By the Royal Instruction of Regents of 1776, the regent was authorized to act as president of the audiencia during the absence of the governor, and in case there were no regent, the senior magistrate of the audiencia was to take his place.[107] This law was confirmed by the cédula of August 2, 1789, which ordered that viceroys and presidents, on going outside of their capitals, “should assign to the regents the faculties for the dispatch of the most important and immediate affairs.”[108] A subsequent law, dated July 30, 1779, stated that “these important and immediate affairs” did not include “the duties and functions of the captain-general.” Again, the royal order of October 23, 1806,[109] commanded that the audiencia should in no case take control of the government when there was a vacancy, but that the name of the temporary governor should be contained in an envelope which was to be opened on the death of the governor, or on his absence from the district. In case provision had not been made in this way, it was ordered that the government should be taken over by the ranking military officer of the colony, if he were higher than the grade of colonel; if not, the regent or decano should be temporary president, governor and captain-general, without ceding the exercise of any of the functions of this office to the audiencia.[110] This law was suspended by the royal order of July 12, 1812, and by the decree of November 2, 1834, which ordered that the segundo cabo, or lieutenant-commander of the king’s forces should succeed the governor and captain-general.[111] It is important to note that these laws were applicable throughout the Spanish colonial empire. Subsequent vacancies in the Philippines were filled by military men, and the audiencia refrained from interference with the government.
Considering the question in its broadest phases, it cannot be said that the audiencia administered the ad interim rule with a great degree of success. This method of filling vacancies in the governorship failed for a number of reasons. Owing to the divided composition of the tribunal, the rivalry and personal jealousy of the magistrates and the perpetual quarrels and struggles which arose as a consequence, the periods of its rule became wild scrambles for power in which the strongest survived and reaped all the benefits of office. By their example, the oidores stimulated others to wrong-doing, and in their efforts to secure advantages for themselves they oppressed the residents, Spanish and native, with the burden of their misrule. They did not scruple to indulge in dishonest practices whenever occasion offered; indeed, they went out of their way to seek such opportunities.
Perhaps the gravest defect of the rule of the audiencia lay in its failure as an executive, owing to the divided character of its composition. There was much jealousy, but neither unity nor centralized responsibility. In their governmental capacity the oidores frequently enacted measures and made recommendations of a statesmanlike character, although they did not always succeed in enforcing them. The magistrates were neither experienced legislators nor trained soldiers, and the latter defect seems to have been a cause of considerable dissatisfaction, especially among the military classes. These were naturally jealous of an assumption of military power by lawyers, whose commands they refused to obey. Nevertheless it must be conceded that such individual oidores as Morga, Alcaraz, Almansa and Anda acquitted themselves of their military duties with great credit when called upon.
The reform which gave the government to the churchmen was designed to obviate the defects expressed above. It was believed that a prelate would not be open to so many ventures of a questionable and mainly commercial character. Moreover, the archbishops in Mexico and elsewhere had fulfilled the duties of the executive on former occasions with a fair degree of success. The church was the most powerful, highly centralized and unified institution in the Philippines at the time when both the audiencia and the governorship were weakest. The ecclesiastical authority had repeatedly triumphed over the civil government, and the former gave promise of being able to control matters more effectively in the future than the audiencia had done in the past. The rule of the churchmen did not remedy matters, however, except that it produced harmony through the exercise of force. During the rule of the archbishops, with the exception of that of Rojo, the audiencia was so completely dominated by the ecclesiastical power that the tribunal could scarcely be considered a factor in the government.
There were various defects in the rule of the ecclesiastics. Of these, perhaps the most prominent was their failure to meet the military requirements of the position. Because of the natural incongruity existing between ecclesiastical and military duties, they were obliged to delegate the command of the troops to military leaders, who thus exercised an influence never realized by them during the rule of the audiencia. Archbishop Rojo was unwilling to trust the problem of defense to any other person, though unable to cope with the situation himself. Hence Anda forced his way to the front because he was fitted to command and Rojo was not. As administrators and executives the prelates were as efficient as any others, but they were never able to reconcile successfully the opposition of the civil, political, and commercial elements, who were displeased with the rule of an ecclesiastic. Surprising as it may seem, the government of a prelate was usually most unsatisfactory to the churchmen and religious authorities. If the prelate-governor were a friar, his rule was resented by the members of all the rival orders. If he were a secular priest, he was opposed by the friars of all the orders.
The failure of Rojo was enough to condemn the practice of permitting ecclesiastics to assume the government, but aside from that, there was a more significant and fundamental reason. The increasing political authority of the church at that time, both in the colonies and in the mother country, its widespread and almost irresistible dominance over temporal affairs, demanded a radical change of policy whereby this dangerous ecclesiastical power could be checked. The rule of Anda, though technically based on that law which gave the succession to the tribunal, was not a typical instance of the government of the audiencia, nor did that period present all the features of such a rule. The influence of the audiencia as a body was practically nil. Anda governed because he was a strong man, not because he was sole oidor or because he was lieutenant-governor. His government was virtually a dictatorship, based on military power, but, nevertheless, just and benevolent. His extra-judicial actions met with the king’s approval, because they were efficient.
History will show that the Audiencia of Manila assumed temporary charge of the government because the distance and isolation of the colony rendered such a course necessary and because it was thought that the audiencia was best fitted to assume control. The government by the audiencia in the Philippines was not an isolated incident, but was typical of the entire Spanish colonial empire. Owing to the conditions which we have noted, and judged by the standards which constitute good government, the rule of the audiencia was neither successful nor satisfactory. Its most far-reaching defect, as far as the relations of the audiencia and the governor were concerned, lay in the wholesale exercise of administrative and military functions by the magistrates of the audiencia. This impaired the quality of their services as impartial magistrates and contributed in most cases to an insatiable thirst for power. The magistrates were loath to surrender the exercise of these governmental activities on the accession of the succeeding governor, the audiencia displaying a marked tendency to continue in the exercise of administrative control. This, then, was a decided cause of strife and dissension between the audiencia and the governor.
[1] Recopilación, 2–15–46.
[2] Moses, The Spanish dependencies in South America. 1, 221. The Council of the Indies manifested its disapproval of the acts of the audiencia and of Pizarro by commissioning Pedro de Gasca as president of the Audiencia of Lima. Gasca was ordered to restore that viceroyalty to the sovereignty of Spain, and to do whatever the king would do under like circumstances. This was in May, 1546. “He (Gasca) was at the head of every department of the administration,” writes Professor Moses; “he might raise troops, appoint and remove officers, and declare war; he might exercise the royal prerogative of pardoning offenses; and was especially commissioned to grant an amnesty to all who had been engaged in the rebellion. He was authorized to revoke the ordinances which had caused the popular uprising and the overthrow of Blasco Núñez; and, returning to the earlier practice, he might make repartimientos, or confirm those which had been previously made. In accordance with his expressed wish, he was granted no specific salary, but he might make any demands on the treasuries of Panama and Peru.” Ibid., I, 225.