It obviously corresponds in 2 space to an iron rod welded together at the crossing place of the loop, so that it is indistinguishable which is the one free end, which the other. At the crossing point the two lines represented by the two ink marks must be absolutely one and the same.

If one line be supposed to go over the other, by however small a distance, it would leave the plane. It would suddenly become invisible to the creature in the plane, and it would appear again at the other side of the line it crossed as if it came from nowhere.

It would be as extraordinary a sight as if we saw a pole going up to a brick wall, then beyond the brick wall the rest of the pole appearing—not going through the brick wall, nor coming round it—but somehow appearing; part of the same pole moving when it moved, obviously connected with it, and yet with no joining part which we could possibly discover.

Again, it sometimes appears to be thought that the fourth dimension is in some way different from the three which we know. But there is nothing mysterious at all about it. It is just an ordinary dimension tilted up in some way, which with our bodily organs we cannot point to. But if it is bent down it will be just like any ordinary dimension: a line which went up into the fourth dimension one inch will, when bent down, lie an inch in any known direction we like to point out. Only if this line in the fourth dimension be supposed to be connected rigidly with any rigid body, one of the directions in that rigid body must point away in the fourth dimension when the line that was in the fourth comes into a 3 space direction.

If the reader will refer back to the paper on the plane world he will find a description of the means by which a being there might know that he was in a limited world, and that his conception of space was not of what was really the whole of space, but of the limited portion of it to which he was confined by his manner of being.

The test by which such a being could discover his limitation was this. He found two things, each consisting of a multitude of parts—two triangles; and the relationship of the parts of the one was the same as the relationship of the parts of the other. For every point in the one there was a corresponding point in the other. For every pair of points in the one there was a corresponding pair of points in the other. In fact, considered as systems made up of mutually related parts, each was the same as the other.

Yet he could not make these two triangles coincide.

Now this impossibility of bringing together two things which he felt were really alike was the sign to him of his limitation; and by reflecting on the similar appearance which would present itself to a being limited to a straight line—by thinking of two systems of points which were really identical, and which he could make coincide, but which a line being could not make coincide, he would be led to conclude that he in his turn was subject to a limitation.

Now is there any object which we know which, considered as a whole consisting of parts, is exactly like another whole, the two having all their parts similarly arranged, so as to form in themselves two identical systems, and yet the one incapable of being made to coincide with the other, even in thought?

Let us look at our two hands.