General John Burgoyne.
181. Movements of Burgoyne.—No general change of policy resulted from Schuyler’s removal. Burgoyne, finding himself in danger of being hemmed in at Whitehall, was forced to move toward the west and across the Hudson. Lincoln, with the New England militia, closed in on his rear, while Putnam arrived with a force from the Highlands and Arnold returned from the Valley of the Mohawk, where he had aided in repulsing St. Leger. It became daily more evident that unless relief should arrive from General Howe, Burgoyne must either defeat the Americans or surrender his whole army. No reënforcements came, and two vigorous attempts at Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights were frustrated by the skill and vigor of the troops commanded by Arnold and Morgan. The source of supplies for the British was now cut off; and, attempting to retreat by way of Saratoga, Burgoyne found his army completely surrounded by a force more than twice the size of his own. On the 17th of October he was obliged to capitulate, and surrendered with his entire force of more than seven thousand men.
Burgoyne demanded, and Gates consented, that the final act should be deemed a “convention” instead of a surrender or capitulation. Hence British historians are accustomed to refer to the event as the “Convention of Saratoga.” The terms, however, were not essentially different. The troops were allowed to march out with the honors of war, and to march to Boston, where they were to embark for home. An oath was required that they would not again serve in the American war. But a misunderstanding soon ensued, and Congress repudiated the convention, in consequence of which Burgoyne and his army were not sent home, but retained as prisoners. Burgoyne, however, was permitted to go in the following spring. He soon entered Parliament and became a stanch defender of the American cause. The army was transferred to a camp at Charlottesville, Virginia. Before 1783 they had dispersed and many had settled in different parts of the country.
182. St. Leger’s Campaign.—St. Leger fared scarcely better in his Western campaign. Advancing early in the spring from Oswego, he reached, on August 3, Fort Stanwix, an important point in Oneida County, now the city of Rome. He at once began the siege. A few days later a force of about eight hundred militia, gathered in the Mohawk Valley by General Herkimer, a veteran of the French war, advanced for the relief of the fort. Near Oriskany, however, his force fell into an ambuscade prepared by Sir John Johnson, the leader of the Tories, and Brant, the greatest of Mohawk chiefs. The battle was not decisive, but the confidence of the Indians and Tories was completely broken, and the Indians rapidly deserted. General Herkimer, severely wounded, died some days afterward.[[84]] The panic of the British was increased by the approach of a force under Arnold, which had been sent from Albany by Schuyler. St. Leger, attacked by a vigorous sortie from the fort on the one side, and by the surrounding patriots on the other, saw no chance of success, and accordingly beat a hasty retreat.[[85]] Thus both the British expeditions in the North were complete failures.
183. Blunder of the British Government.—It had been the design of the British government that General Howe, while holding New York with a part of his force, should ascend the Hudson with the other part for the reënforcement of Burgoyne; but the British minister of war, instead of sending peremptory orders, left much to the discretion of Howe.[[86]] This gave an opportunity for the scheming designs of General Lee, who was still a prisoner of war in the hands of the British. Lee had formerly been an officer in the British army, and Howe had serious thoughts of hanging him for desertion; but Washington wrote to Howe that he held five Hessian officers, whom he should treat as hostages for Lee. The British, thereupon, not daring to risk the anger of the Hessians that would surely follow an execution, concluded to hold Lee simply as prisoner of war, subject to exchange. But Lee, meantime, hoping to gain the favor of Great Britain, drew up an elaborate plan, advising the British in regard to the best method of assuring success. This treasonable paper, indorsed as “Mr. Lee’s plan, March 29, 1777,” was not discovered until eighty years after the war.
