Panama to Patagonia

by Charles M. Pepper

Seeds of Revolution Running Out—Educated Classes Not the Sole Conservative Force—President Candamo’s Peacemaking Administration—Crisis Precipitated by his Death—Triumph of Civil Party in the Choice of his Successor—President Pardo’s Liberal and Progressive Policies—Growth in Popular Institutions—Form of Peruvian Constitution and Government—Attitude of the Church—Rights of Foreigners—Sources of Revenue—Stubborn Adherence to Gold Standard—Interoceanic Canal’s Aid in the National Development.

WHEN Professor James Bryce wanted an apt illustration of the numerous elections in the United States, he compared them in their frequency to revolutions in Peru. The comparison was not unjust. Civil wars have occurred almost as often. The bloodiest drama was enacted as recently as 1895. In that year the streets of Lima were choked with corpses and ran with the blood of brother shed by brother. No one to-day can give a rational cause for it. A few years earlier, when Peru yet was prostrate at the feet of Chile, there were revolutions and counter-revolutions.

But the seeds of revolution do run out after centuries. The soil grows barren. The soil in this case is the mass of aboriginal population, the Indians and the mixed bloods, who have known only blindly to follow one chief or another. Slowly they learned that in the revolving of rulers they were no better off. An English monarchist repeated to me the story of an old Indian at Chosica. He was bent with age and hard work, was in rags and was a beggar. This was after the Spanish power had been broken and independence established. He came one day to the group of political chiefs who were then in control and were controlling for the benefit of themselves. They were eulogizing Liberty and the glory of having done with kingships. The old fellow listened and then meekly remarked: “But, sirs, it is all the same. Under the viceroy I was a beggar. Under the Republic and your Honors, I am a beggar. I don’t see that Liberty means anything to poor old Juan Martinez.”

For the bulk of the inhabitants it has not been quite so bad, because even the republican semblance of government has been better training for them than the monarchical rule. Yet in the uprisings and counter-uprisings they were like the old beggar. Whatever dictator was in and was promulgating high-sounding proclamations of liberty, they were no better off than under his predecessor. They followed one cacique (chief or boss) or another, killed one another at his behest, and then settled back in the old way. But of late years the condition of the mass of the Indian and mixed population has improved. I take this statement on the evidence of discriminating foreigners, and not as a conclusion from my own observations, which were made within too short a period to afford a basis for comparison. It is the testimony of the Europeans that more than one ambitious leader has been willing to lead revolt when his faction lost, but he could not get followers or dupes, and therefore he acquiesced.

It is true also that the educated classes have become more stable and have put forth a stronger influence against political disturbances. Yet over-credit should not be given them, for the hot Spanish blood in all of them has not been brought down to an even temperature. This was very forcibly impressed on me during the Spring of 1903, when the presidential election was pending. Señor Miguel Candamo, for several years president of the Lima Chamber of Commerce, was the only candidate who had a political party back of him. He had been an influential supporter of the liberal administration of President Romaña. He was the choice of the Constitutionalists and Civilistas. There was another aspirant whose canvass was entirely personal. Besides the Civilistas the only important political organization was the Popular Democrats, who were supposed to represent the popular element, or the masses. They nominated no candidate, but they sought to control the Congress.

One of their leaders, Señor A——, calmly explained to me that they would get control of Congress, would declare the election null and void, and substitute their own man for Señor Candamo. He looked on this as perfectly legitimate politics. Señor A—— had been educated in the United States in order to have the benefit of free government, had spent his youth there, and after returning to Peru had held important public offices. When he was explaining to me the plans of his faction, the future of Peru hinged on the peaceful succession to President Romaña.

After Señor Candamo had been chosen for a faction which had not even proposed an opposing candidate, to seek to prevent his inauguration and put in its own man—who never had made even a pretence of seeking the suffrage of the electors—meant to precipitate, if not actual revolution, a condition fully as bad. It meant to destroy the confidence of foreign capital, and to take from Peru the prestige which she slowly was regaining among South American nations. It was inconceivable how a patriotic Peruvian could harbor a purpose of encouraging such a condition, and yet Señor A—— was intensely patriotic and ready to fight for his country.

The election was held, and some of the hot-heads, among whom was Señor A——, did undertake to question the result, and for a brief period the fate of Peru trembled in the balance. It was settled by the stern displeasure of General Nicolas de Pierola, the former President, himself the chief actor in many revolutions and at that time the leader of the Popular Democratic party. He told his radical followers that insurrection against the government would be treason to the nation, and Señor Candamo was inaugurated with his support.

In this incident I do not mean to lose sight of the real significance, which was that patriotism did triumph, but it was in spite of Señor A—— and a group of highly educated Peruvians, like himself, who would have revolted if they could have been sure of enough followers. It showed that Peru’s educated classes were not yet educated to the point where they alone could be trusted with the destinies of their country, but that the bulk of the population, this common clay, was acquiring a conservatism which insured the future. Let hard times come and there may be some discontent among this mass, yet it will not be moulded to the ambitious purposes of selfish leaders so easily as formerly. The national policy on which Peru has entered is one that, by the material development which it promises and the industrial and agricultural prosperity which its carrying out assures, is a guaranty, so far as administrative measures can be, against economic depression, and consequently of conservatism among the mass of the people.

Another test came when, a few months after President Candamo’s inauguration, he was taken ill and in May, 1904, died. He had been conspicuously and honorably identified with the history of Peru, had the confidence of the whole people, and especially of the commercial classes both foreign and native. His programme had been purely a civilian one. All the political parties had been harmonized and were supporters of his administration. His death inevitably brought on a contest for the succession. In this struggle there was to be an alignment of political organizations. Again Peru was approaching a crisis which would test her stability, and show the world whether confidence could be placed that the progressive career on which she had entered would be uninterrupted by domestic dissensions.