A History of the United States

by Charles Kendall Adams; William P. Trent

504. The Second Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.—In the last week of August, Lee sent Jackson and Longstreet in succession around Pope’s right flank, interposing their forces between him and Washington. Before any of McClellan’s army, except Fitz John Porter’s corps, had arrived, the forces of Lee and Pope fought the second battle of Manassas, or Bull Run, on the 29th and 30th of August. In view of the position of the forces, it is not strange that the Union army, numbering about sixty thousand men, was overwhelmingly defeated by the Confederate force of about fifty thousand. The Union loss was more than fourteen thousand, while that of the Confederates was less than ten thousand. The issue of the battle was, at the time, largely attributed to the delay of McClellan’s force in returning from the James River, and especially to the failure of General Fitz John Porter’s corps[^[226]] to render the proper assistance, after it had arrived.

505. Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg.—Lee, instead of making a direct attack on Washington, decided to cross the Potomac for an invasion of Maryland and the North. His chief purpose, as he announced in a proclamation, was to arouse the Confederate sentiment in Maryland and unite the state with the Confederacy. Crossing the river near Harper’s Ferry, he took Frederick City and pushed forward toward Pennsylvania. But no signs of a sympathetic rising of the people encouraged him. He was surprised to find that even farmers whom he supposed to be Southern sympathizers would not sell their produce for Confederate money. As soon as Lee saw that he was not to get supplies in Maryland, he sent Stonewall Jackson back to take Harper’s Ferry and thus open communications for supplies with the rich Shenandoah Valley. The heights above Harper’s Ferry had been neglected by the Federals, and Jackson easily took the place, with twelve thousand five hundred prisoners. McClellan, who on the 2d of September, had arrived in Georgetown with the major part of his army, after a long conference with the President in Washington, was directed to resume command, not only of his own forces, but also of the Army of Virginia. By spasmodic promptness of movement, and encouraged by an accidental discovery of Lee’s orders disclosing his whole plan of campaign, the Union commander was able to advance so rapidly as to throw his army in front of Lee. McClellan was jubilant, and had confident hope of destroying or capturing Lee’s army. But his later movements were so dilatory that Jackson returned from Harper’s Ferry before the battle. The two armies first came in contact in the vicinity of South Mountain. The preliminary conflict was decidedly in McClellan’s favor. Then occurred the desperate battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, on the 17th of September. The Union army was the larger of the two, but the number of the forces engaged cannot be confidently estimated. The tactics of McClellan on the field have been regarded by military critics as very faulty, while Lee is thought to have handled his troops with great skill. It was the most desperate and bloody single day’s battle of the war. The final advantage was with the Federals, though the victory was not by any means decisive. The losses of McClellan were more than thirteen thousand, and Lee’s more than eleven thousand.[^[227]] McClellan had lost another great opportunity; but Lee’s advance was checked. He was so weakened that he was compelled to withdraw to Virginia, and his movement as a whole was a failure. At this time, when a rapid pursuit might have broken up Lee’s army, which, according to Longstreet, was so crippled that ten thousand fresh troops could have destroyed it, McClellan had about twenty thousand troops in reserve. The latter, mainly in consequence of his excessive caution and lack of promptitude, was soon superseded by General A. E. Burnside.[^[228]]

General A. E. Burnside.

506. Burnside’s Disastrous Campaign.—Burnside hastily brought together all the Union forces in north Virginia for the purpose of a direct advance on Richmond. With an army which, early in December, numbered about one hundred and thirteen thousand men, he crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg; but Lee and Jackson had reached the southern bank before him, and had posted their forces advantageously on the high grounds back of the town. Burnside, having arranged his army in three divisions, under Franklin, Hooker, and Sumner, crossed the river on December 13, and had the temerity to attempt to carry the works by storm. The result was disastrous. The Union army was pushed back in confusion upon the river, and might have been annihilated if Lee had used his advantage. As it was, Burnside safely withdrew his shattered forces to the north side of the river. The Union loss was over twelve thousand, while the Confederates lost considerably less than six thousand.[^[229]] General Joseph E. Hooker soon superseded Burnside, and the Union army went into winter quarters. Lincoln was especially depressed by the result, as he had hoped for a victory which would counteract the hostility of Great Britain. The contrary effect was indicated by the London Times, which referred to the battle as “a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic.” Throughout the North, the following days were days of darkness and gloom. Stocks declined, and troops volunteered more slowly than ever before.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN EFFECTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1862.

507. Military Results of the Year.—Thus the events of the year, notwithstanding great losses on both sides, had not essentially changed the situation. While no territory of importance had been lost, no considerable gain had been secured. McClellan, McDowell, Banks, Frémont, Pope, and Burnside had all proved unable to cope successfully with their opponents, and had all been relieved. Up to the end of 1862, the military successes of the Union troops had all been in the West and the great losses had all been in the East. The military history of the year had made it evident to President Lincoln and to Congress that every resource of the North must at once be brought to bear upon the conflict in order to insure success. The commander capable of holding his own against Lee had not yet appeared. It was to require another year to reveal him. Meanwhile, the necessities of the situation led to the emancipation of the slaves, the levy of new taxes, and the conscription of troops.

508. Emancipation of Slaves.—In March, 1862, slavery had been abolished in the territories by Act of Congress, and in April, emancipation had taken place in the District of Columbia. In the same year, Lincoln had urged the governors of the border states to adopt a proposition for compensation to such of the border states as might abolish slavery. The failure of the Peninsula campaign and the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and the defeat at Manassas, convinced the President that emancipation was justifiable as a war measure, and should be resorted to as soon as a victory could be secured. Accordingly, immediately after the battle of Antietam, he issued a proclamation, declaring that in such slaveholding states as should not have returned to their allegiance to the United States on January 1, 1863, all slaves would, on that day, be declared free. As none of the seceding states returned to its allegiance, the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 1st of the following January, and thereafter, all negroes in these states were regarded by the Union army as free men.

509. Influence of Emancipation on the War.—The effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was not quite what was anticipated. Contrary to general expectation in the North, the negroes showed remarkable faithfulness in remaining with their old masters. They were very generally employed in the South in caring for the plantations, and sometimes were used for work on fortifications. It was only in recovered territory that their relations were much changed. Before the end of the war, about one hundred thousand of them were enlisted in the Union army, and they fought with great bravery. As the South refused to recognize them as soldiers, they could not be exchanged when taken prisoners. The embarrassment which followed had much to do with the entire cessation of exchanges in the latter part of the war. In consequence of this cessation, prisons were overcrowded and the sufferings of prisoners increased.

510. Effect of Emancipation upon Europe.—In Great Britain, public opinion was very slow to respond to the proclamation of freedom. The fact that their supply of cotton was cut off by the more complete blockade of the Southern ports caused great suffering on the part of the British manufacturing population. While the laboring classes were generally in sympathy with the North, the owners of the factories and the wealthy classes, led by Palmerston, the Prime Minister, and Russell, the Foreign Secretary, were in favor of the South. Many, not realizing that it was a war for national integrity, regarded it as a war for liberty on the part of the South, and for conquest on the part of the North.