The junta de guerra consisted of four ministers of the Supreme Council of War who were designated to sit with an equal number of ministers of the Council of the Indies.[13] It was, in fact, the executive committee and at the same time the special tribunal of military affairs for the Council of the Indies. It passed upon such military questions as were nominally referred to it by the president of the Council of the Indies, although these cases automatically came to this junta without the intervention of the president of the Council. It had jurisdiction over appeals in cases affecting soldiers tried in first or second instance in the colonies, over the administrative matters of armament and defense: the equipment of fleets and military operations, garrisons, military supplies, and munitions. It also tried appeals from the tribunal of the Casa de Contratación, and, in fact, it exercised general supervision over that institution in its various activities.

This was the machinery which existed for the adjudication of military cases during the greater part of the history of the Islands, the magistrates of the audiencia officiating as auditores de guerra when designated by the governor.[14] The royal decree of January 30, 1855, made a radical reform in this particular, adding two new magistrates, an auditor de guerra and an auditor de marina and to some extent relieving the ministers of the audiencia. These magistrates were appointed by the Minister of War and had original and secondary jurisdiction over cases involving soldiers and sailors of the fleet. These new magistrates served as ministers of the audiencia when their special duties permitted, and they were ordered to consult with the governor from time to time in regard to matters pertaining to their respective fields. Though the audiencia was forbidden to concern itself with cases which belonged to the military jurisdiction, the regent and two magistrates of the tribunal, acting with the auditor de guerra or the auditor de marina, could resolve themselves into a special court for the trial in second instance of cases pertaining to the respective fields of the last two officials.[15]

Two or three cases may be described here which illustrate the method of procedure in the trial of military cases by the tribunals. On January 22, 1787, a royal order was issued on the recommendation of the junta de guerra de Indias, approving of a sentence of death pronounced upon a soldier in the Philippines four years before. This soldier had been sentenced in first instance by the castellán. The captain-general, on appeal, affirmed the sentence, and the junta de guerra approved the proceedings when the case was appealed a second time.[16] Another case, and one which illustrates the slowness of the proceedings of this junta, as well as the nature of its jurisdiction, was that of a soldier who had set fire to a powder magazine, causing it to explode, thereby killing several persons. The culprit was sentenced by the consejo ordinario de guerra, a sort of local military and strategic committee, composed of local military officers (in this case a kind of court-martial),[17] but Governor Basco y Vargas, upon the advice of his asesor, suspended sentence, directing the case to the junta de guerra. Nothing was done, however, and on December 10, 1788, Governor Marquina, successor to Basco y Vargas, wrote to the president of the Council of the Indies, calling attention to the fact that this soldier had been in prison for six years awaiting the action of the Council of the Indies.[18] The matter was then referred to the junta and the sentence was approved by that tribunal.

As in all other departments and activities of government, so in this, there were many opportunities for conflict between the audiencia and the governor as to authority over cases which by their nature bordered on the sphere of both the civil and military jurisdictions. The governor who had the power to assign cases to whatever tribunal he chose, often took advantage of his position to bring the trial of civil cases within his own military sphere. Among these were suits involving the militiamen. These were subject to the military jurisdiction when they were under arms, and at other times, being civilians, they were subject to the civil authorities.[19] An instance of a case of this kind occurred in 1800. A militiaman, Josef Ruy, had killed an Indian, and the audiencia, on the basis of its authority over Indians, had sentenced the culprit to death. The governor, after sentence was passed, reopened the case on the ground that as a member of the militia, Ruy was subject to the military and not to the civil jurisdiction, although the militia was not at that time in active service. The judgment of the audiencia was therefore suspended. The case, meanwhile, had been appealed to the Council of the Indies, and that tribunal had approved the sentence of the audiencia, apparently without taking note of the fact that the case involved the military jurisdiction. A short time afterward the Council received a second report from the audiencia, stating that jurisdiction over the case had been surrendered to the governor on account of its military character. This procedure was accordingly approved by the Council. Soon after, report came of the receipt by the audiencia of the former judgment of the Council, relative to the action first taken by the audiencia, with the information that since the will of the Council was known, the governor had surrendered the prisoner again to the jurisdiction of the audiencia. Disgusted at the contradiction and cross-purposes at which the authorities in the Islands were working, the king decreed on March 27, 1802, that cases involving Indians should be tried in the audiencia, but that this poor wretch had been tried and retried, condemned and condemned over again so often that he had already expatiated his crime. He was accordingly authorized to go free.[20]

The king administered a severe reprimand to the governor and oidores on this occasion for their insistence on these small points of personal dignity in which the real purpose of the law was entirely overlooked in the pompous insistence of these officials on what they imagined to be their own particular rights. The case just alluded to began in 1792, and was carried through ten years of petty strife. The blame for this cannot be ascribed entirely to the magistrates of the audiencia, or to the governor, who had to act in accordance with the law as he interpreted it. The real fault lay in the failure of the Spanish governmental system to place implicit confidence in the judgment and ability of its servants. Considering the final ends of justice, it made little difference whether sentence was pronounced upon this individual by the governor as military commander, or as president of the audiencia. It is true that the authorities might have compromised on many occasions; indeed, from the viewpoint of history it may be said that they should have done so, instead of so often wasting their energies on these petty battles. These incessant disputes were encouraged and facilitated by the ease with which appeals could be made to Spain, thus hindering the immediate execution of decisions. The Council of the Indies interfered in details which should have been left entirely to the colonial authorities. This interference encouraged appeal, and matters of no relative importance to Spain’s colonial empire frequently occupied a large share of the attention of the sovereign tribunal. Colonial officials were not entrusted with the authority and responsibility which they should have had, and the central government wasted its time attending to small affairs which should have been concluded by subordinates in the colonies.