184. General Lee’s Advice.—The advice of Lee was that Howe direct all his energies to an attack upon Philadelphia; and accordingly, as soon as the British commander heard of the success of Burgoyne in taking Ticonderoga, he decided to adopt this plan. His first purpose was, while leaving New York in command of a small force, to advance with the greater part of his army across New Jersey. But Washington, detecting his purpose, threw up strong intrenchments at Middlebrook, directly athwart his path. Howe thought it not prudent either to attack directly, or, by marching around, to leave his opponent in the rear. After nearly two months of unsuccessful effort to bring Washington to battle, he changed his plan, and about the middle of July withdrew his army to Staten Island.
185. Movements of Howe.—It became evident at once to Washington that Howe’s purpose was to put his force upon a fleet and either ascend the Hudson or sail to the south. The American commander was not left very long in doubt. Leaving eighteen hundred men under Sir Henry Clinton in New York, Howe put to sea. Washington at once inferred that Howe had gone south, but it was necessary to guard against the possibility of his turning suddenly northward and advancing up the Hudson. On account of supposed obstacles in the Delaware below Philadelphia, Howe passed on one hundred miles farther, into Chesapeake Bay, and landed his army at Elkton. Hearing of Howe’s arrival, Washington turned south to meet him. In order to prevent a panic in Philadelphia, he marched his army of eleven thousand men through the city.
186. Battle of the Brandywine.—It was evident that Howe would advance upon Philadelphia without delay. Though Washington had only eleven thousand men with whom to meet Howe’s eighteen thousand, he decided to contest the advance in a battle. Accordingly the Americans were posted along the north bank of Brandywine Creek, with their center at Chadd’s Ford. The position was admirably chosen, and the forces were skillfully posted. But the British decided to force the passage by means of a flank movement. On the morning of September 11, Cornwallis, who commanded the British left, marched up the river some eighteen miles by the Lancaster road and crossed at Jeffrey’s Ford, intending to pass around and attack the Americans in the rear. The success of such a movement depended upon its secrecy. Washington, fortunately, learned of the operation in time to order Sullivan to change his front and meet Cornwallis as he approached. But for this discovery the Americans would undoubtedly have been routed and a large part of the army captured. Sullivan fought with great bravery and skill, but he was not able to repulse the enemy. In order to support Sullivan the whole American army fell back, but it fell back in good order, chiefly through the masterly skill of Greene. The Americans lost a little more than a thousand, and the loss of the British was about six hundred. The skill of the Americans in the retreat was shown by the fact that Washington opposed the advance of the British so vigorously that fifteen days were consumed by Howe in a march of twenty-six miles to the city. On September 26 the British moved into Philadelphia. Cornwallis was left in command of the city, while Howe established his headquarters at the adjacent village of Germantown.
187. Needs of the British; Battle of Germantown.—As the American army had not been crippled, it was easy for Washington to cut off the supplies of his enemy on the landward side. The British were therefore dependent upon vessels from the sea. To clear the river of obstructions a force was at once sent from Philadelphia. Washington determined to take advantage of this advance and to attack the main army at Germantown, while the British were thus temporarily weakened. Such extraordinary audacity on the part of an army which had just been defeated seems never to have entered the minds of the British. But on the evening of the 3d of October, Washington began his march, with the purpose of nothing less than the destruction or capture of Howe’s force. The town was to be approached by four roads, the army consisting of two divisions, under Greene and Sullivan. The advance arrived at the outskirts of the village at daybreak, but unfortunately a heavy fog came up, so that it was impossible for the different lines to recognize one another. The Americans advanced successfully in four different columns and seemed likely to push the British back upon the river and completely overwhelm them; but, in the center of the field, one of the brigades of General Greene’s division came into collision with one from that of General Sullivan. Each, supposing the enemy had been met, fired upon the other.[[87]] A confusion resulted which gave the British time to recover, and the Americans were finally repulsed. This battle is universally considered as one of the boldest fought by the Americans, and it came wonderfully near to complete success. Howe and Cornwallis were now left for the winter in Philadelphia, while Washington took up his winter quarters at Valley Forge, only a few miles away, where he could prevent the British from foraging the country.