The amendment of Senator Brown he characterized as a bare negative; it did not inform the people of the seceded States upon what principle they were to be again admitted into the Union.[[334]]

Mr. Carlile, of Virginia, observed on entering into the discussion that everything the bill proposed to do in the way of remedying existing evils would be accomplished by adopting the amendment offered by the Senator from Missouri. The provisions of the bill were not to be enforced and were not to have any life until after the suppression of the rebellion, and, therefore, there could be no pressing necessity for action at that time, when a large majority of Senators expected in three or four days to leave Washington for their homes. Senator Wade interrupted him to point out that there was provided a military governor whose duties could be performed in any stage of the rebellion, from the time Federal forces obtained a foothold in any State until it was in the Union again. The Virginia Senator agreed with Mr. Wade as to the extent of the President’s power in the matter, and in the belief that once a State in the Union always a State; but the bill, he said, not only maintained that State governments were overthrown, but so far as it could do so, recognized and assumed the right to overthrow the State governments if that work was not already accomplished. If the President had not the right to prescribe rules for the return of rebellious States, where was the constitutional provision which authorized Congress to do so? The title of the bill was an insult, he declared, to the understanding of every enlightened man in the nation and the bill itself one of the most revolutionary that ever was proposed in a deliberative body claiming to be the representatives of a free people.

The question mooted in Congress forty years before, he continued, was insignificant compared to the present. That was a proposition to impose upon the inhabitants of a Territory seeking admission into the Union a restriction upon their right of self-government when they became a State. After one of the most exhaustive and learned debates that ever graced the Capitol of the nation that assumption for Congress was abandoned. It was permitted to rest as the settled law of the land that Congress had no power to impose limitations affecting the right of the people of a State to regulate their own domestic affairs, even when sought to be applied to the inhabitants of a Territory seeking admission to the Union. This continued the settled action of Congress until reversed at the preceding session by assuming to create an independent State out of a portion of the Commonwealth which he represented.

“No State can have a Republican form of government,” he declared, “no State has a republican government, when that government, no matter what are its provisions, is prescribed to them by another outside of their limits. A republican form of government must emanate and emanate alone from the people that are to be governed. It belongs not to the Congress of the United States; it belongs not to the thirty-three States of this Union to prescribe for the smallest State within its folds a constitution or form of government. If you have a right to impose a limitation upon this power as to one subject of domestic legislation you have a right to impose it upon every subject. If you have a right to make one provision of a constitution for a people you have the right to make the entire instrument itself.”

An interruption of his argument by Mr. Wade drew from the Virginia Senator a query rather embarrassing to the Ohio statesman. “Where,” asked Carlile, “does the Senator derive the power to appoint a governor for a State, a State which he acknowledges to be in existence, a State government that he acknowledges to be in existence, a State government that he acknowledges it to be his duty to protect and maintain? By what provision of the Constitution does the Senator derive the authority to appoint for such a State an executive head?” Mr. Wade replied that when the Constitution imposed the duty of guaranteeing a republican form of government it conferred the power to do so, and he in turn inquired, “Is not that good law?” “No, sir,” answered Carlile, who proceeded: “Now, Mr. President, I will satisfy the Senator himself, I think; and really it is not necessary for me to attempt to satisfy him, for he is too good a lawyer not to know the meaning of the word ‘guaranty.’ What is it? Does the authority to ‘guaranty to each State in this Union a republican form of government’ authorize this Union to set up a government, to create a government, or to make a government? Is the maker of a note the man who guaranties its payment? There is no man in the Senate who knows better the definition and legal significance of the word ‘guaranty’ than the Senator from Ohio, and none, I am sure, is more familiar, too, with the power that was intended to be conferred by this provision of the Constitution.” After admitting that he would bring the power of the Government to bear on a faction who undertook to establish a monarchical form of government, Mr. Wade put this hypothetical case: “Suppose now that we have conquered them and the people are still bent on their monarchy, shall we not guaranty a republican government to them by putting one over them?” “If the Senator be right,” answered Carlile, “Mr. Madison, the author of the Constitution, was wrong.” He then quoted from the forty-third number of the Federalist:

“To guaranty to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.”

In a confederacy founded on republican principles and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations.

“The very case put by Senator Wade,” observed Carlile; “and how it is to be done is stated:”

The more intimate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be substantially maintained.... It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments can be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered that if the General Government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guaranty of a republican form of government, which supposes a preëxisting government of the form which is to be guarantied.

Sustained in his position by Madison’s commentary Carlile resumed: “Now, sir, is the Senator answered?... It is not claimed or pretended, I suppose, by the Senator from Ohio, or by any advocate of this bill, that under any other provision of the Constitution can a pretext be afforded for the assertion of such a power as this bill proposes to assert.” To Senator Wilkinson’s inquiry, what would the Government of the United States do if the people of South Carolina determined that they would not have a republican form of government in that State, the Virginia Senator answered: