291. The Impeachment of Justice Chase.—Two years previous to the miscarriage of justice in Burr’s case, another trial of a different nature had failed almost as signally. This was the trial, before the Senate, of Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court. Chase was a violent Federalist, who had been impeached by the Democratic-Republican House of Representatives for partisan conduct on the bench. He was ably defended, while John Randolph, who led the prosecution, completely mismanaged his case. The result was a failure to convict (1805).

William Pitt the Younger.

292. Troubles with Great Britain and France.—More serious matters now confronted Jefferson. Since the signing of Jay’s Treaty, American shipping had flourished, owing to the fact that being a neutral nation, the United States could convey to France and Spain the produce of their West Indian colonies, the ships of the two European countries not being serviceable on account of the war with Great Britain, whose fleets swept the ocean. By 1805, however, the jealousy of British shipowners had been aroused and the Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, applied to American vessels what was known as the “Rule of 1756.” This prevented a neutral from enjoying, in time of war, trading privileges not allowed in time of peace. British men-of-war, therefore, began to seize American ships, and the old impressment abuses were increased. Meanwhile, Jay’s Treaty expired, and a new treaty, signed by Monroe and William Pinkney, a brilliant Maryland lawyer and orator, was not honorable to us and was not even laid before the Senate. One provision of it ran, that Great Britain would not be bound by it unless the United States undertook to resist Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806. This was a paper blockade of the British Isles, in retaliation for the British blockade of the Continent. In other words, Napoleon, who by that time had humbled most of the sovereigns of Europe, had declared Continental ports closed to British ships, although he had no effective means of keeping them out. Great Britain wished to force America to take sides against France. An Order in Council of November, 1807, actually authorized the seizure of any neutral vessel on a voyage to closed ports, unless it had previously touched at a British port. To this order Napoleon replied by the Milan Decree (December, 1807), authorizing the capture of any vessel that had entered a British port. Thus American neutral trade was practically an impossibility, and an important portion of our population was seriously affected.

Fulton’s Steamboat, the
“Clermont.”

293. The Embargo.—Under these harassing circumstances, Jefferson was forced to adopt a more energetic foreign policy than at all suited his pacific disposition. Diplomatic efforts were wasted on headstrong opponents, who despised a weak, young nation. So the Non-intercourse Act, forbidding the importation of goods from Great Britain or her colonies, was passed in the spring of 1806, but did not go into effect for nearly two years; by 1808 it had been determined that mere non-importation was not a sufficiently drastic remedy, and that an embargo, forbidding all American vessels to leave for foreign ports, was necessary. In the interim, relations with Great Britain had been strained to the point of breaking, through the fact that on June 27, 1807, the British ship Leopard, acting under the orders of an admiral at Halifax, fired on the American frigate Chesapeake, and took from the latter four sailors, three of whom were American citizens.[[123]] Jefferson at once ordered British warships out of American waters and tried to bring the impressment controversy to an issue, but the British merely disavowed the action of their admiral. This conduct, together with the Order in Council of November, 1807, precipitated the Embargo.

Robert Fulton.

294. Nature and Object of the Embargo.—The Embargo was partly intended to save the lives and property of the Americans—who were, nevertheless, willing to risk both on account of the great profits accruing from trade with Europe—by preventing ships from leaving port and running the risk of being captured by British men-of-war, or of being confiscated in Continental ports. Jefferson, however, had another object in view. He believed that both England and Europe would suffer so much from the loss of the American trade that the combatants would be forced to abandon their repressive measures against the ships of neutrals. He miscalculated the stubbornness and malignity of both parties, and both Non-intercourse and Embargo, instead of proving coercive, proved irritating and mischievous. Nevertheless, there was precedent in favor of the experiment, and from the point of view of general human welfare Jefferson was justified in trying it. From the point of view of politics, the experiment was disastrous, but the fact that he induced Congress to adopt it is a conclusive proof of Jefferson’s capacity to control men.