that changes of such importance should have been made without any consultation or even communication with us.
The friends of the Emperor Napoleon say that they believe his motive for making peace on any terms he could get to have been principally that he was so shocked and disgusted at the fearful scenes of pain and misery that he had to behold after the battle of Solferino in addition to the other battle-fields, and at the spectacle of thousands of killed and wounded presented to his eyes, that his nerves could not bear it. Lady Cowley told me that he was so tenderhearted that he could not bear the sight of pain, much less being the cause of inflicting it, and she had seen him quite upset after visiting hospitals at the sufferings he had witnessed there, which of course are not to be compared with the horrible scene of a battle-field. It is impossible to say that this may not be true wholly or in part, it is impossible to account for human idiosyncrasies; but it is quite certain that the man who is said to shrink with horror from the sight of suffering does not scruple to inflict it in quite as bad a form when he does not himself witness the infliction. He has hundreds and thousands of people torn from their families, and without form of trial or the commission of any crime sends them to linger or perish in pestilential climates, when he fancies it his interest to do so, and for their sufferings he evinces no pity or any nervous sensations.
August 7th.—I have found it impossible to collect anything to record in this book for the last month almost. The session is drawing to a close, having glided on without difficulty for the Government, and almost without opposition. The Election Committees have made great havoc in Palmerston's small majority, having unseated no less than seven Liberal members. I am told, perhaps on no good authority, that Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone are anxious to join in a Congress to mix themselves up in the settlement of Italian affairs, but that they cannot have their way, the majority of the Cabinet being opposed to it, and the House of Commons and the country (as represented by the Press) being decidedly against any such interference.[1]
[1] [I think it was at this time that Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell proposed to the Cabinet that England should enter into a Treaty of Alliance with France and Sardinia, but the proposal was negatived by their colleagues. The feelings of these Ministers, however, speedily changed when the cession of Savoy and Nice, and the manner in which it was brought about, were known, and their language became so hostile that it gave great offence to the Emperor Napoleon. See Lord Malmesbury, 'Autobiography,' vol. ii. p. 225.]
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.
I met Edward Mildmay the other day, who gave me some account of his own personal experiences during the last Italian campaign, when he was attached to the Austrian Army. He confirmed all previous accounts of the excellence of that army and the incompetency of its chiefs; that nothing could have saved the French Army at Magenta if the Austrians had been tolerably commanded; that Giulai, who had never seen any service, had been allowed to retain the command by the influence of General Gr�nne, whose friend he is, and that the indignation and disgust of the army at having been thus sacrificed to Court favour and partiality had been extreme. He told me that at Solferino the Austrian loss was (within a fraction of) 20,000, the French 19,000, and the Sardinians 9,000 men; Benedek is the ablest of the Austrian generals, and if he had had the command probably affairs would have taken a very different turn. Mildmay has no doubt that peace was much more necessary to the French than to the Austrians, and he still believes that if the war had continued the tide of victory would have been rolled back, as the latter had 90,000 fresh troops coming into line. It is probably better as it is than if the Austrians had recovered all their losses; the Emperor Napoleon seems likely to be satisfied with his military exploits, and to be really intending to revert to his peaceful policy. He is certainly doing all he can to persuade the world that such is his intention, and there seems a disposition here to take him at his word.