Torquay, March 28th.—The past week has been remarkable for the speech in which John Russell denounced in strong language the conduct of France, declared that we could no longer trust her, and that we must renew our intimacies with the other Powers. Whether all this was sincere and meant all it seems to do is yet to be discovered. The week was near being still more remarkable, for the Reform Bill was within an ace of falling to the ground by the House being counted out in the midst of a debate. This would have been very ridiculous, but would have been hailed with delight by the House of Commons, and without dissatisfaction by the country. Clarendon writes to me in a strain of bitter hostility to the Bill and disgust at everything, complains of the general apathy and the impossibility of rousing any spirit of opposition to what all abhor. Derby told him that if twenty-five or even twenty Liberals would take the lead in opposing this Bill, the whole Conservative party would support them. Clarendon wrote to me when I was at Bath that the time would probably come when Gladstone would propose a graduated Income Tax, and lo! it has nearly come, for Gladstone gave notice the other night to people to be prepared for it. The Triumvirate of Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone, who have it all their own way, dragging after them the Cabinet, the House of Commons, and the country, will probably be the ruin of this country. They are playing into the Emperor Napoleon's hands, who has only to be patient and bide his time, and he will be able to treat all Europe, England included, in any way he pleases. Nothing but some speedy change of Government and of system can avert the impending ruin.
London, April 2nd.—One day last week (as mentioned above), on one of the numerous discussions of the Savoy question in the House of Commons, John Russell electrified the House and rather astonished the country by delivering a very spirited speech, denouncing in strong terms the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon, and declaring the necessity of cultivating relations with the other Great Powers for the purpose of putting an effectual check upon the projects of French aggrandisement and annexation. I must own that my first impression was that this speech was made merely to deceive the House and the country, and was only a part of the collusive system between our Government and the French, by virtue of which Louis Napoleon has been enabled to work out all his objects and designs; but though it is impossible to doubt that John Russell and Palmerston have all along been aware of the Emperor's intentions with regard to Savoy, and that they have been more intent upon procuring advantages for Sardinia and provoking Austria than upon thwarting the projects of France, I am inclined to see Lord John's speech in another light from what I hear since I came to town. He made it without any previous consultation with his colleagues, it having been one of those impromptus which he is so apt to indulge in, and Palmerston, seeing the way in which it was received in the House and by the Press, approved of its tone and expressed a full concurrence with it. Flahault, who went to Paris a few days ago, called on Palmerston before he went and asked if he wished him to say or do anything there. Palmerston said he might inform the Government that Lord John's speech expressed the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet here. In my opinion his speech was a great imprudence, and will probably involve the necessity of our eating a great deal of humble pie. We have long ago declared that though we disapprove very much of the annexation of Savoy, we should take no steps to prevent it; but Lord John made a great distinction between the question of Savoy and Nice and that of Faucigny and Chablais, and though he did not commit himself to any positive course, he gave it to be inferred that something more would be required from us, in the way of opposition to the seizure of the latter, than there was any necessity for our making to that of the former. But the Emperor makes no such distinctions, and if, as is most probable, he does not admit our right to draw them, we shall be in an unpleasant fix, and have to back out of the position we have assumed in a way neither dignified nor creditable.
SCHEMES OF THE EMPEROR.
The accounts from Paris are that this speech has made the French very insolent, and the Emperor more popular than he has been for a long time, as even his enemies say that they will rally round him to chastise English impertinence. Then as to forming alliances with the other Powers, which of course will be taken (as was intended) as a menace to France, nothing could be more ill-advised than such an announcement, for the other Great Powers have neither the ability nor the inclination to join us in any coalition, present or prospective, against France. Russia and Austria hate us, as well they may, for we have done them both all the injury in our power, besides heaping every sort of insult upon them. Austria is totally ruined, hopelessly bankrupt and torn to pieces with internal disaffection and discontent. Russia is hampered with her great serf question, and overwhelmed with financial embarrassments, which she owes in great measure to the Crimean War, and the unfortunate dissension and estrangement between her and Austria are attributable to the same cause and to our policy. Prussia, the only one of the three that is able to make any efforts, and that has no cause of enmity against us, is always selfish and timorous, and is more occupied in trying to supplant Austria in Germany than in taking defensive measures against French ambition; nor is there in Germany any such strong sentiment of national independence as might induce the various States to sink their minor jealousies and partisanships in a general union, to meet any aggression that may proceed from France. Among the many schemes which the Imperial brain is supposed to be continually engendering, it is far from impossible that one may be the reconstruction of the kingdom of Westphalia, or at least of some Rhenish kingdom with the concurrence of Prussia, by concluding a bargain of partition with her. He might then replace old Jerome on the throne, and so get rid of his obnoxious son, of course taking as much of such acquired territory as he wanted for himself. All this is mere vague conjectural speculation, but it is on the cards, and it is at least as probable as that we should be able to form another coalition, like that which overthrew the first Napoleon, strong enough to cope with the present Napoleon. People are beginning at last to doubt whether the war we waged against Russia four years ago was really a wise and politic measure; but the whole country went mad upon that subject, I never could understand why. Palmerston took it up to make political capital out of it, and made himself popular by falling in with the public humour, and making the country believe that he was the only man really determined to make war on Russia, and able to bring the war to a successful end. Aberdeen, who was wise enough to see the folly of quarrelling with Russia and sacrificing all our old alliances to a new and deceitful one with France, was unable to stem the torrent, and fell under its violence. His fault was his not resigning office when he found it impossible to carry out his policy and maintain peace.
