Thus ended, so far as Delaware was concerned, the question of compensated emancipation. Precisely why the offer of Federal assistance was rejected nowhere clearly appears except in the records of the General Assembly. The high ground assumed in the resolutions was, of course, the only one in harmony with public opinion in the State. There are, however, some facts in the history of that Commonwealth which afford a partial explanation of the action of its Legislature. When the Federalist party as a political force had disappeared everywhere outside of New England its principles and traditions still lingered on in Delaware. The same conservative tendency, the same distrust of innovation is seen again in the prudent manner in which the authorities of the State invested and improved her portion of the surplus revenue distributed among the States in 1837. With a half dozen exceptions the shares allotted to other members of the Union have disappeared, in some instances expended patriotically, in others squandered on projects more or less visionary. It has frequently been observed, too, that a community whose population is chiefly agricultural is apt to view with suspicion any financial proposition of great magnitude. Whatever the true explanation of her opposition to the policy of the President, the question at once sank to rest in Delaware; it was soon to be revived elsewhere, however, as will presently be seen.
Meanwhile army officers continued to determine, on their own authority, very important questions relative to the surrender of fugitive slaves. Major-General Halleck declared in a proclamation of February 23, 1862, that “it does not belong to the military to decide upon the relation of master and slave. Such questions must be settled by the civil courts. No fugitive slave will therefore be admitted within our lines or camps, except when specially ordered by the General commanding.”[[240]] General Halleck’s order No. 3 of November 20 preceding, as it cut off an opportunity for the escape of thousands, occasioned much bitter discussion both in and out of Congress. By Halleck it was explained in these words: “Unauthorized persons, black or white, free or slaves, must be kept out of our camps, unless we are willing to publish to the enemy everything we do or intend to do.” This statement, however, does not altogether harmonize with the spirit of his order.[[241]]
General Buell up to March 6 appears to have uniformly returned this class of persons, and on the 26th of that month General Hooker permitted nine citizens of Maryland to search for negroes supposed to have taken refuge with some of the regiments in his division. Notwithstanding the commander desired that no obstacles be thrown in their way, trouble occurred when the claimants showed their authority and demanded the surrender of their slaves. They were driven from camp because fears for their safety were entertained by some of the officers. The anger of the soldiers appears to have been especially aroused by the fact that when within a few yards of camp the slaveholders fired two pistol shots at a negro who was running past them.[[242]]
General Doubleday’s opinion, as stated April 6, 1862, by the Assistant Adjutant-General, was, “that all negroes coming into the lines of any of the camps or forts under his command, are to be treated as persons and not as chattels.
“Under no circumstances,” continues this regulation, “has the commander of a fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as fugitive slaves, as it cannot be done without determining their character.
“The additional article of war recently passed by Congress positively prohibits this.”[[243]]
Notwithstanding the unmistakable tone of the above, General Williams announced two months later from his headquarters at Baton Rouge that commanders of the camps and garrisons in that part of Louisiana were required to turn all fugitives beyond the limits of their guards and sentinels because of “the demoralizing and disorganizing tendencies to the troops of harboring runaway negroes.”[[244]]
Enough has been said to show the divergence of sentiment among Federal commanders on the rendition of fugitive slaves. The party preferences of officers served as a rather reliable index to the treatment of the fugitive in any particular case. This confusion, it is scarcely necessary to add, arose from the failure of Congress to pass a law on the subject, and to a considerable degree from the absence of any clearly expressed policy by the Administration. Of the changing opinions of the President, however, we catch an occasional glimpse. Though the contrabands at Fortress Monroe had, no doubt, brought before him the entire question of slavery, the sagacity of General Butler had postponed the necessity of any announcement in May, 1861; but the subject could not always be avoided, and the imprudence of Fremont forced a declaration in September following. The events of another year were destined to produce changes which even the wisest could not then foresee.
A new phase of this troublesome question resulted from the capture, November 7, of Hilton Head, South Carolina, and the Federal occupation of the Sea Islands, where the labor of slaves abandoned by their masters was organized under authority of the Treasury Department by Mr. E. L. Pierce. This was, probably, intended as nothing more than an experiment, to be extended if successful. To interest Government officials at Washington in the work among these freedmen, Mr. Pierce, at the suggestion of Secretary Chase, called, February 15, 1862, upon the President, who seemed rather annoyed at the visit, and, after listening a few moments, said somewhat impatiently that he did not think he ought to be troubled with such details; that “there seemed to be an itching to get negroes into our lines.” To this Mr. Pierce replied that the negroes were domiciled there when the Union forces took possession. The President then handed his visitor a card by which Mr. Chase was authorized to give what instructions he thought judicious relative to Port Royal contrabands.[[245]] This impatience Mr. Pierce explains by saying that the President was in expectation of a personal bereavement. This certainly accounts for the anxiety and apparent annoyance of Mr. Lincoln, but his remark that there seemed to be an “itching” to get negroes inside Federal lines shows that he had not yet deliberately considered the novel case of abandoned slaves; abandoned masters had hitherto claimed his attention. Though slowly, as it may have appeared to radical members of his own party, the President was surely approaching the great question, and on March 6, 1862, sent to Congress a message which recommended the adoption, and even proposed the form, of a joint resolution declaring:
That the United States ought to coöperate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system.[[246]]