The governor frequently claimed jurisdiction over cases involving retired soldiers on the grounds that they had once been under the fuero militar. He also claimed jurisdiction in suits affecting widows of soldiers, all of which, in accordance with the law of December 11, 1788, should have been tried by the audiencia.[21] Another abuse frequently perpetrated by the governor was the assumption of jurisdiction over suits for the payment by military officials of bonds which they had assumed for defaulted civil officials.[22] In doing this he was encroaching on the rights of the oficiales reales, and these were always supported by the audiencia in the contentions which arose over this question. Cases involving conflicts of jurisdiction between the civil and military authorities were appealed to the Council of the Indies, and there, after considerable delay, the proper sphere of authority was always determined.

While the audiencia as a tribunal was forbidden jurisdiction in the trial of cases involving war, we have already shown that the governor exercised the right of designating oidores to try cases of this nature on second appeal. The power of enforcing this right depended entirely on the governor. Frequently the efforts of the governor along these lines were attended with much difficulty as were those of Governor Marquina in 1789 when he sought to designate an oidor to assist in the trial of Antonio Callejo, naval artilleryman on a frigate of war. The case had first been tried before the proper military judge, but it was referred on appeal to a tribunal of which an alcalde ordinario of the city was a member. The governor designated Oidor Yuguanzo to act as a member of this tribunal for the trial of the case of Callejo on review. The magistrate begged to be excused on the ground that all his time was occupied with the trial of civil cases in the audiencia. The governor called on all the other oidores successively, and all declined to act. At last he peremptorily ordered Yuguanzo to serve, telling him that if he objected he might carry the matter to the king in the regular way, which, according to the laws of the Indies, was to comply with the governor’s demands, under protest, while appealing the question of disagreement to the Council of the Indies.[23] This was accordingly done, the magistrate basing his claim to exemption on the law which prohibited the governor from sending oidores on commissions outside the audiencia.[24] The governor at the same time filed a memorial which forestalled all the arguments of the oidor.[25] He stated that the real cause of the disinclination of the magistrates of the audiencia to serve as auditores de guerra was their indolence, and not the pressure of their excessive duties. It was contrary to their ideas of dignity to be associated with the acting auditor de guerra, who was not a letrado, and it was therefore considered a sacrifice of their own personal dignity. The governor stated that no argument could justify such an attitude on the part of the oidores. The inconsistency of their position was further shown, he alleged, by the fact that they had served regularly on the tribunal of appeals of the consulado, in company with two merchants who were not even lawyers. Hence there could be no reason for their refusal to serve with an alcalde ordinario.

The governor based his right to call upon the regular magistrates for this service on that section of the laws of the Indies applying to Española, Nuevo Reino, and Tierra Firme, which declared that jurisdiction over cases affecting soldiers belonged to the captain-general with inhibition of the audiencia, and that soldiers, during the time they were under arms, should not be tried on criminal charges.[26] The governor, according to this law, might call upon a magistrate to serve as special auditor de guerra for the determination of cases in second instance. Finally, by April 20, 1784, the king had extended this rule to all other colonies.[27] Although we have no record of the reply of the tribunal in Spain, the strength of the governor’s position could not well be questioned, especially since he was resting his case on a law made in 1784, which was completely up-to-date, while the magistrate’s contention was based on one promulgated in 1609.[28]

Aside from the duty of the oidores to try military cases when commissioned by the governor to do so, it will be seen that the tribunal itself exercised much more extensive authority in the actual administration of military affairs. Two factors may be said to have contributed to this. One was the fact that the audiencia was frequently consulted by the king or governor in regard to the defense of the colony. The other may be seen in the actual assumption of the government at various times by the audiencia, and the successful defense of the Islands by the military forces under the leadership of the oidores. Notwithstanding the fact that the governor’s recognized sphere of action was military, and in spite of the repeated prohibitions against the interference of the tribunal in these matters, the audiencia received considerable official encouragement and authorization to interest itself in military affairs.

As the problems of general administration were too serious for the solution of one man without advisors, so the governor also found it frequently undesirable to assume sole responsibility for military affairs. The audiencia shared the acuerdo power in these matters to a lesser degree than it did in government. The hostility of the Japanese in the early years, the fear of the Chinese, the danger of native outbreaks, the raids of the Moro pirates, and the incursions of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English aroused the fears of the commonwealth to such an extent that defense was felt to be a matter of common concern. The governor, upon whom legally rested the obligations and responsibilities of defense, was glad to share these duties with any authority that could be of assistance. The history of the Philippines is replete with instances in which the audiencia either gave counsel in matters pertaining to defense, or took an active part in resistance. There were even occasions on which it advocated offensive warfare.[29]