A propos of the Russian War, I heard lately an anecdote for the first time that surprised me. Everybody knows that we beat up for allies and even mercenary aid against Russia in every direction, but it is not known that our Government earnestly pressed the Portuguese Government to join in the war, and to send a contingent to the Crimea, and that on the refusal of the latter to do so, the Ministers made the Queen appeal personally to Lavradio and urge him to persuade his Government to comply with our wishes; but Lavradio represented to Her Majesty, as he had done to her Ministers, that Portugal had no quarrel with Russia, and no interest in joining in the war; on the contrary, Portugal was under obligations to the Emperor of Russia, and she therefore would have nothing to do with the contest. This was a most extraordinary proceeding, and it was contrary to all usage as well as all propriety to make the Queen interpose in person on such an occasion.
DANGER OF WAR WITH FRANCE.
April 4th.—Clarendon has just been here talking over the state of affairs, in the course of which he alluded to what had passed in the autumn of '58 between the Emperor and him, and between His Majesty and Palmerston. In September he had a long conversation with the Emperor, in the course of which he asked Clarendon, 'Supposing I find myself compelled to go to war with Austria, what part would England take in the contest?' Clarendon replied that it would depend upon the circumstances of the case and the cause that would be shown for such a war, and that he must not be misled by the language of the English Press and the prejudice which no doubt existed in England against Austria and her system of government, which would not be sufficient to make us take any part against her. On comparing notes with Palmerston afterwards, Clarendon found that Louis Napoleon had put the same question to Palmerston, who had given him the same answer. When they went to Compi�gne in November of the same year, they both had conversations separately of the same character, and when they afterwards compared notes and Clarendon asked Palmerston what impression the Emperor's words had left on his mind, Palmerston replied he thought either that the Emperor had abandoned the design he had certainly been meditating to go to war, or he had resolved upon it, but did not choose to acknowledge his intentions to them, and this Clarendon said was exactly the same opinion as he had formed. This, however, was not above six weeks before his famous speech to the Austrian Ambassador (which was a declaration of war), and therefore the latter conjecture was the correct one. We talked over Lord John's speech and his letter in answer to Thouvenel. Clarendon said that this despatch was entirely written by Palmerston himself, that anybody as well acquainted with their styles as he was must be quite certain of this, but that he knew it to be the case. He had a conversation with Palmerston the other day, who praised Lord John's speech and said it would do good, and he thought the question of Savoy was in a very satisfactory state.
Palmerston, he told me, had said more to Flahault[1] than I had been apprised of. Flahault went to him, and found him just going to the House of Commons. Flahault asked him to let him get into his carriage, which he did, and when Flahault asked what he should say to the Emperor, and Palmerston told him to say that the Emperor had better read Lord John's speech, and understand that he (Palmerston) agreed in every word of it, Flahault said, 'Then you mean that you have no longer any confidence in the Emperor, or place any reliance upon his word.' Palmerston replied, 'I do mean this. After having been repeatedly deceived and misled by his professions and assurances, it is impossible that I can place any further confidence in him.' Then said Flahault, 'There will be war,' to which Palmerston rejoined that he hoped not, that nobody could be more anxious to avoid war than he was.
[1] [Count de Flahault was at this time French Ambassador in London.]
This was very spirited and becoming, and Clarendon said he highly approved of such a tone. I said that I had all along suspected that there was a secret understanding and collusion between Palmerston and the Emperor, and that Palmerston had given His Majesty to understand that if he would set Italy free, he might do what he pleased with regard to Savoy, but that what had recently passed seemed to negative that idea. Clarendon replied he had no doubt Palmerston had very often said to Persigny what, if repeated by Persigny to the Emperor with some exaggerations and suppressions, would convey as much to His Majesty, for Palmerston had a dozen times said to him (Clarendon) that the liberation and settlement of Italy was of far greater consequence than the preservation of Savoy to Piedmont.