EASTERN CAMPAIGNS.

General Joseph Hooker.

523. Chancellorsville.—In the East, at the close of the Antietam campaign, McClellan, as we have seen, had been superseded by Burnside, and the latter, after Fredericksburg, by Hooker[[238]] (§§ [505]-[506]). In April, 1863, the Union army of about ninety thousand advanced southward for the purpose of pushing its way by direct line to Richmond; but a few miles south of Fredericksburg, Hooker was confronted (at Chancellorsville) by a Confederate army of about forty-five thousand under Lee and Jackson. The battle which ensued, May 3, was most disastrous to the Union cause. By superior generalship, Lee and Jackson completely thwarted the strategy of Hooker, and not only repulsed the Federal army, but threw it into confusion and drove it back to the north side of the Rappahannock. The Union loss was about seventeen thousand; the Confederate, about twelve thousand. The loss of the Confederates, however, was not counted by numbers alone; for just before the main battle, General “Stonewall” Jackson, the most successful corps commander that the war produced on either side, was accidentally fired upon and killed by his own men.

General George G. Meade.

524. Second Advance into the North.—Inspired by his remarkable success at Chancellorsville, Lee decided to attempt again a movement into the North. Crossing the Blue Ridge and marching down the Shenandoah Valley, he passed the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and, advancing across Maryland into Pennsylvania, threatened, not only the rear of Washington, but also the cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia. Hooker followed, keeping at the right of Lee, between Harper’s Ferry and Washington, and moving rapidly northward for the protection of the threatened cities. The Union army was reënforced from every quarter. On the 28th of June, Hooker was superseded by General George G. Meade,[[239]] of Pennsylvania, a soldierly officer who, though uniformly successful as a division and corps commander, had as yet occupied only a subordinate position. Meade pushed his force of about ninety-three thousand rapidly forward and concentrated it in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, taking up his position on a crest of hills in a circular line south and east of Gettysburg, on what is known as Cemetery Ridge. The Confederate line of about seventy thousand occupied the hills opposite, on Seminary Ridge.[[240]] At the Union right was Culp’s Hill, and at the left were two hills, known as Round Top and Little Round Top. Thus situated, both armies made ready for the most crucial battle of the war. If Meade should be overwhelmed, the cities of the North would be at Lee’s mercy, and the Confederacy would, in all probability be recognized in Europe; while if Lee should be defeated, he could hardly hope to do more than prolong an unsuccessful conflict.

General James Longstreet.[[241]]