532. Crossing the James.—Skillfully concealing his main movement by continuous attacks along the front, Grant then accomplished the great feat of swinging his entire army across the James, with the purpose of approaching Richmond from the south. There, however, he was confronted with strong fortifications about Petersburg, a city some twenty miles south of Richmond, on the Appomattox River. During McClellan’s campaign and since that time, so carefully had the entire country been fortified under the direction of Lee that Grant found an immediate advance impossible. The defenses in front of Petersburg were at once mined by the Federal forces, and on the 30th of July four tons of gunpowder were exploded under the most powerful of the Confederate works. Guns and men were thrown high into the air; but, by a gross blunder, the troops who were to charge in through the breach were not ready, and before the assault was made, the pit was protected by Confederate cannon brought in from a distance on every side. The Union forces lost many more by this effort, known as the “Battle of the Crater,” than did the Confederates. The best that Grant could do during the rest of the year was to extend his lines to the south so far as to cut the railroad from the southeast, which furnished the Confederates a large part of their supplies, and to drill the new troops that came pouring in from the seemingly inexhaustible North.[[245]]
B. F. Butler
533. Subordinate Movements.—The subordinate movements in the East had rendered Grant very little assistance. In the spring General Butler[[246]] had been sent up the James River, with an army of thirty-six thousand men, to attack Richmond from the south, but the major part of his troops were forced by the Confederates into a bend of the river at Bermuda Hundred, and there, as Grant said, were “bottled up.” Sigel and Hunter also had been sent into the Shenandoah Valley for the purpose of taking Lynchburg and then advancing on Richmond from the southwest, but they were defeated by General Early and driven over the mountains into West Virginia. Thus the Confederates secured command of the entire Valley and threatened Washington. Passing over into Maryland early in July, they defeated General Lew Wallace at Monocacy, and then pushed on until Early with his force actually appeared before the defenses north of the capital. But finding these more formidable than he had anticipated, he withdrew without making an attack. Late in July, one of Early’s subordinates, McCausland, burned Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in consequence of a refusal of the city to pay a ransom of five hundred thousand dollars in greenbacks. The vigor of this policy provoked immediate retaliation. In September Grant sent Sheridan against Early, and the tables were soon turned. Early was defeated in several engagements in September and October; and Sheridan, in accordance with Grant’s orders, desolated the Valley of Virginia so completely that no further supplies could be furnished the Confederate army before another summer.
SHERMAN’S CAMPAIGNS.
534. Sherman’s Advance.—In the West, the movement of Sherman was in some respects similar to that of Grant. The Union force gathered at Chattanooga numbered about one hundred thousand men, while that of the Confederates numbered about ninety thousand.[[247]] Sherman’s policy was to attack Johnston’s defenses lightly in front, and by extending his line either to the right or to the left, attack the latter in the flank and oblige him to come out into open battle or to retreat. Johnston, though constantly fortified, instead of fighting vigorously, as Lee was doing, fell back without offering great resistance. This course was justified by the fact that Johnston knew that Sherman’s army must be fed by transportation over a single line of railroad, and by the belief that if Sherman could be drawn into the South, so much of the Union army would be required for guarding trains, and such reënforcements might be secured by the Confederates as they neared Atlanta, that the two armies might ultimately meet on equal terms. In other words, it seemed obvious to the Confederate commander that the farther south Sherman should be drawn, the weaker he would be. The mistake in this strategy lay in underestimating the resources of the North in furnishing new troops with which to aid in protecting the railroad and keeping up the numbers of the Union force.[[248]]
535. Removal of Johnston.—The campaign was in a mountainous country just south of Chattanooga, and great skill was shown by both generals. Johnston was rapidly pushed back until his forces were near Atlanta, and a decisive battle was at hand. But the people of the South, not understanding the merits of Johnston’s method of conducting the campaign, became impatient. President Davis,[[249]] who had no partiality for Johnston, yielded to the pressure of public opinion, and, accordingly, just as the Confederates were about to strike their blow, Johnston was removed, and General John B. Hood,[[250]] who had the reputation of being one of the most energetic generals in the Confederate army, was placed in command.
General J. B. Hood.
536. General Hood’s Methods.—Hood’s fighting qualities, however, in accordance with Sherman’s predictions, at once took the form of rashness. He seemed determined to fight, whether a favorable opportunity offered or not. In three important battles in July, on different sides of Atlanta,[[251]] Hood made desperate attempts to beat back the approaching forces, but was unsuccessful. On September 2 he was obliged to evacuate the city, and early in October he adopted the policy of moving around Sherman’s army and attacking the line of supplies. This was done in the hope that Sherman would follow; but the move was exactly what Sherman anticipated and desired. Following for a short distance, he sent on half of his army under General Thomas, while he returned with the other half to Atlanta. Hood pushed on vigorously toward Nashville. At Franklin, south of Nashville, a battle was fought, November 30, between Hood and a part of Thomas’s army under Schofield, in which the Confederates lost heavily.[[252]] Thomas made his stand at Nashville and fortified his line with great skill. Remaining long wholly on the defensive, he was much criticised for his delay in attacking; but his answer was that, while willing to turn over his command to another, he would not go out of his defenses to fight a decisive battle until he was ready. The outcome justified his course. On the 15th of December Hood advanced to the attack, and the battle raged for two days; but when the Confederates had spent their force, Thomas ordered his men forward and pushed on so vigorously that Hood’s army was completely broken up and dispersed.[[253]] It was the most decisive Union victory of the war. Thus Hood, after losing five battles, had now lost his army.