Panama to Patagonia

by Charles M. Pepper

John Quincy Adams’ Advice—Canning’s Trade Statesmanship—Lack of Industrial and Commercial Element—Excess of Benevolent Impulse—Forgotten Chapters of the Doctrine’s History—The Ecuador Episode—President Roosevelt’s Interpretation—Diplomatic Declarations—Spectres of Territorial Absorption—Change Caused by Cuba—Progress of South American Countries—European Attitude on Economic Value of Latin America—German and English Methods—Proximity of Markets to United States Trade Centres—Conclusion.

WHEN John Quincy Adams was Secretary of State, he issued instructions to the minister accredited to Colombia after that country’s recognition as an independent Republic. They related to the negotiation of a commercial treaty with a single nation, but their blunt advice might have been given to all Spanish America. “Let Colombia,” wrote Secretary Adams, “look to commerce and navigation, and not to empire.”

I have shown in the preceding chapters how the West Coast countries are looking to navigation, and to the commerce that comes from the railway which was undreamed when Secretary Adams issued his instructions to the minister to Colombia. They have laid the bases of industrial development in public works and private enterprise. They have prepared the approach to financial stability which is demonstrated by the adoption of the gold standard and the very marked success of some of them in maintaining it. They have given a hint of the possibility of refunding national obligations and of the profitable employment of reproductive savings. They have sought to induce the currents of immigration, which in the case of South America never will rise with the phenomenal flood of the great West, but which may be expected to grow in depth and movement. They have given the proofs of political progress in the substitution of civilian presidents, bankers and sugar-planters, for the old-time military dictators, and they are working out their own destinies after their own manner.

But what of the United States?

The United States, in its relations with South American countries during the eighty years since the monitory words of John Quincy Adams were written, has not dreamed of political empire, and, unfortunately for its international prestige, has not looked to trade dominion. The lack of a commercial and industrial basis for the Monroe Doctrine never has been fully appreciated by the nation which promulgated it and accepted the responsibility for maintaining it, though some understanding of this defect has been felt in the countries to which the Doctrine applies, and a keener realization has been shown in Europe.

Canning, by patient and adroit manœuvres, was able to consolidate the mercantile classes as a counter-irritant to the prejudices of the English aristocracy, which sympathized with the Holy Alliance in its war against republican institutions. His cold and calculating intellect perceived that the commerce which Spain had monopolized in her colonies was drifting to Great Britain as a result of their revolt, and he was resolved that it should be held. The threat was made to France that the independence of the colonies would be recognized in case Spain should seek to restore her former monopoly system and should attempt to stop the intercourse of England with them. When the British trade instinct began to manifest itself, the edifice of aristocratic intrigue crumbled. England supported the United States in the recognition of the revolted Spanish colonies, the Holy Alliance failed, and British merchants and manufacturers sought the channels which Canning’s statesmanship had opened for them. They never have ceased to follow those channels. Much later came Germany. But the United States always has been indifferent.

If they gave the subject any thought, public men failed to grasp why there was not invariably a warmer welcome to their promulgations, and why the grateful South Americans did not buy more goods in the United States. Now, sentiment alone does not bring trade. The Monroe Doctrine, beneficent as it has been, at no period has caused the sale of a dollar’s worth of merchandise in Southern markets. Nor in their most benevolent and belligerent moods, when ready to fight all Europe in behalf of some other Republic, have the North American people ever ordered an extra ship’s cargo from these markets. Fraternal sentiment does not change the currents of commerce, but commerce sometimes strengthens brotherly relations. And in this manner it will strengthen the Monroe principle by increasing the material interests of the United States, which in the past have been so immaterial in comparison with Europe. When they see and come in contact with the concrete Yankee nation as represented by trade and by industrial investments, the South Americans will understand better what the Monroe Doctrine is and why it is. The Panama Canal extends the responsibility of the United States. It enlarges the commercial opportunity commensurate with the increased responsibility, and the rest remains for the enterprise and the initiative of the individual citizen.

Since these commercial and industrial elements cannot be entirely divorced from political subjects and international policies, a brief review of the Monroe Doctrine in its historic and political aspect may be permitted.

Has national polity ever been more bragged about and less understood than this Doctrine? It was dogma, creed for the American people, but with the vaguest ideas of what it meant. Heretofore one fundamental error has obtained in the United States,—an error which explains why South America did not always welcome our paper assertions of it. In the loose discussion and affirmation of the principle we usually assumed that it was purely philanthropic, and that our national benevolence was to be exerted solely for the good of the weaker nations of the hemisphere,—an altruistic, even quixotic, mission on our part. Internationally our motives are benevolent, but the Monroe Doctrine was asserted in the first place for the welfare and the self-protection of the United States. When John Quincy Adams told Russia that the Western Hemisphere was not to be used territorially for the extension of monarchical institutions, he made the declaration for our own safety. When that official pronouncement was applied to the Spanish colonies which lately had secured their independence, the fear that the establishment of kingships on this continent would threaten the United States was what gave the declaration force as the will of the American people. Protection of the neighboring infant Republics was secondary. The United States was no more disinterested than was Canning in giving effect to the will of British commercial interests rather than to the prejudices of the British aristocracy against republican government.

Nor were the revolted colonies themselves in that formative period so averse to European alliances. Some of them began their republican careers under dictatorships, but others turned to Europe. O’Higgins, the liberator of Chile, would have had another viceroyalty with a deputy monarch from some European Power. La Plata, which is the Argentine Republic of to-day, sent the Rivadavia mission to Europe to borrow some member of a reigning house. It was Canning’s perception that the effort to maintain a balance of South American power by lending European princes as rulers would only add to the difficulties of preserving the European balance that caused the Rivadavia mission to be discountenanced.