In summarizing the results of the investigation with which this chapter has been concerned, it may be said that the audiencia constituted a court of appeal in ecclesiastical cases wherein the services of an impartial, non-ecclesiastical tribunal were required, or wherein the defense of the royal jurisdiction against the aggression of the churchmen was involved. In defending the civil government from ecclesiastical usurpation the audiencia acted in defense of the royal patronage. Nevertheless, in the cases noted, namely, in settling disputes between orders, between the secular church and the orders, between either of these and the civil government, in entertaining recursos de fuerza, in restraining the interdict, and the abuses of the Inquisition, the audiencia acted by judicial process as a tribunal of justice, and not in the capacity of an administrative committee or an executive agent, as in the cases which have been heretofore described.
[1] See Note 2 of the preceding chapter.
[2] Recopilación, 2–16–138.
[3] See Note by A. P. Cushing, in Blair and Robertson, V, 292. Escriche (Diccionario, I, 838–9) defines fuerza as “the wrong which an ecclesiastical judge does to a party when he assumes jurisdiction over a case which does not belong to him, or when he fails to observe the rules prescribed by the laws and canons, or when he unjustly denies appeal.” Recurso de fuerza is defined as the reclamation to a civil judge, made by a person believing himself aggrieved by an ecclesiastical judge, imploring the protection of the former in order that the fuerza or violence may be terminated or undone. There are three ways mentioned by Alcubilla in which an ecclesiastical judge may commit fuerza: 1. When he assumes jurisdiction in a purely temporal case, which by its very nature is not rightfully subject to his authority. 2. When, by trying a case whose jurisdiction belongs to him, he fails to observe the method and form prescribed by the laws and canons. 3. When he refuses to allow appeals which should be rightfully allowed (Martínez Alcubilla, Diccionario, V, 807).
[4] Recopilación, 2–15–148, 149. The interdict, as defined by Escriche (Diccionario, I, 712), is a prohibition, mandate, or censure, pronounced by an ecclesiastical authority by which is prohibited the use of certain spiritual privileges which are common to all. The effect of the interdict may be to prohibit Christian burial, the administration of the sacraments or the celebration of divine services. Exception may be made in rare cases of baptisms, confirmation and confession for the dying. Even though the interdict may be pronounced it does not prohibit the saying of mass in a low voice behind closed doors and without the ringing of bells. A priest who violates the interdict may be pronounced “irregular”, but a layman who does so may incur the penalty of excommunication (see Catholic Encyclopedia, under “Interdict”).
[5] This refers to the privilege extended by the church to offenders against the laws of the realm, who were allowed to take refuge from the civil authorities in a church or convent. This practice was recognized by the government. By a bull of Clement XIV, the right of extending asylum was limited to a few churches only, the number of these depending on the population of the town or city. Those guilty of certain specified crimes of the most heinous character were denied the privilege of sanctuary. The act of sheltering oneself under the protection of God was supposed to be spontaneous and not premeditated. The privilege was often abused by individual churchmen (Escriche, Diccionario, I, 353).
[6] A clarifying description of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction has been given by Escriche. He defines it as “the power of the Church for the trial and adjudication of civil and criminal affairs exercised either by its own right or by concession of princes.” This jurisdiction, says Escriche, is of two kinds, inherent (spiritual) and privileged (temporal). After classifying the different cases which fall naturally under each category, he describes the tribunals for the interpretation of canon law. “The ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” he writes, “the inherent, as well as the privileged, is exercised, in first instance, by the bishops and archbishops in their respective dioceses, in the second, by the metropolitan with respect to the suffragans, and in the third, by the papal delegate. The bishops and archbishops do not exercise the jurisdiction by themselves but by means of their provisores or vicarios. These latter may be either generales or foráneos.... The term provisor or vicar-general is used to designate him who exercises the ordinary ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the entire territory of the diocese and resides in the episcopal city situated therein; ... foráneos are the others established as delegates in certain parts of the diocese in order to facilitate the administration of justice; no appointments to these offices may be made without the royal approbation. The authority of the provisores and vicarios cease by death of the prelate from whom they obtained the nomination, and is reassumed by the cabildo or chapter, sede vacante, which selects persons to succeed them” (Escriche, Diccionario, II, 453).
Escriche further describes this hierarchy of ecclesiastical judges: “The metropolitans, then, are the ordinary judges of first instance with regard to the archbishoprics and at the same time they are the judges of appeal from the suffragans, and, accordingly, they are accustomed to appoint, aside from the provisores or vicarios, ordinarios who discharge the functions of judges of first instance. As the obispos exentos are not subject to a metropolitan, but directly to the holy see, recourses of appeals from their decisions go to the papal delegate.” The cases of appeal from the metropolitans and other ecclesiastical judges were heard in third and last instance by the tribunal known as the rota of the papal delegate, which was composed of the nuncio of the pope, and the ecclesiastical auditors appointed by the crown.
The ecclesiastical courts of the Philippines conformed generally, in organization and limits of jurisdiction, to the scheme outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The three bishops of Nueva Segovia, Camarines, and Cebú had their courts in the chief towns of their respective dioceses. They were assisted by the customary provisores. Appeals were carried from them to the court of the metropolitan which was located in Manila; this latter tribunal consisted of the archbishop, the vicar-general, and a notary. Above this court was that of the papal delegate who tried cases of appeal from the lower tribunal in accordance with canon law. In conformity with a bull of Gregory XIII, dated May 15, 1572, the authority of the papal delegate in appeal cases was final; “he might overrule and even supersede the metropolitan, as being the judge in final appeal.” The Bishop of Camarines most frequently acted as papal delegate (Blair and Robertson, XLII, 27, Note 4). Aside from these courts there was that of the commissary of the Inquisition whose jurisdiction will be subsequently noted.