Christopher Columbus: His Life and His Work

by Charles Kendall Adams

Fernando Columbus tells us that Margarite, instead of striving to overrun and reduce the island, took his soldiers into the great plain known as the Royal Vega, and there gave them up to all forms of wanton excesses. But he soon fell into disputes with the council instituted by the Admiral. After sending its members insolent letters, and finding that he could not reduce them to obedience, he went aboard one of the first ships that came from Spain, and sailed for home. This he appears to have done without giving any account of himself, or leaving any direction in regard to his command. “Upon this,” says Fernando, “every one went away among the Indians wherever he thought fit, taking away their goods and their women, and committing such outrages that the Indians resolved to be revenged on those they found alone or straggling; so that the cacique had killed ten, and privately ordered a house to be fired in which were eleven sick.” The same authority further states that “Most of the Christians committed a thousand insolences, for which they were mortally hated by the Indians, who refused to submit to them.”

Such was the condition of affairs on the return of Columbus. All was in such confusion that the very existence of the colony was threatened with the fate that had overtaken La Navidad; and it was for essentially the same cause. The weakness of Margarite and his subsequent desertion of his command had thrown the garrison into anarchy, and given it up to the unbridled indulgence of the most provoking and offensive excesses. Fernando Columbus himself says of the Indians that in consequence of the “thousand insolences” of the Christians, “it was no difficult matter for them all to agree to cast off the Spanish yoke.” That the provocation was chargeable to the Spaniards is admitted both by Don Fernando and by Las Casas. But the fact that the invaders had brought this threatening condition of affairs upon themselves can hardly be thought to have lessened the obligations of Columbus. What he was now confronted with was a condition, not a theory as to how that condition had been brought about. In order to save the colony from immediate and perhaps fatal disaster, he was obliged to act without hesitation.

While Caonabo was threatening the garrison at St. Thomas, another of the caciques, Gustignana by name, approached with a large force to within two days’ march of Isabella. It is even said that his army consisted of a hundred thousand men. Columbus was able to muster a hundred and sixty Spanish foot, twenty horsemen, and as many bloodhounds. The force was divided into two battalions, one being under the command of the Admiral himself, and the other under that of his brother Bartholomew. The Spaniards were clad in armour, while the natives had only their naked bodies to oppose to the ferocity of the bloodhounds and the cross-bows and musketry of the invaders. At the first onset the Indians were thrown into confusion, and a terrible carnage ensued. Vast numbers were either killed outright or torn by the dogs; while others, perhaps less fortunate, were taken prisoners, to be sent to Spain as slaves. The force of the Indians was completely broken up and dispersed; but Caonabo, who was besieging St. Thomas, was still at large.

This Carib chieftain was very naturally a source of great anxiety to the Admiral. He had been defeated by Ojeda; but he was still at the head of a formidable force, and his own intrepidity and skill made him a constant object of dread. Columbus determined to secure him by treachery. Ojeda was selected to carry out this purpose; and the instructions given by the Admiral were base and treacherous in the extreme. The wily Spanish officer was to beguile the Indian chieftain to a friendly interview; and thus, having thrown him off his guard, was to put him in irons and escape with him to the Spanish garrison. The Admiral’s plan was carried out.

The accounts of this ignoble transaction, as given by Las Casas and the later historians of the time, do not differ in essential particulars, though there are differences in unimportant details. The authorities, moreover, are not agreed as to the time when this daring exploit occurred. Herrera says that it took place before the great battle, almost immediately after the return of Columbus from Cuba. Attributing the design to the Admiral, this historian says, “He contrived to send Alonzo de Ojeda with only nine Spaniards, under colour of carrying a present.” According to the same authority, the capture took place about sixty or seventy leagues from Isabella. Herrera’s account is graphic and circumstantial. Other authorities tell us that it was the last act required to reduce the island into subjection. But the precise date is not important. Las Casas, who visited the island six years after the event took place, and received his information on the spot, has preserved the account which has generally been followed by the subsequent annalists and historians.

It is not difficult to understand how the friendly relations which at first prevailed between the Spaniards and the Indians were gradually converted into distrust, and finally into deadly hostility. For this change the Spaniards must ever be held responsible. All the original accounts agree that the natives of Hispaniola were remarkable alike for their gentleness, their friendliness, and their generosity, and that they looked upon the Spaniards as superior beings that had descended from heaven. The son of the Admiral himself tells us that as time passed on, the Spaniards were guilty of “a thousand insolences, especially to the Indian women.” We have already seen how Columbus sent home five shiploads of inoffensive natives of Hispaniola to be sold in the Spanish markets.

It was easy now for the invaders to go one step farther in this process of subjugation. The capture of Caonabo had removed the last serious obstacle to a complete control of the island. Fernando tells us that the country now became so peaceable that “one single Christian went safely wherever he pleased.” Supreme power was now in the hand of the Admiral, and he determined to make use of it in the interest of that great object of his expedition which as yet had been completely unsuccessful.

In order that the call for gold might at length be gratified, he determined to impose a tribute on all the population of the island. The matter was thus provided for: Every Indian above fourteen years old who was in the vicinity of the mines was required to pay every three months a little bellful of gold, and to take for it a brass or tin token, and to wear this about the neck, as a receipt or evidence that payment had been made. All persons not living in the vicinity of the mines were every three months to pay twenty-five pounds of cotton.

When this order was issued, the natives were thrown into something like despair. They asserted that they knew not how to collect the gold, and that the gathering of so large an amount would be impossible. The cacique of the Royal Vega tried to persuade the Admiral to modify the order. He offered to convert the whole of the Royal Vega, stretching from Isabella to the sea on the opposite shore, into a huge farm, which would supply the whole of Castile with bread, on condition that the tribute in gold should be relaxed; but Columbus would not accept the proposition, as he wished to collect such objects of value as he could take back to Spain.

It was found impossible to enforce the requirements imposed. The gold in requisite amounts could not be found. Columbus was therefore obliged to modify his demands. In some instances the amounts called for were lessened; in some the nature of the demand was modified; in others service was accepted in place of tribute.